Informed by silence by Paddock, Jeff
CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 
TOTAL OF 10 PAGES ONLY 
MAY BE XEROXED 
(Without Author's Pennission) 



St.John's 
INFORMED BY SILENCE 
by 
© Jeff Paddock 
A thesis submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
Department of Philosophy 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland 
June 2000 
Newfoundland 
Abstract 
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Phi/osophicus seeks to demonstrate the 
activity of purging from philosophical and scientific discourse all expressions ofthought 
that are not stated clearly in a way that allows their veracity to be determined through 
truth-functional analysis; however, he concedes the language in which he expresses this 
project falls short of his standard for acceptable discourse and therefore cannot define his 
project didactically. This apparent contradiction has fostered both criticisms and 
reinterpretations of the Tractatus. The critic Gellner on this ground dismisses the text as 
meaningless while Feibleman faults Wittgenstein for denying rather than embracing the 
metalanguage the Tractatus employs along with its metaphysical implications. Those 
reinterpreting Wittgenstein' s project read into the Tractatus elements he expressly rejects: 
Kantians such as Pears, the synthetic a priori and a transcendental standpoint; 
phenomenologists such as Black, reflexivity; and semiotical analysts such as Brown, a 
triadic rather than gapless dyadic relation of world, language and meaning. Nieli's and 
Edwards' presentations expose Wittgenstein's predilection for the ineffable truths of 
religion, ethics and esthetics for which the Tractatus clears a space in limiting sensible 
discourse to propositions of natural science. In this light, one must take seriously 
Wittgenstein' s rejection of the metaphysical discourse the Tractatus employs, thereby 
allowing what Wittgenstein leaves to silence to inform debates regarding criticisms and 
reinterpretations based on what are clearly false readings of the Tractatus as a 
metaphysical treatise: in other words, letting the message of what he does not say show 
what is not meant by what he does say. As Marion demonstrates, Wittgenstein' s idea-
that one can never say what philosophy is but can only do it- is expressed and evolves 
during Wittgenstein's lifetime in his treatment of mathematics as anti-Platonist 
constructivism employing operations without classes. Following through on the radical 
implications of this approach, Wittgenstein abandons his Tractarian belief in a solitary 
pure transformational language of scientific discourse in favour of multitudinous ordinary 
language games. Wittgenstein' s final anti-standpoint leaves him wlnerable to charges 
his approach is nonrational and mystical. 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, on Wittgenstein's account in the book's 
Preface, functions to "draw a limit. .. to the expression of thoughts''' in order to deem 
nonsensical and purge from philosophical discourse all expressions of thought that are not 
stated clearly. The Tract a/us itself is, of course, an expression of thoughts - thoughts 
Wittgenstein holds to have "truth"2 but whose expression in this book, he concedes, has 
"fallen far short of the possible"3• By implication, Wittgenstein is warning readers at the 
outset that the book he has crafted for the express purpose of delimiting the expressibility 
of thoughts may have itself transgressed that limit by failing to state the thoughts behind 
it with sufficient clarity and sensibility and thereby fallen into nonsensical discourse. 
This potential failing of the book would be a fatal one for the Tractatus on its own terms 
for the reason of logical necessity were it not for the fact that Wittgenstein evidently 
leaves open the possibility that thought can transcend clear expressions of thought. The 
book, he says, functions to draw a limit "not to thinking, but to the expression of 
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden (New 
York: Routledge, 1990), p. 27. 
2 Tractatus, p. 29. [emphasis Wittgenstein's] 
3 Tractatus, p. 29. 
sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)'"': 
that is to say, while one cannot think beyond the limit of thought, one can indeed think 
beyond the limit of the clear expression of thoughts as one must do in order to determine 
where that limit of expressibility should be drawn. Moreover, he states that the Tractatus 
"will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the 
thoughts which are expressed in it''s. Clearly, then, he believes that while any articulation 
that transgresses the limit of the expressibility of thought is "nonsense'~, thought can 
nonetheless clearly think that which has not been clearly articulated. In other words, that 
a statement is nonsensical is not sufficient reason to judge the thoughts it purports to 
represent to be meaningless. So, while Wittgenstein's Tractatus may well fail to express 
with clarity some or all of the thoughts it purports to represent and therefore fall into 
nonsense to the extent that it fails in this regard, yet the thoughts it purports to represent 
may be no less true, on Wittgenstein's view, than if they had been expressed with clarity. 
Though he challenges others to "come and do it better''7 by expressing with greater clarity 
the thoughts behind it, Wittgenstein seems content for the time being that his Tractatus 
should serve to point out that there is a limit to the expressibility of thought, even if it 
fails to define that limit adequately. 
4 Tractatus, p. 27. [parentheses Wittgenstein's] 
s Tractatus, p. 27. 
6 Tractatus, p. 27. 
7 Tractatus, p. 29. 
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Chapter D - Traaseeadiag Artieulability: 
What What Wittgeasteia Doesn't Say Says 
Wittgenstein intends, in his Tractatus, to lay the groundwork for a new pure 
language of inquiry that reflects the primacy of the propositional function. On his 
analysis, everything in the world is divided into two aspects: the objective and the logical. 
The objective aspect involves simple objects, which are real -but these objective 
simples are not the basic elements of experience. Experience encounters these simples 
already combined, as complexes that he calls facts. 8 All facts are finite combinations of 
objective simples. The world is nothing more than the totality of facts. The other aspect, 
the logical, is also composed of simples, which he calls names - but these names are not 
the basic elements of logical experience. Experience encounters these simples already 
combined, as complexes he calls propositions.9 The general form of a proposition is: 
Such and such is the case. 10 Elementary propositions - the simplest propositions -are 
truth-functions of themselves, and the act of verifying the proposition consists of 
determining whether the "such and such is the case" that the proposition asserts is true or 
8 Tractatus, section 1.1 and following. 
9 Tractatus, section 3.1 and following. 
10 Tractatus, section 4.5. 
s 
One who seeks to critique Wittgenstein' s project on its own terms, then, is 
charged with the rather difficult task of rescuing thoughts Wittgenstein takes to be true 
from language expressing those thoughts that Wittgenstein calls inadequate. How does 
one analyze thoughts the author purports to be true when the expression of those thoughts 
that becomes the focus of such a critique is, by the author's own admission, to some 
extent nonsensical under the very notion of ~nonsense' that the work defines? If language 
is not a vehicle adequate to the task of articulating the position, then with what other 
vehicle can the position be presented for analysis? Moreover, can a position that 
transcends expressibility become the proper subject of rational philosophical discourse at 
all, or is it, rather, a religious doctrine that can be accepted only on the basis of faith or a 
mystical epiphany of some sort? It is with questions such as these in mind that some 
analysts have rejected the Tractatus as internally incoherent. Others, to save the work, 
have read into certain propositions of the Tractatus general conclusions about the 
author's intent that seem to contradict other propositions in the text, especially those 
warning against the embrace of metaphysical discourse. Conclusions based on generally 
indefensible readings of the Tractatus, it will be argued, are false. 
The present thesis is that it is possible to salvage Wittgenstein's project as defined 
in the Prefac:= to the Tractatus - that is, to successfully show a truth without articulating it 
- by allowing that which Wittgenstein relegates to silence to inform contradictory and 
therefore indefensible readings of his text. Put another way, the thesis is that what what 
Wittgenstein doesn't say says shows what what Wittgenstein says doesn't say and thereby 
demonstrates the efficacy of demonstration for the conveyance of truth. To accomplish 
the tas~ it will be useful to present fair analyses of, first, the place of silence in the 
Tractatus; second, the place of nonsense in the Tractatus; third, certain critical 
reinterpretations of the Tractatus; and, fourth, the place of mathematics in the Tractatus. 
On its way to proving the thesis, this project will show: 
L that Wittgenstein's project in the Tractatus is vulnerable to the charge that it is 
grounded in unarticulated, ineffable epiphany; 
II. that the project not only contains fundamental contradictions that leave it unclear 
and therefore, in Wittgenstein's terms, nonsensical but, moreover, that these 
'nonsensical' assertions are so integral to the project that its prospects survive or 
fall on theirs; 
lll. that the project does not survive if reinterpreted as a 'critique' in the Kantian 
sense, a 'phenomenology' in the Husserlian sense, or a work of semiotics; and 
IV. that Wittgenstein, to rescue the intent of his project, must undertake a shift in 
approach -a shift that is epitomized by his shift in approach regarding 
mathematics. 
4 
false. General propositions, in tum7 are truth-functions of elementary propositions. 11 
There is a perfect correspondence between true propositions and facts~ and that 
correspondence is a pictorial correspondence such that true propositions depict facts. 12 
Nothing can be said of any meaning or truth about the world that is not a true proposition 
about a fact. One cannot encounter the world meaningfully in the absence of this 
correspondence: true propositions and facts are the indivisible aspects of every 
experience. Experience is in this way apprehended at all times pictorially. 
While on Wittgenstein' s analysis the world has this duality of aspects, he does not 
maintain that there is a real duality of realms. The factual and propositional aspects of 
reality are not themselves facts. The factual and propositional aspects of reality are 
indivisible features of a world we apprehend as a unified totality. There is no sense in 
which we can have one without the other. This presents a special challenge for 
Wittgenstein as he writes the Tractatus, for he is attempting to present in propositional 
discourse, not a tact of reality, but an explanation of what propositional discourse has in 
common with the factual reality is depicts. Since the objects of philosophical discourse 
are encountered as facts nowhere in the world7 therefore philosophical discourse fails to 
11 Tractatus, section 5 and following. 
12 Tractatus, section 2.1 and following. 
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meet the test of that which can be stated sensibly and clearly. 13 Wittgenstein makes clear 
the logical relation binding propositionally-articulated pictures of facts to the facts they 
depict cannot itself be articulated in clear, truth-functional propositional discourse. 14 
So, while Wittgenstein, in making this point, calls into question the validity of 
much if not all of the great corpus of philosophical discourse preceding his work, he also 
cannot avoid calling into question the Tractatus itself. Indeed, he evidently concedes this 
very point when he writes, in the penultimate section of this work: 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
after he has climbed up on it.) 
He must sunnount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly .15 
The function of philosophy, then, is neither to produce a corpus of true propositions about 
the world (for this is the activity of natural science16) nor to produce in propositional 
language an explanation of how true propositions present a picture of the world (for this 
13 Tractatus, section 4.003. 
'" Tractatus, section 4.12 and following. 
15 Tractatus, section 6.54. [parentheses Wittgenstein's] 
16 Tractatus, section 4.11. 
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cannot be stated17); rather, philosophy is the activity of making propositions clear. 11 On 
his view, philosophy exposes the logical fonn of reality- that is, how propositions 
picture the world - in an indirect way by making propositions clear and sensible. 19 
Propositions that purport to state what philosophy does are not truth-functional, depict 
nothing in the world and, therefore, have no sense. 
Donald Peterson analyzes the way in which Wittgenstein divides possible 
discourse into three categories: representational language, which is comprehended by 
truth·propositional discourse and covers the breadth of natural science; non· 
representational language, which has proper syntactical fonn but whose propositions have 
no 'sense' (evidently meaning in this case they have no 'reference'); and nonsensical 
language, which comprises the pseudo·representational statements of ethics, esthetics, 
religion20 and, arguably, metaphysics. In order for this division of discourse to be valid, it 
must be inarticulable, for the only kind of discourse that can purport to describe this 
division is the pseudo-representational, whose statements are nonsensical. 
17 Tractatus, section 4.12. 
11 Tractatus, section 4.112. 
19 Tractatus, section 4.121. 
20 Donald Peterson, Wittgenstein 's Early Philosophy: Three Sides of the Mirror 
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990), pp. 166-167. 
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Wittgenstein's harsh judgment on the veracity of traditional (though not his own) 
philosophical discourse was bought freely by adherents of the movement, situated largely 
in Vienna, that came to be known as logical positivism. The Vienna Circle of logical 
positivists included RudolfCarnap who, in 1932, published in the Circle's journal, 
Erkenntnis, the definitive and influential article of the movement entitled "Die 
Oberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprachen (which is, in 
translation, "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of 
Language") in which he argued that 
[t]hrough the development of modem logic it has become possible to give 
a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification 
of metaphysics.... In the realm of metaphysics (including all value-theory 
and norm-science) logical analysis leads to the negative conclusion that 
the alleged statements in this area are totally meaningless. Thus is 
achieved a radical victory over metaphysics, which, from the earlier anti-
metaphysical standpoints, was not possible.21 
By "meaningless", Camap means "pseudo-statement" (Scheinsatz), where a pseudo-
statement contains either meaningless words or meaningful words strung together in 
defiance of the rules of proper syntax, in either case rendering the statement incapable of 
being judged according to truth-functional logic. "The meaning of a statement lies in the 
method of its verification"22, where verification is grounded in empirical observation and 
21 Rudolf Camap, "Die Oberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der 
Sprache", Erlcenntnis, Band 2, Heft 4, p. 220, trans. Arthur Pap. In Nieli, p. 7. [emphasis 
and parentheses in the document quoted; brackets mine] 
22 Carnap, Er/cenntnis, p. 236. In Nieli, p. 8. 
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the logical derivation of statements on the basis of defined 'protocol statements'. Carnap 
in this way dismisses as meaningless such concepts as metaphysics~ God~ the thing·in-
itself, and a host of other such terms of speculative metaphysics. 
Russell Nieli23 has noted that Camap's polemic against metaphysics is here far 
stronger than the conciliatory approach to metaphysics laid out in his book Der logische 
Aujbau der Welt published four years earlier. Carnap- in the Foreword of the second 
edition of the Aujbau and elsewhere- credits Wittgenstein's Tractatus for his adoption of 
the more polarized view that comes to characterize logical positivism. Yet, Camap later 
comes to recognize that he and Wittgenstein do not see eye·to·eye on the purpose of the 
Tractatus. Camap indicates in his "Intellectual Autobiography .. that something about 
Wittgenstein's approach bothered him. In Camap's view, Wittgenstein not only had the 
"attitude" and "point of view" of "a creative artist ... a religious prophet or a seer'', but 
also defended both religion itself and the metaphysical statements of a speculative 
philosopher against attacks by a member of the Vienna Circle. 24 Camap indicates he had 
a suspicion upon fust meeting Wittgenstein that the author who so greatly influenced him 
23 Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language: A Study of 
Viennese Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Albany, NY: State 
University ofNew York Press, 1987). 
24 Rudolf Camap, "'Intellectual Autobiography", The Philosophy of Rudolf 
Carnap, Paul Arthur Schlipp (ed.) (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1963), 
pp. 25-27. In Nieli, pp. 64-65. 
10 
regarded science and mathematics, not in the manner of the members of the Vienna 
Circle, but in contrast with ''an attitude of indifference and sometimes even with 
contempt"25• Camap stated: 
[e]arlier, when we were reading Wittgenstein's book in the Circle, I had 
erroneously believed that his attitude toward metaphysics was similar to 
ours. I had not paid sufficient attention to the statements in his book about 
the mystical because his feelings and thoughts in this area were too 
divergent from mine. Only personal contact with him helped me to see 
more clearly his attitude at this point. 26 
W.D. Hudson also paraphrases Engelmann's description of the divergence, saying 
"whereas the logical positivists thought that what we can speak about is all that matters in 
life, Wittgenstein believed all that really matters to be precisely what we must be silent 
about".27 
This divergence of views distinguishing Wittgenstein from Carnap and other 
logical positivists is critical. Historically, the positivist movement is mortally wounded 
by the criticism that its very existence rests on the use of language that fails to meet the 
rigid tests laid out in positivist documents for detennining whether propositions make 
25 Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography", p. 28. In Nieli, p. 66. 
26 Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography", p. 27. [n Nieli, p. 68. [brackets mine] 
27 W.D. Hudson, "The Light Wittgenstein Sheds on Religion", Aesthetics, Ethics 
and Religion, Volume 14 of The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, John V. Canfield { ed.) (New 
York: Garland, 1986}, p. 342. 
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sense. Unlike Wittgenste~ positivists cannot fall back on the argument that the 
statements grounding their approach are imperfect representations of a truthful but 
ineffable conception of the world. For positivists, statements that make no sense-
including those defining their movement- have no purchase whatsoever, nor is there, for 
them, any sense in that which cannot be stated clearly. The positivists are left with no 
way to ground, as meaningful, the activity that defines them. 
On Nieli's view, Wittgenstein project is grounded on the assumption that some 
subjects of thought and discourse whose sentences do not meet the test of what can be 
clearly and sensibly expressed in truth-propositional language are not to be eliminated 
from thought and discourse but rather to be distinguished and protected from the 
constraints of truth-propositional discourse. It is particularly the language of religion, 
ethics and esthetics that Wittgenstein intends to rescue, Nieli says. Nieli illustrates 
Wittgenstein's appreciation for mystical writings by citing the author's manifest high 
regard for the works of St. Augustine, Seren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevski, William 
James, and George Fox (the founder of the Quaker movement).21 Furthermore, Nieli 
points to a passage referring to one of the lectures Wittgenstein gave soon after returning 
to philosophy in 1929 in which he describes the foundation of ethics. 
He describes this experience of being "absolutely safe"; it is a "state of 
mind in which one is inclined to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me 
.,s N. 1" ... 
- le I, p. Xlll. 
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whatever happens'." This experience is offered by Wittgenstein as one of 
three types which constitute for him personally the tenninus of ethical 
inquiry.... Ethical inquiry for Wittgenstein is a truth-seeking inquiry ... 
which delves into "what is really important", "into the meaning of life", 
"into what makes life worth living". Further on in the Lecture, 
Wittgenstein links the absolute safety experience in religious literature, 
equating it with the experience of being "safe in the hands of God". 29 
Nieli also points to a passage in a memoir ofWittgenstein's sister Hermine in suggesting 
that, prior to his transfer from engineering to philosophy during or soon after 191 0, 
Wittgenstein may have had a mystical experience -an experience so profound that it led 
him to pursue philosophy in an attempt to ground or to recapture it. This is, of course, 
speculative on Nieli's part, but to support his assertion he points to the language of the 
memoir. While studying engineering, Hermine indicates, 
he was suddenly seized ( ergrifj) so strongly and so completely against his 
will by philosophy, i.e. by reflections about philosophical problems, that 
he suffered severely under his double and conflicting calling, and felt 
inwardly divided. One of several transformations which he was to 
undergo in his life had come over him and shaken his whole being. 30 
This, says Nieli, suggests Wittgenstein's switch to philosophy and, by implication, the 
particular philosophical path he chose may have been grounded in a mystical experience. 
If he initially pursues philosophy to reinforce an ineffable mystical experience, as these 
29 Nieli, p. 91, referencing "Wittgenstein' s Lectures on Ethics", Philosophical 
Review, 74, 1965. 
30Bemhard Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein (New York: New 
York University Press, 1976), p. 18. ln Nieli, p. 96n. [parentheses Nieli's] 
l3 
passages suggest, then it follows that the philosophy he produces will reserve a privileged 
place for the ineffable. 
This conclusion is shared by Ignace D'hert who, in Wittgenstein 's Relevance for 
Theology•, argues that Wittgenstein sees the system of truth-propositional discourse he 
creates in the Tractatus as being merely "a necessary transitional stage on the way to a 
right view of the worldn32• In D'hert's view, Wittgenstein deliberately omits from the 
world-view of the Tractatus those things that belong to a realm of the world that cannot 
be put into propositions: namely, the mystical realm. D'hert says the Tractatus is a rigid 
language-game whose rigidity nevertheless elicits in the person using it the question, 
unanswerable within the system, of why there is a world at all. The discourse, in saying 
so much about the world, concomitantly reveals its impotence to say anything to account 
for its own activity. By continually focusing on the ordinary world through the grid of 
truth-propositional discourse, D'hert says, one is more and more exposed to the 
"'character of mystery"33 implicit in the effort. "[l]t is essential for the business of 
philosophy (and consequently for his own work) that it should not forget that it is 
31 Ignace D'h~ Wittgenstein 's Relevance for Theology (Berne: Peter Lang Ltd., 
1978). 
32 D'hert, p. 33. 
33 D'hert, p. 140. 
14 
something provisional, that it is not itself the ultimate goal. "34 By leaving questions of 
the meaning of life outside the realm accessible to rational discourse, says D'hert, 
Wittgenstein joins Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer in paying allegiance to a realm that it 
beyond what reason can comprehend. 
Peterson says Wittgenstein in the Tractatus gives no original thoughts about the 
mystical or ineffable realm and, moreover, that it is his refusal to do so that imbues the 
Tractatus with its strength on this point. Unlike other presentations of the philosophy of 
language which ignore or reject the mystical, Wittgenstein clears a space where the 
mystical realm, recognized from ancient times to convey meaning through silence, can 
inhere and work in silence. 35 Peterson notes that William James, whose work 
Wittgenstein admired, identified in religious experience four factors - namely, 
ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity - that can be found prominently at 
work in such religions as Japanese Zen Buddhism and its progenitor, Chinese Ch'an 
Buddhism.36 Peterson sees the same factors at play in artistic activities, such as painting 
and music, and other disciplines whose art or technique is taught or learned more despite 
than through the medium of language. Peterson contends the Tractatus is intended to 
34 D'hert, p. 33. [brackets mine] 
35 Peterson, p. 158. 
36 Peterson, p. 154. 
15 
function in the same way. 
The common theme in all literature of mysticism, on Nieli's view, is what Rudolf 
Otto references with the tenn 'ganz andere'- which, loosely translated, means 'wholly 
other' .37 A similar tenn, used by Pseudo-Dionysius, is' ixrrram~'- 'ek-stasis' or 
'standing outside'.31 In Nieli's words: 
[t]he absorption of consciousness away from its fanner dwelling, its flash-
entrance into a non-multiplicitous, transcendent realm, is so spectacular 
and emotion-laden, that a declaration of the ontological distance from the 
events and things of the everyday world, i.e., a declaration of being ganz 
andere, is very often seen as the only adequate way of expressing the 
experience. Such a method of theological symbolization was known in 
Latin Christendom as the via negativa or ''negative way" (negative 
theology). By [enumerating] all the categories and concepts of earthly 
things, and the nature of God in relation to them as ganz andere, the via 
negativa stood, frrst of all, as the most appropriate manner of expressing 
the pureness of the divine nature; and second, as a meditative aid whereby 
all the realms of being less than God might be contemplated and 
transcended in an effort to reach (and renew) the peak of the mystic 
flight.39 
Mysticism, then, treats the ordinary world and the transcendent realm as wholly other 
than one another such that the language of the former is inadequate to defme the latter, 
except perhaps by enumerating the ordinary world in an attempt to create a space where 
37 Nieli, p. 7ln. 
31 Nieli, pp. 74-75 and 75n. 
39 Nieli, p. 73. [parentheses Nieli's; brackets mine] 
16 
the transcendent is free to appear. 
Peterson is not convinced the demarcation is as severe as he believes Wittgenstein 
suggests. He points out that the religious and esthetic realms are commonly taken to be 
accessible to some extent through the language of poetry and metaphor, for example, and 
that the lack of literalness of metaphors, which are ubiquitous in language, is a matter of 
degree. uordinary discourse contains a multitude ofhalf-dead metaphors, and these 
words owe some of their semantic resonance to their original non-metaphorical meanings, 
as is brought out if there is 'mixing'. ,.,40 Yet, he concedes Wittgenstein is focusing on 
something that is generally outside factual discourse: ''something behind, rather than 
inside, the great mirror'wt. Peterson disagrees, though, that one can then conclude that, to 
the extent that the boundary comprehending factual discourse can be determined through 
the delineation and expression of factual propositions, the realm of the mystical is also 
defined since the factual and the mystical share and are mutually detennined by a 
common perimeter. For one thing, the factual is bounded by not only the mystical but 
also the syntactical; and, secondly, one can never be sure that a proposition purporting 
and appearing to be factual is fact-stating since Wittgenstein provides no method of 
40 Peterson, p. 159. 
41 Peterson, p. 159. 
li 
analysis to test the individual case.'12 Wholly determining the boundary setting off the 
mystical, then, is on Peterson's view not a task one can hope to accomplish; yet, despite 
the imprecision of the demarcation and the consequent amorphousness of the mystical 
realm, there is this space whose contents stand outside the realm of factual discourse but 
are not merely reference-less syntactic propositions. 
In the Tractatus itself, despite its intransigence on matters of metaphysics, one can 
find explicit justification for the thesis that Wittgenstein is attempting to protect rather 
than merely to dismiss the disciplines of ethics, esthetics and religion from the rigours of 
truth·functional discourse. Nieli says he began to recognize Wittgenstein's intent in this 
regard when he reflected "on the meaning of the term 'world', and of the mystical or 
higher reality (das Mystische, Hoeheres) which lay outside and beyond the world"43 • 
Everything in the Tractatus, I came to realize, - the musical cadence, its 
logical system of"the world", the say/show itself distinction, the remarks 
on timelessness, the mystical, silence, etc. - begins to fall into its proper 
place once the world is seen in its function as a ladder in the mystical 
ascent along the via negativa.~ 
"World" is a term Wittgenstein defines early in the Tractatus (in proposition land 
following) as the totality of facts such that no facts lie outside the world and nothing of 
42 Peterson, pp. 160·161. 
"
3 Nieli, p. xi. [parentheses Nieli's] 
44 Nie1i, p. xii. 
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the world transcends the facts. Later in the Tractatus (in proposition 6 and following), he 
adds that the meaning and value of the world must lie outside the world since meaning 
and value are not what they are unless we take them to be non-accidental. In proposition 
6.432t he goes even further by indicating God does not reveal himself in the world. 
Meaning, value and God - if they are taken to matter - must be viewed as nonfactual, non-
accidental and beyond the world. Wittgenstein evidently believes the logical positivists 
are wrong to conclude nothing beyond the world matters. In Nieli's words: 
... the "world" Wittgenstein was delineating in the Tractatus was just the 
world one stands outside of (ek-stasis) in the mystic flight, the logical 
system of the Tractatus being a precise delineation of the profane world 
which is left behind in the transcendental encounter with the Sacred. One 
might call proposition 6.432 - "God does not reveal himself in the world" -
the Tractatus in miniature."5 
Put another way: "[t]he sacrality of God is thus established symbolically by a de-
sanctification of all that is less than God.·~ D 'hert says this activity of de-sanctification 
of the ordinary reveals that "any language which wants to talk about what is beyond the 
realm of natural science cannot and should not use the truth-functional model of 
language"'" but requires a kind of discourse appropriate to its extra-rational nature. 
"
5 Nieli, p. 98. [parentheses Nieli's] 
o16 Nieli, p. 107. 
"
7 D'hert, p. 35. 
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One can see, then, how logical positivists and mystics, while sharing a common 
opposition to attempts to express in the language of philosophy - i.e., as speculative 
metaphysics - the nature of mystical experience, nevertheless fmd themselves opposed to 
such a project for entirely different reasons: the logical positivists because such 
statements transgress the limits of what can be stated sensibly, and the mystics because 
such statements profane and subordinate to the constraints of truth-propositional 
discourse that which cannot be stated as such. Nieli contends Wittgenstein's apparent 
agreement with the logical positivists on this point belies a radical disagreement on the 
fundamentals which is grounded in Wittgenstein's embrace of the mystical realm that 
logical positivists deny. Wittgenstein forbids the philosopher from articulating in the 
language of philosophy the mystical experiences of religion, not because they are 
meaningless, but because the validity and nature of such experiences can be only 
demonstrated, not stated. 41 Both the logical positivist and the mystic advise silence with 
respect to the mystical. In Nieli's words: 
[ s ]ilence may thus be held as the only manner of symbolization which 
does not profane, either by suggesting that the experience is an act of 
human will, or that the Reality revealed through it is like an everyday 
"thing" in the mundane world.49 
Nieli quotes Pseudo-Dionysius in the Theologia Mystica (chapter liD saying "when 
41 Nieli, p. 83. 
49 Nieli, p. 89. [brackets mine] 
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plunging into the Darkness which is above the intellec~ we pass not merely into brevity 
of speech~ but even into absolute silence. of thoughts as well as ofwords".50 
That silence on matters other than natural science, such as religion~ is chosen by 
Wittgenstein is clear in the final proposition of the Tractatus where he writes: 't.What one 
cannot speak about, one must pass over in silence.''51 It is also made clear in his Preface 
where he writes: "One could sum up the whole import of the book in the following 
words: what can be said at all can be said clearly; and what one cannot talk about one 
must pass over in silence."52 Silence. says D'hert, has the peculiar feature of needing 
language to form the boundary of the space in which it obtains. "Silence cannot be 
'expressed' in language. And yet, if it is to exist at all, it can only be through the means 
of language. It is only by means of words that silence can be created."n Words lead, not 
to knowledge, but to a place (or a state of mind or a condition of being) in which a naive, 
unfiltered view of the world is possible. "They draw attention in a negative way to what 
is not yet present but is to come."s4 D.Z. Phillips describes the transition from 
articulation to silence as a "stopping" and says there is a natural resistance to this 
50 Nieli, p. 89. 
51 Tractatus, section 7. 
52 Tractatus, p. 27. 
53 D'hert, p. 140. 
S4 D'hert, p. 141. [emphasis D'hert's] 
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arresting of articulatio~ as if one has stated only in a preliminary way something that 
needs further explanation: Quoting Wittgenstein, he points out that what we often take to 
be preliminary is actually the fmal solution and efforts to articulate further "explanations, 
justifications and foundations" of this solution only serve to distort. 55 Silence and 
acquiescence, says Phillips, are what we ordinarily choose when we put an end to inquiry 
and initiate an activity on the presumption that the subject of the inquiry has been 
adequately, though only approximately, justified. 56 Though we ordinarily end inquiry in 
particular instances - for example, when we stop asking whether this thing before us is a 
person and proceed to behave as if that is the case - Wittgenstein is concerned with 
ending inquiry and adopting silence regarding an entire component of existence:~ das 
kfystische' or the mystical. In Wittgenstein's 'pictorial' theory of language in which true 
propositions 'picture' true facts, the truth-propositional discourse itself- as a singular 
corpus- serves as a 'picture' in that it silently ~shows' something about the way things 
are; or, rather, the way things are silently ~shows' itself through the activity of the 
discourse. As Wittgenstein puts it in the Tractatus, "There is of course the unspeakable 
[Unaussprechliches: inexpressible, ineffable]. It shows itself[sich zeigen: manifests 
itself]; it is the Mystical. "57 
ss D.Z. Phillips, "Wittgenstein's Full Stop'', Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
Willgenstein, Irving Block (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981 ), p. 179. 
56 Phillips, p. 356. 
57 Tractatus, sec:tion 6.522. [emphasis Wittgenstein's; brackets mine] 
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Behind the silence that both unites and divides Wittgenstein and the logical 
positivists is, therefore, a difference that fundamentally disconnects the fonner from the 
latter. Wittgenstein is silent because he is waiting to see what cannot be spoken while the 
logical positivists are silent because there is nothing 'unspeakable' to be seen. The 
silence that is to Wittgenstein pregnant is to the logical positivists vacant. Logical 
positivists believe that through truth-functional propositional discourse one can say all 
that can be said~ while Wittgenstein believes defining truth-functional propositional 
discourse accomplishes little despite solving so much. 51 Therefore~ the logical positivist 
will fill the silence with discourse while Wittgenstein will as much as possible push the 
discourse aside the let what is hidden in the silence peer through. That the distinction is 
critical to Wittgenstein is evident in a letter from Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell 
critiquing Russell's comments on the unpublished Tractarus, where Wittgenstein states: 
[n]ow I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to 
which the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The 
main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions 
-i.e. by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and 
what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); 
which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. 59 
Nieli says the relevance of this distinction between what can be expressed 
58 Tractatus, p. 29. 
59 G.E.M. Anscombe~ An Introduction to Willgenstein 's Tractatus (Philadelphia: 
University ofPennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 161. In Nieli, p. 113. [parentheses in the 
work quoted; brackets mine] 
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(gesagt) and what can only be shown (gezeigt) is revealed in Wittgenstein's treatment of 
what a picture of reality has in common with the reality it claims to represent. That this 
relation cannot be stated is made clear by Wittgenstein in subsections of proposition 4 of 
the Tractatus~ where he indicates "[t]he proposition shows the logical fonn ofreality'960 
and "(t]he proposition can represent (depict) the whole of reality but it cannot represent 
what it must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it • i.e., logical 
form ... "61 • If the picture of reality, which propositions are, is taken to be a road map, one 
cannot discuss the relation of the map with the actual road network unless one can step 
outside the world of facts and language~ which is not possible. The proposition can show 
what reality is like, but the relation between the two cannot be stated, Nieli says. 62 
Language is part of reality and cannot step outside its own limitations. Nieli puts it like 
this: 
What language shares with the reality it depicts that shows or manifests 
itself but cannot be said, is just its in-the-world structure. This structure 
cannot be described by language because it is a property possessed only by 
virtue of, and in contrast to~ the out-of-the-world mystic flight • the flight 
(i.e., consciousness disattention~ intensification~ and absorption) into a 
sacred realm. It is this contrast.63 
60 Tractatus, section 4.121. [emphasis Wittgenstein's; brackets mine] 
61 Tractatus, section 4.12. [parentheses Wittgenstein~s; brackets mine] 
62 Nieli, pp. 114.115. 
63 Nie1i, p. liS. [emphasis and parentheses Nieli's] 
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Furthennore!t "[i]n this flight, logic represents the'/' in the in/out traveloguen.64 Nieli 
says there are two kinds of showing going on here concomitantly: there is the showing of 
what lies beyond the world, and there is also the showing of the mutual relation of 
language and the world it depicts, taken together, to what lies beyond the world, that 
relation being the logical form. Meaning is outside the realm of fact but involves the 
world of facts; and this meaning is shown to be a transcendence that anchors the veracity 
of the world of facts by allowing the world to be meaningful to the individual. One might 
say the search for meaning is proof of the veracity of meaning. 
The role of the say/show distinction in grounding Wittgenstein's ethics is James 
Edwards' concern in Ethics Without Philosophy, in which he says "showing is an escape 
hatch from the realm of nonsense'~5 not just for logic, which Wittgenstein seeks to rescue 
whole from the theory of types Russell proffers to counter a troublesome paradox 
regarding class membership, but also for ethics. Ethics, concerned with what a human 
being should do - or, more fundamentally, with the meaning and purpose of life - is 
grounded in the broader question of what it is to be a human being, which Edwards says 
has been bound up in Western philosophy since Socrates with the capacity to think: to 
represent sub specie aeternitatis, which means, inevitably, to represent the ideal human, 
64 Nieli!t p. 116. (brackets Nieli's] 
65 James C. Edwards, Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Lifo 
(Tampa: University Presses of Florid~ 1982), p. 15. 
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sub specie aeternitatis. 66 Ethics, unlike matters of contingent fact, must involve matters 
of necessity, for otherwise there is no way notions of good and evil can be either 
determinative or prescriptive~ Edwards seems to say.67 Necessity, Wittgenstein contends, 
is found in the conditions of representation, not in what is represented. The conditions of 
representation are such that any picture, to be a picture that can show something, must, 
first, be structurally complex such that there are elements that stand discretely apart from 
one another or form boundaries against one another; and, second, comprehend 
relationships among elements that can be measured and compared against the 
relationships obtaining in that which is to be ~pictured' or represented; and, together, 
these aspects constitute the logical form of the picture, which Wittgenstein takes to 
correspond to the logical form of that which is being pictured.61 It is by standing back 
from this rigid structure of the world, allowing its necessary structure to reveal itself as 
such, and feeling oneself to be outside the structure as the limit of the structure possessing 
an attitude towards the structure that one can encounter the meaning of life; so in this way 
philosophy - the process of coming to tenns with the structure - is an activity of ethics: 
an encounter with the meaning oflife.69 Meaning is shown when the structure of things 
with the self at their limit is shown. 
66 Edwards, p. 22. 
67 Edwards, p. 27. 
61 Edwards, pp. 13-14. 
69 Edwards, pp. 32-48. 
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How showing occurs is grounded in the difference between science, concerned 
with contingent facts, and ethics, concerned with necessities. Hudson draws 
Wittgenstein's distinction in this way: '"The mystical' ... has to do with the questions: 
What is the meaning of all there is? and What has absolute value? He [Wittgenstein] 
thinks it logically impossible for the answer to either question to be something that 
. 
merely 'happens and is the case.' How can the sense of all things be just one more thing? 
How can absolute value be something that just happens?"70 Edwards says "if thought can 
reach no further than representation of contingent reality, then ethics, which has to do 
with discovering the noncontingent meaning of those contingencies, has nothing to do 
with thought."71 Edwards contends that the will, not thought, is what grounds 
noncontingency. Wittgenstein' s will, despite being connected with the self that sees and 
limits the world and despite being named for a faculty that is traditionally taken to be 
essentially active, is neither representational nor active. The will does not change the 
world but rather adopts an affective attitude towards the world it encounters - an attitude 
it can change. Edwards says the reading of a poem or an encounter with a religious text 
can profoundly affect how one sees the world: whether one is happy or unhappy with it. 
The world has not been changed, but how one sees it has. 72 
70 Hudson, p. 341. [emphasis Hudson's; brackets and omission mine] 
71 Edwards, p. 50. [emphasis Edwards'] 
72 Edwards, pp. 51-52. 
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What is said can be the vehicle for showing something that is unsayable. 
What is shown in ethics is das Mystische, and it is this which makes 
possible the good will that solves the problems of life. In ethics the 
doctrine of showing is fundamentally Wittgenstein 's attempt to connect the 
will to thought; it is his attempt to make explicable the way in which what 
can be said (thought, known, represented) can illuminate what cannot.73 
In other words, through the operation of showing, we can attend to and be changed by 
that which cannot be captured in representational propositions. Richard Brockhaus 
makes a point, similar to Edwards', that showing involves an alteration at the level of 
one's receptivity to the world rather than a manipulation of its elements. He notes that 
Wittgenstein nearly always uses .. showing" in the Tractatus in the passive sense while 
using "saying" in the active sense.'" 
On Edwards' view, showing functions to ground for us several truths: that logic 
mirrors the formal properties of language and the world; that logical tautologies are 
tautologous; that mathematical processes are reliably useful; and that one has the power 
to will the world to be a happy one. 's What is shown that cannot be stated is how these 
features of our encounter with the world can be necessarily true. Brockhaus, too, 
73 Edwards, p. 52. [emphasis and parentheses Edwards') 
7
" Richard R. Brockhaus, P11/ling Up the Ladder: The Metaphysical Roots of 
Wittgenstein 's "Tractatus Logico-Phi/osophicus" (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991 ), 
p. 184. 
7s Edwards, pp. 54-58. 
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identifies at the centre ofWittgenstein's work the question of how value is possible in a 
world of pure contingency76; or, to put the matter in another way, Wittgenstein is 
searching for the ground of freedom and therefore the possibility of morality in a 
contingent world. Wittgenstein achieves his aim by revealing how the world's 
contingency is framed by a rigid structure grounded in necessity. It turns out, as Edwards 
notes, that the necessary truths structuring reality are, in each case, a truth that is of 
practical use. Edwards says showing takes precedence over saying, not only because it is 
the only link available to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus between rational thought and the 
mystical will, n but moreover because the ethical - which is about what is done, 
practically, rather than what is said, representationally - takes precedence over the 
rational. 71 
With a view to the centrality of the say/show distinction to Wittgenstein's project 
and the priority of showing over saying, Nieli interprets the final propositions of the 
Tractatus, which read: 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
76 Brockhaus, p. 13. 
n Edwards, pp. 58-59. 
78 Edwards, pp. 64-66. 
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He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world 
aright. 
What one cannot speak about, one must pass over in silence. 79 
In this, Nieli sees a four·part movement: 
(1) there is the mystical ascent of the ladder, which the Tractatus may or may not be 
helpful in facilitating - something Wittgenstein suggests when he opens the 
Preface warning that the book may be understood only by those who have already 
thought the thoughts it expresses; 
(2) there is the vision of the world from the ek-static standpoint of one outside the 
world; 
(3) there is the transcending of the propositions via negativa, thereby leaving by 
default what cannot be said; and 
(4) there is silence in the face of what is left by default once what can be said is 
eliminated.10 
79 Tractatus, sections 6.54 and 7. 
80 Nieli, p. 118. 
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Yet, one is not merely silent but, moreover, in awe in the face of what is seen in light of 
what bas been transcended. That is because. in having achieved the ascent of language 
and abandoned language, one finally sees the world aright. 
Inasmuch as language serves more as a barrier than as a facilitator of genuine 
understanding in Wittgenstein' s system, the state of having-been-shown is far more 
personal and solitary than the state of having-been-told. This solitude is reinforced by 
Wittgenstein's construction of reality with the lone subject as its limit. In propositions 
5.632 and 5.62 of the Tractatus, respectively, he points out that '•[t]he subject does not 
belong to the world, but is a border of the world"11 and "(t)hat the world is my world, is 
shown by the fact that the boundaries of language ... mean the boundaries of my world"82• 
The subject is therefore outside the world and the world is there for the subject. This 
subject or 'I', says Nieli, is the 'I' of the ek-static which makes possible the unity of the 
world of experience and that which transcends it. The mystical experience that 
Wittgenstein is seeking to ground through demonstration is intensely personal and not in 
any way public, either immediately or indirectly through articulation.13 To see oneself in 
11 Tractatus, section 5.632. [brackets mine) 
12 Tractatus, section 5.62. [emphasis Wittgenstein's; brackets mine] 
13 Nieli, pp. 118-123. 
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the structure Wittgenstein proposes, as its limi~ is also to recognize how great the 
solitude is. for one is not then free to use language to bring others to that point of 
awareness to share in the vision. How one reaches the point is as solitary as the point 
itself. because that which one cannot hear to be said cannot be said in order to be heard by 
another. Yet, while one cannot say accurately within the medium of truth-propositional 
discourse what it is that what Wittgenstein doesn't say says, it is clear from what 
Wittgenstein says in demanding silence that the demand for silence is always something 
that has to be said to create the space in which the showing occurs. The solitude is 
created by the silence but the silence is created by language. The do-not-say always has 
to be said for the self to reveal itself in its genuine relation to the world. 
Nieli and Edwards have demonstrated effectively that Wittgenstein is not averse 
to appreciating the value of disciplines whose discourse fails to meet the test of clear 
truth-functional propositional discourse. Furthermore, Wittgenstein himself has made 
clear that ethics and esthetics, while not expressible in truth-propositional language. are 
not meaningless but transcendental. 114 Also, Wittgenstein has, in his Preface to the 
Tractatus, left open the possibility that thought can transcend that which can be clearly 
and sensibly articulated. It is a reasonable conclusion, then, that the thought motivating 
his effort in constructing the Tractatus, on his view, transcends the language he uses to 
114 Tractatus, sections 6.421 and 6.522. 
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construct it and maintains its integrity and effect despite its ineffability. 
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Chapter 10 - Abiding Nonsense: 
What What Wittgenstein Says He 
Doesn't Say Doesn't Not Say 
The preceding notwithstanding, Wittgenstein cannot so easily dismiss the 
implications of the failure of the language he uses in the Tract at us to meet the test of 
what can be said clearly and sensibly. If he were presenting articles of faith, it would be a 
different matter; but clearly, he intends the Tractatus, not only to clear a space for such 
disciplines as ethics in which truthful propositional discourse is on his view not an issue, 
but also to serve as a strict corrective against the metaphysical excesses of past 
philosophical schools so the nonsensical talk they proffered can be expunged from 
meaningful discourse and natural science can be grounded 'finally', 'unassailably', and 
'definitively' (to use the terminology of his Preface) in ''true" propositions about the 
factual world. If the effect of the application of the Tractatus is to be 'final', 
'unassailable', and 'definitive', then arguably either the propositions composing the text 
must be clear enough to define those borders in logical space irrespective of their IQgical 
groundlessness or else the point the Tractatus is making must itself be so obvious a priori 
as to be 'final', 'unassailable', and 'definitive' irrespective of its articulability. The farst 
of these two options seems untenable since it means the propositions employed in the 
Tractatus are at the same time sensible and nonsensical; and the second seems untenable 
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if for no other reason than that there is no prima facie justification for choosing this 
conception of the world over the alternatives. 
Ernest Gellner in Words and Thing~J - his attack on linguistic philosophy and its 
progenitors -accuses Wittgenstein of attempting with the Tractatus to define and 
prescribe a unique and privileged language game which Wittgenstein presumes at the 
outset to be the only proper language game for meaningful discourse. In this language 
game, all propositions are homogeneous. Gellner describes it thus: 
Atomic propositions are envisaged as mirroring atomic facts -a notion 
which is a picturesque hypostatisation of the fact that communication 
requires some concomitant variation between the two communicating 
centres, and knowledge has traditionally been viewed as communication 
between fact and mind (or, in Wittgenstein's case, fact and language). 
Then, non-atomic propositions are seen simply as reiterations, 
combinations and denials of atomic propositions, built up from them and 
owing their truth or falsity entirely to them.16 
As Gellner describes it, then, there is an immediate and nondistorting relation between 
fact and language which functions as a mirror. To the extent that the elements of the 
propositional discourse truly mirror the facts they purport to represent, the discourse 
comprising them is true. The function of philosophy is to slice away the nonsensical 
elements of discourse so all that remains is truth-functional propositions whose elements 
15 Ernest Gellner, Words and Things: An Examination of, and an Attack on, 
Linguistic Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 
86 Gellner, p. 89. [emphasis and parentheses Gellner's] 
35 
can be tested against the factual world to determine whether what they assert to be the 
case is in fact the case: whether the propositions are true pictures of the world. 
Wittgenstein's problem, says Gellner, is that the propositions of the Tractatus 
cannot purport to represent anything in the factual world because language and fact, taken 
generally, are not themselves facts in the world and the relation between them is also not 
a fact in the world. The only way language, fact and the relation between them could be 
taken as elements of the factual world is if there were a proper metalanguage standing 
apart from the one proper language of truth·propositional discourse; but Wittgenstein has 
already disallowed this possibility. As Gellner puts it, outside the proper language game, 
"meaningful discourse [is] impossible"87; ''[o]ne cannot speak outside all speech"88 • 
Wittgenstein's solution is apparently to treat the discourse of the Tractatus as 
neither truth·propositional discourse nor nonsense but a nebulous other type of discourse 
Gellner calls 'insinuation'. To insinuate is to state something and then withdraw from 
having said it, leaving the intended message intact while denying the language through 
which the message has been communicated. Gellner believes Wittgenstein must resort to 
such a device because the complex message of the Tractatus cannot demonstrate or show 
11 Gellner, p. 89. [brackets mine] 
11 Gellner, p. SS. [brackets mine] 
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itself in the same simple way that an atomic proposition is said to show itself to be a true 
picture of the fact in the world it purports to represent Wittgenstein himself writes that 
"[p ]ropositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what they must 
have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - the logical form"19• He 
repeats this in several ways: "(p ]ropositions cannot represent the logical form: this 
mirrors itself in the propositions''; "[t]hat which mirrors itself in language, language 
cannot represent"; [t]hat which expresses itselfin language, we cannot express by 
language"; [t]he propositions show the logical form of reality"; and "(t]o be able to 
represent the logical form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with the 
propositions outside logic, that is outside the world',<}(). Therefore, he says, the 
propositions composing the Tractatus are '"senseless" and one must "surmount" them to 
"[see] the world rightly'~'. The image of throwing away the ladder only after one has 
climbed it is a device used to demonstrate that the effect of the propositions of the 
Tractatus remains even after their validity has been denied. That is the essence of 
insinuation. 
In Wittgenstein' s defence on the matter of insinuation, one might argue the 
19 Tractatus, section4.12. [brackets mine] 
90 Tractatus, sections 4.121 and 4.12. [emphasis Wittgenstein's; brackets mine] 
91 Tractatus, section 6.54. [brackets mine] 
... _ 
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Tractatus is not intended to function as a didactic device but is rather an esthetically-
pleasing interpretation of that which is already understood to be true. This argument is 
bolstered by the opening paragraph of Wittgenstein' s Preface where he makes clear only 
"those who have themselves already thought the thoughts" the book expresses are likely 
to understand it; it is "not a text-book"; and "(i]ts object would be attained if it afforded 
pleasure to one who read it with understanding".92 On this interpretation, the kicking 
away of the ladder is not the activity of a student following the prescription of a teacher 
but rather a metaphorical illustration of what it is for a person who operates in the world 
of language to recognize the inadequacy of language to express an understood truth. This 
defence does not entirely save the Tractatus, though, because Wittgenstein does choose, 
as his artistic device, the form of didactics and does leave his prescriptions, once denied 
in the book's penultimate section, to look very much like insinuations. To the extent that 
a statement jUnctions as an insinuation, it is an insinuation. 
Gellner's difficulty with the Tractatus is that it is entirely grounded in this 
nebulous activity of insinuation. What is left to insinuation are several complex 
assertions that are fundamental to the whole project: that there are objects, facts, names 
and propositions; that the relation between facts in the world and language about the 
world is an immediate and undistorted 'mirror' relation; and that there is only one 
92 Tractatus, p. 27. [brackets mine] 
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language game through which anything meaningful about the world can be stated. The 
difficulty with insinuation is that it abides a deep contradiction: the simultaneous 
affinnation of two mutually-exclusive assertions: that a statement both is and is not a 
sensible truth in a rational context. 
The deep contradiction is demonstrated starkly when one considers the Tractatus 
in light of the enduring debate between realism and idealism with respect to the Ding an 
sich- the thing-in-itself. Generally speaking, the character of knowledge is such that it 
presents itself in an individual as being about something that is independent of its being 
known or spoken of. The difficulty is that, in presenting itself through the media of mind 
and language, knowledge contlates that which is known with the process by which it is 
known, leaving an assessment of the thing independent of the medium of knowledge 
impossible. The realist chooses to believe the object is there anyway, while the idealist 
concludes the thing-in-itself is forever outside cognitive bounds. For Wingenstein in the 
Tractatus, the object is not unknowable but ineffable - a linguistic twist on idealism. 
Yet, Wittgenstein does not shy away from describing the way language and the world 
work, both together and independently of one another, even though he later disavows the 
description as meaningless. ln undertaking to offer a description in the fust place, 
Wittgenstein embraces a kind of realism. In other words, says Gellner, '1he convenient 
doctrine of ineffability and "the ladder' [enables Wingenstein] ... to choose both horns of 
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the dilemma at the same time".93 
Wittgenstein tolerates this deep contradiction because of a belief that he feels is 
'unassailable' and 'definitive': that there is a unique fundamental language that really 
does mirror the world in a direct, passive, undistorted and nondistorting way and that this 
'truth' is obviously true to anyone who has seen it. Gellner's difficulty with this 
reasoning is that Wittgenstein allows elsewhere that people can be deluded about the 
relation between language and the world. 94 Therefore, the message inherent in the 
insinuation must be a complex one that lays out boundaries between what is true and 
what is not; otherwise, the insinuation cannot have the corrective effect against the 
metaphysical discourse it is intended to eradicate. On this reasoning and clearly 
parodying the final section of the Tractatus, Gellner writes in his own concluding 
sentence: "That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak. '795 While he agrees 
with Wittgenstein that laying forth with clarity the foundations of epistemology is 
wrought with difficulties that may render the project impossible, he challenges 
Wittgenstein' s suggestion that such foundations can simply be ''guaranteed a priori to be 
innocuous'796 on the basis of a prejudice that linguistic philosophers and those informed 
93 Gellner, pp. 1 S 1-152. [brackets and omission mine] 
94 Gellner, p. 90. 
95 Gellner, p. 287. 
96 Gellner, p. 287. 
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by them can, without disturbing anything, undertake the exhaustive process of clarifying 
the propositions of natural science as well-formed propositions and thereby say 
everything that can be said at all about the world. The insinuations inherent in this 
prejudice, Gellner says, mean something only if they are articulated. "Whatever can be 
insinuated can be said "91 
Wittgenstein does not have the luxury of purging from the Tractatus the 
propositions he proffers as insinuations in order that the remnant {if there is a remnant) 
can stand on its own. The philosophical activity he advocates in the book is both 
described and grounded in the lattice-work he constructs involving objects and facts and 
their relation to names and propositions. This ladder cannot be kicked away in the book's 
penultimate section unless it has been ascended. Gellner says, this ladder "alone gives 
both point and justification't91 to the activity Wittgenstein has defined as philosophy's 
appropriate function. Therefore, one of two things must be the case: either the argument 
about philosophy's appropriate function- which is central to the book- means nothing, 
or else the ladder remains, despite its disavowal, as a feature that is now "insinuated 
and/or presupposed't99. This means the propositions of the Tractatus cannot evanesce 
97 Gellner, p. 285. [emphasis Gellner's] 
91 Gellner, p. 88. 
99 Gellner, p. 88. 
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despite Wittgenstein's insistence to the contrary. If his book is not to amount to nothing, 
its propositions stand as a demonstration of the employment of a metalanguage. That 
there is no way to ground this metalanguage is~ in Gellner's judgment, sufficient proof 
that Wittgenstein's approach is neither nondistortional nor coherent nor effective. 
Therefore, according to Gellner, the Tractatus in the end cannot but disintegrate. "[W]e 
must see this doctrine itself as one philosophical doctrine amongst others. And then it is 
seen to be false."100 
Gellner recognizes that proponents of the Tractatus see their project as surviving 
this attack because of a clever approach to the question of validation that has been a 
perennial Achilles heel of metaphysical systems and approaches. Traditionally, systems 
have been condemned for either slipping into an infinite regress of rationalizations, each 
of which presupposes a rational context beyond itself, or else putting a capricious end to 
justification through the adoption of ''dogmatic and arbitrary" fust principles. In having 
to choose between these two alternatives, he says, "[y]ou cannot win". 101 Gellner faults 
Wittgenstein and his successors in linguistic philosophy for creating a third option. 
If you cannot beat them, disqualify them! If you cannot prove rival views 
to be false, then say that they are meaningless! This is validation of one 
view by means of the exclusion of possible rivals from eligibility as 
100 Gellner, p. 37. [brackets mine] 
101 Gellner, p. 3. (brackets mine] 
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candidates. in virtue of their claims to having "no meaning ... 102 
The focus on meaning was grounded historically in the emergent emphasis on logic. 
Gellner credits logicians• solution to Russell's paradox, in particular, with opening up 
4 rneaninglessness' as the strategy for discrediting philosophical rivals. Russeu·s paradox 
- that there is no solution to the problem of whether the class of all classes which are not 
members of themselves includes itself as a member- is solved by dismissing such 
problems of self-reference as meaningless. Once this class-based definition of logical 
meaninglessness is proffered in this contex~ it is applied to rival philosophical systems 
which are said to violate strict logical syntax through the misapplication of classes. 
Language that seeks to say something about the relation of language to reality violates the 
proscription against self-referential classes and is therefore meaningless. 103 In dismissing 
the systems containing such language as meaningless, linguistic philosophers 
concomitantly escape their rivals' criticisms; their rivals' attacks on the veracity of 
linguistic philosophy cease to be viewed as meaningful and linguistic philosophy is taken 
to survive by default as the only legitimate system by which veracity is definable. 104 By 
doing away with the legitimacy of questions about validation and offering in the place of 
this reliance on validation the naive belief in the simple immediacy of the language-world 
102 Gellner, p. 3. [emphasis Gellner's] 
103 Gellner, p. 6. 
104 Gellner, p. 5. 
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relation, linguistic philosophers rid themselves (in their own eyes) of the need to ask on 
what ground their position stands. So, when Gellner concludes the Tractatus is false 
because it is self-contradictory, the linguistic philosopher will respond saying the 
criticism is meaningless because the activity of guaranteeing self-referential consistency 
is logically impossible, has nothing to do with veracity and is meaningless. 
James Feibleman105 recognizes, as does Gellner, the metalanguage inherent in 
Wittgenstein's presentation of the Tractatus, but he reaches the other conclusion: not that 
the metalanguage, being ungroundable, is the work's fatal flaw, but that the use of a 
metalanguage implies its implicit embrace. He sees Wittgenstein, not as eschewing 
second-order names - i.e., classes - but as relying on them. 
Feibleman is intent on determining to what extent this duality of first-order 
language and metalanguage survives Wittgenstein's presentation, Wittgenstein's 
disclaimer notwithstanding. Feibleman is preoccupied with what he calls the notion of 
two-storeyness in philosophy, those two storeys being, ftrs~ discourse involving the 
objective realm of real objects and, second, discourse involving facts and the logical 
realm of names and propositions. He says the first and fundamental storey, if 
105 James Feiblem~ Inside the Great Mirror: A Critical Examination of the 
Philosophy of Russell, Wittgenstein. and Their Followers (The Hague: Martinus NijhotT, 
1969). 
unaccompanied by the superior storey involving logic, is nominalism, which holds that 
things named are real but there is no reality to the names or to the propositions which 
combine them apart from their objects. Wittgenstein clearly talks about the logical realm 
as if it is separate, whether he intends to sustain this separateness beyond this analysis or 
not; and to the extent that Wittgenstein does this, Feibleman considers this logical realm 
ofWittgenstein's and its elements to be real and to constitute the second storey of the 
system. 
Wittgenstein's presentation elicits for Feibleman a host of questions: What 
mediates the combination of objects as facts? What mediates the combination of names 
as propositions? What mediates the correspondence between true propositions and facts? 
What is the status of the relational elements in propositions- elements such as •and', 
'or', and so forth- and classes? What is the status of false propositions? What grounds 
the totality of synthesizing and corresponding activities that compose experience? 
Arguably, Wittgenstein's presentation also dismisses some of these questions as 
meaningless - but since his presentation also dismisses much of itself as meaningless, to 
the extent that one gives any of it credence one may also give some measure of credence 
to these questions as well, at least tentatively. 
In this light, we consider Feibleman's criticisms, beginning with the place of the 
subject in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's propositions regarding the subject in the fifth 
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section of the Tractatus~ Feibleman argues~ establish a kind of solipsism. First, 
Wittgenstein circumscribes the world in terms of the limits of language. 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 
[ ... ] What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say 
what we cannot think. 
[ ... ] That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of 
the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my 
world. 
The world and life are one. 106 
Next, he shows how the subject is simply the limit of the world. 
I am my world. (The microcosm.) 
The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. 
If I wrote a book "The world as I found it", I should also have therein to 
report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do 
not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of 
showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it 
alone in this book mention could not be made. 
The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world. 107 
By comparing the subject to the eye as the eye presents itself to the observer in the course 
of observation, he illustrates how the subject hides itself from direct view while at the 
106 Tractatus, sections 5.6, 5.61, 5.62 and 5.621. [emphasis and parentheses 
Wittgenstein's; brackets and omissions mine] 
107 Tractatus, sections 5.63, 5.631 and 5.632. [emphasis and parentheses 
Wittgenstein' s] 
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same time showing itself through its activity. 
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? 
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of 
sight. But you do not really see the eye. 
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen 
from an eye. [ ... jl08 
Finally, he shows how the subject is seen to be the metaphysical subject of realism. 
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. 
The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the 
reality co-ordinated with it. 
There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a 
non-psychological I. 
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the '~orld is my world". 
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul 
of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a 
part of the world. 109 
In brief, Wingenstein is saying the world as he experiences it and describes it - which is 
necessarily language-based and exhausts language - is seen from his own perspective; 
yet, the self from whose perspective experience is, forever hides itself from view. 
Solipsism leaves experience, not worldless, but subjectless; or rather, it reduces the 
108 Tractatus, section 5.63. [emphasis Wingenstein's; brackets and omissions 
mine] 
109 Tractatus, sections 5.64 and 5.641. 
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subject to an extensionless point of view which itself is not encountere~ only posited 
tentatively. What remains of the self is not the psychological[ but the metaphysical 
subject, presupposed by experience but not a part of the world of experience. 
F eibleman, commenting on the preceding 110, indicates he finds in Wittgenstein 
essentially the same position on the subject that he finds in Kant: one that is not 
subjectivist in the sense of being a psychological subject, but one that is a limit on 
experience which can be noticed only indirectly. Wittgenstein rejects the thinking subject 
but points to the metaphysical subject as the limit abutting against experience, as it were, 
which is reminiscent of the Kantian I that accompanies all my representations but that 
itself cannot be seen, neither as the receptacle of thinking nor as its source. Even 
Wittgenstein's analogical 'eye' is a kind of( that accompanies all my representations: an 
eye is a presumed sine qua non of sight although it cannot possibly be a direct object of 
its own seeing activity. 
While Wittgenstein, like Kant, refuses to give the subject status as an object of 
rational inquiry or philosophical knowledge, if anything Wittgenstein is more restricted in 
his capacity to even discuss the subject because of his insistence on the definitive role of 
the proposition in experience. If it is not a fact in the world, then the proposition has no 
11° Feiblem~ pp. 103-104. 
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business positing it; and Wittgenstein seems to leave no room for the subject to be a fact 
in the world. In proposition 5.631, he argues that experience does not divide between the 
in·here and the out·there, but rather is absolutely exhausted by the world; for even the 
experiences I take to be internal and personal are part of the total parcel of experience l 
call life. Feibleman says111 that, in this, Wittgenstein, like Kant and Hume taken on their 
own terms, rejects subjectivism and the in·here/out-there, subject .object dichotomy, 
because there is no subjective, in·here remnant surviving when one considers what is the 
world of experience. "I am (exhaustively defined by] what l can experience from here, 
i.e. from me." 112 So, properly considered, Kant, Hume, and Wittgenstein dispense with 
the subject entirely; for, if the subject is not a thing in the world, then the philosopher, 
who is interested in developing a fundamental characterization of experience, will reject 
the subject .object dichotomy as being irrelevant to the meaningful analysis of experience. 
"Only by getting knowledge away from the object and from the subject can we see that it 
is not /mow/edge after all with which we are concerned but system. " 113 The hunt for 
knowledge is grounded in the prejudice that there is a subject whose perspective on the 
world might need to be informed by an ideal perspective, while the hunt for a system 
begins without the presupposition that experience is characterized perspectivally. So not 
111 Feibleman, p. 103. 
m Feibleman, p. 103. [brackets mine] 
113 Feibleman, p. 103. [emphasis Feibleman's] 
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only is there no basis for posing propositions about the subject in Wittgenstein, but there 
is moreover no point. 
It is in Wittgenstein's construction of a system that Feibleman sees Wittgenstein's 
fundamental weakness: he assumes synthesis without elucidating how it is accomplished. 
Wittgenstein assumes he is proceeding scientifically, allowing the realm of facts, studied 
inductively, to elicit in the philosopher a true knowledge ofbow propositions are 
constructed and combined in relation to the facts. But Wittgenstein is assuming the 
validity of the synthetic activity he seeks to identify by positing construction as a 
presuppositionless given. When one inquires about the kind of synthesizing activity that 
is going on in \Vittgenstein's system- the kind of synthesis that combines objects into 
facts, that adjoins facts to propositions, that combines names into propositions, and that 
combines simple propositions into complex ones in logical space - the problem one 
encounters, according to Feibleman, is that Wittgenstein has ignored the question of 
'how' that his system leaves the reader to ask. As Feibleman puts it: 
The endeavour of the Tractatus is clear. It was to substitute the method of 
constructionism for the axiomatic method. Instead of the assumptions 
contained in the axioms, we would begin with atomic facts as given, 
although half assuming that the objects which the atomic facts combine 
are disclosed or at least disclosable by sense experience. In this way, a 
presuppositionless technique could be devised, the method of 
presuppositionless combinatorics. 114 
114 Feibleman, p. 119. 
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"Constructionism presupposes axioms and neglects to bring them out."115 That is to say, 
it pretends to be inductive while proceeding on the basis of deduction from fli'St 
principles. Ironically, says F eibleman 116, the scientific method Wittgenstein is trying to 
emulate also proceeds on the basis of both induction and deduction, since the 
mathematics in terms of which research is measured is itself deduced from first 
principles. But Wittgenstein will not own up to having employed first principles, and 
instead leaves questions about the how of synthesis unanswered. 
Moreover, be leaves them unanswerable within his system. Of panicular concern 
is the status of Wittgenstein' s logical connectors. lf only objects and the facts of which 
they are composed are real, and names and propositions do nothing but mirror the real, 
then are logical connectors such as 'and' and 'or' and object classes, themselves objects? 
For, even ifWittgenstein's propositions about the logical realm are a tentative ladder 
which must be kicked away once used so that propositions and facts collapse in on one 
another again, one is still left to ask what happens to the connectors if they have nothing 
factual with which to correspond. Obviously, says Feibleman, logic is not nothing, 
though one, reading Wittgenstein, might easily assume that since the logical realm wholly 
115 Feibleman, p. 122. 
116 Feibleman, p. 126. 
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mirrors the objective realm, interconnective logic has nothing left to do.117 If philosophy 
were nothing, Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce philosophy to an inductively-derived 
logical system would be pointless. So, logic and its elements, and the functions it allows 
the scientist to perform - such as classification - must not be nothing. Yet, one is left 
by Wittgenstein without the tools to discern what they might be. 
In defence ofWittgenstein on the point of logical connection is John Passmore's 
analysis of how such connection works. 118 "Senseless, but not nonsensical"119 is how 
Passmore describes the tautological discourse of mathematics and, by implication, logic. 
Such expressions as 'all', 'some', 'or' and 'not' have no analogue in atomic fact and do 
not represent. If, for example, 'not' were the name of a fact, then 'not-not-p' would not 
be logically equivalent to 'p'. The use of 'not' indicates, not a fact, but the application of 
a logical operation. Peterson echoes the point when he writes: 
the logical constants - the connectives • V', ' & ', ':J' etc., the identity sign 
'=',and the quantifiers'()' and '3'- are not names of substantive objects 
in the world. 120 
It is Wittgenstein's assertion that every non-elementary proposition is a truth-function of 
117 Feibleman, p. 123. 
111 John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Toronto: Penguin, 1994). 
119 Passmore, p. 358. 
120 Peterson, p. 48. [emphasis Peterson's) 
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elementary propositions. Logical connectors such as 'or' disappear when propositions are 
fully analyzed in truth-functional tenns. The connector 'or' wholly displays itself when 
atomic propositions p and q are presented in a truth-table whose entries are 'true' for 
every conjunction except the conjunction of a 'false' for panda 'false' for q. In other 
words, that is entirely what 'or' means. As Passmore puts it, "[t]his result can be 
alternatively expressed by saying that all propositions have the same general form: that of 
a selection out of the range of atomic facts, a selection made by negating certain 
combinations." 121 
All the truths of logic are considered by Wittgenstein to be tautologies, which are 
extreme cases of truth-functions of the form 'p or not-p'. The proposition 'q' can be 
recognized, for example, as the conjunction of '(p or q)' and 'not-p'. To say '{p or q) and 
not-p implies q' is to exclude no genuine possibility and, therefore, to say nothing new. 
The function of the truth-functional proof is to betray tautologies for what they are. 
Passmore says: 
the view that there are 'primitive propositions' of logic from which all the 
other propositions of logic ought to be deduced is a delusion. All the 
propositions of logic, he argues, stand on exactly the same footing; they all 
say the same thing, i.e. nothing at all. 122 
121 Passmore, pp. 356-357. [brackets mine] 
122 Passmore, pp. 357-358. 
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All tautologies show is how the symbolism works. The same is true for the tautologous 
'equations' of mathematics. Tautologies and equations say only that a thing is identical 
with itself, which says nothing new. The antitheses of this statement- that a thing is not 
identical with itself or that a thing is identical with something other that itself- are 
nonsensical since they are inherently meaningless. A statement that is logically necessary 
is not nonsense, but it is senseless nonetheless because it says nothing that has to be said. 
There is no sense to be depicted. As Passmore puts it, tautologies are senseless while 
metaphysical talk is "nonsense, in the fullest sense of the word"123• 
Passmore's analysis regarding logical connection seems true to the Tractatus, yet 
F eibleman is evidently not convinced that Wittgenstein' s employment of a mechanism of 
combinatorics does not require a more explicit grounding of its functional elements. It is 
not a minor issue. Logical connection and classification is not a small point in 
philosophy, and it poses a great challenge to the analysts. Feibleman points out that 
Russell, seeking to embrace logical nominalism as opposed to metaphysical realism, 
allows that a class is a name for the collection of objects which are its members, and he 
should therefore also allow that the class, once named, must itself be a real object; but he 
does not. While Whitehead addresses the dilemma by affinning both the reality of the 
collection of reals and the reality of classes, Wittgenstein rejects the reality of classes, 
123 Passmore, p. 358. 
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leaving one to wonder in what way one can speak meaningfully of classes at all if 
propositions and facts are to be a snug fit. 
Feibleman argues that Wittgenstein cannot, and in fact does not, have it both 
ways: that is, by rejecting the reality of classes while at the same time employing the logic 
of classes, classifications, and combinations. While Wittgenstein argues for 
presuppositionless combinatorics, Feibleman says something must underlie the 
combining of the name· words into elementary propositions and the elementary 
propositions into complex propositions, or else it is pointless for him to speak of 
simplicity, complexity, and analysis in the logical realm in the first place - and his 
whole project will have yielded nothing but babble. He concludes that, to the extent we 
follow Wittgenstein along on his journey through facts and propositions, we must 
suspend belief in one ofhis own tenets: namely, that combinatorics are 
presuppositionless. Feibleman says: 
... knowing when to make a calculation and what sort of calculation to 
make implies a background of deductive schema in tenns of which we are 
operating.... But while he attacked the axiomatic method in detail, he did 
not succeed in getting away from it in the background: it hides behind 
assumptions of his structure, for while we increase in generality as we go 
from atomic facts to elementary propositions to complex propositions, if 
we tum the system around and look at what we have, we will fmd that 
what we have is an axiomatic method, only we have to set it up in reverse. 
The axiomatic method begins with the axioms and reduces down to the 
theorems and from them to their applications in particular: first, particular 
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propositions and then atomic facts corresponding to these. 124 
In other words, although Wittgenstein maintains the position that he has achieved his 
system inductively by refusing to admit he has assumed the validity of the first principles 
on which his system is grounded, we who encounter his system are induced to recognize 
the unnamed first principles on which the edifice stands. Like the scientific model he 
seeks to emulate, his system only implicitly embraces the process of deduction from first 
principles while it pretends to eschew them. It leaves its a priori givens in the 
background, treating them as unpresupposed in order to allow their derivatives to present 
themselves as presuppositionless. 
Unfortunately for Wittgenstein, says Feibleman, his system cannot be saved 
merely by attaching to his system the first principles he claims not to be using, because 
the first principles he uses, he uses inconsistently. F eibleman lists five axioms that are 
presupposed, though neither defined nor justified, in Wittgenstein's presentation12s: 
l) that a system of philosophy can be constructed on the basis of a presuppositionless 
combinatorics - a presupposition it would probably be logically impossible for 
any system to presuppose; 
124 Feibleman, p. 120. [omissions mine] 
m Feibleman, p. 121. 
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2) nominalistic logic - the reality of physical particulars witnessed by an evanescent 
intuitional logic that facilitates the distinguishing between sense and reference 
without itself being real; 
3) metaphysical realism -the presence of an independent real world of logical 
propositions and their inter-relations; 
4) epistemological realism - the supposition that the objective and logical realms 
are as they are independent of one's knowledge of them; and 
5) constructionism - the supposition that atomic facts elicit a logic which grounds 
the representation and construction of elementary and complex propositions. 
There is in these 'axioms', of course~ mutual contradiction- for example~ between (2) 
and (3) - which is precisely F eibleman' s point: Wittgenstein not only uses these axioms 
while denying he is doing so, but also uses them in such a way that the fmal product is 
internally inconsistent. The elements of logic cannot be both nothing and something at 
the same time. "Wittgenstein assumes that there is no place in such a scheme for 
5i 
metaphysics; he did not seem to understand that the scheme itself was metaphysical."126 
F eibleman is arguing that the only thing that can save the Tractatus from itself is an 
explicit affirmation of the reality of the logical realm - the affinnation of the legitimacy 
oftwo-storeyness (though this would mean paradoxically that the only way to save the 
Tractatus is to destroy it). 
Following Wittgenstein in the errors of the Tractatus, among others, are the 
logical positivists, both European and American, Feibleman says. He accuses them of 
interpreting the Tractatus more narrowly than its own logic demands: for example, by 
omitting the metaphysical import of the construction from which propositions of 
existential import arise - ••construction which consists in a finite world of propositions 
and of facts and of the relations between them"127• Logical positivists did not follow 
Wittgenstein entirely -or even entirely honestly - nor was their movement univocal or 
static over time. For example, some such as Camap and Mach affinned psychologism 
where Wittgenstein explicitly rejected the psychological subject. As Feibleman puts it, 
'rwhere Mach wanted to get rid of the metaphysical idea of an objective world, 
Wittgenstein wanted to show by setting up an objective world how it would be possible to 
126 Feibleman, p. 127. 
127 Feibleman, p. 128. 
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get rid of metaphysics"121• Still, there is in the logical positivist movement an extension 
of the same basic error Feibleman identifies in the Tractatus: essentially, the failure to 
account properly for synthesis. 
As part of his critique of the Tractatus and its effect on those who follow it, 
Feibleman presents and critiques the six essential theses of logical positivism, focusing 
first on the Vienna School. The three practical theses are these129: 
1) The only valid knowledge is scientific knowledge that is empirically verifiable; 
2) The only valid interpretation of scientific knowledge is that offered by the 
Viennese positivists; and 
3) The interpretation of the positivists is logical metascience. 
In short, Feibleman dismisses each of these in its tum as presumptive. 
121 Feibleman, pp. 134-135. 
129 Feibleman, pp. IJS-136. 
59 
More problematical, perhaps, are positivism's three technical theses130: 
l) Logic and mathematics are tautological; 
2) The analysis of language solves all metaphysical problems; and 
3) Whatever is not fact is feeling. 
On the first of these, Feibleman accuses both Europeans and Americans holding 
this view - many of whom are avowed nominalists - not only of failing to recognize 
that the Tractatus, in developing Frege's ideal language of sense, concomitantly gives 
reality to the logical realm, but also of leaving their own undefined logical elements, such 
as Quine's 'variable', without a meaningful status. For them to affinn and extrapolate 
beyond Wittgenstein's presentation without affirming the logical metaphysics on which it 
must be grounded, he says, is inconsistent. 
On the second of these, Feibleman argues that Wittgenstein did not dismiss 
metaphysical problems but simply "wished to pare down metaphysics to the point to 
13° Feiblem~ p. 144. 
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which logic was able to carry it out,.131 and was prepared to retain some entities of logical 
metaphysics in the process, though there is disagreement on how much logical 
metaphysics he was prepared to tolerate. Clearly, Feibleman does not believe 
Wittgenstein was a nominalist -a one-storey philosopher- but was bright enough to 
recognize, in writing the Tractatus, that the logical realism it demanded and tentatively 
posited was sustained beyond the analysis; in other words, that once the ladder was 
kicked away, some logical metaphysics remained. Feibleman argues that for the 
positivists to cite Wittgenstein in rejecting metaphysical problems that Wittgenstein 
retains in his own system is inconsistent. 
On the third of these, Feibleman argues that, by the positivists' own logic, their 
own system could be dismissed as a collection of value-based statements that the science 
it pretends to ground would not need if what they purported to articulate were valid. For 
them in their system to dismiss as meaningless the very kind of language that they 
themselves use in articulating their system is inconsistent and fatally problematical. 
Feibleman thereby accuses the logical positivists of making the same fundamental 
error of which the early Wittgenstein is guilty if judged apart from his implied 
metaphysics: inconsistency; or, more specifically, rejecting metaphysical presuppositions 
131 F eibleman, p. 14 7. 
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regarding synthesis that their own system both explicitly rejects and implicitly demands. 
Positivists such as Camap, of course, would not agree with Feibleman on this point. 
Indeed, Camap132 poses to himself the very question that lies at the heart ofFeibleman's 
objection of self-inconsistency: How does one account for books espousing logical 
positivism if their propositions are neither inductively derived from experience nor 
deductively derived from the axioms of mathematics as demonstrable tautologies? 
Carnap concedes that Wittgenstein agrees his own statements about philosophy do not 
make sense, but adds: 
I cannot agree with him. In the first place, he seems to me to be 
inconsistent in what he does. He tells us that one cannot make 
philosophical statements and that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent; and then instead of keeping silent, he writes a whole 
philosophical book. Secondly, I do not agree with his assertion that all his 
statements are quite as much without sense as metaphysical statements are. 
My opinion is that a great number of his statements (unfortunately not all 
of them) have in fact sense; and that the same is true for all statements of 
logical analysis. 133 
But critics of logical positivism consistently turn the philosophy against itself, 
arguing that a system that denies the validity of a logical realm of propositions that have 
reality apart from the facts they name, cannot account for itself. First, unless the 
132 RudolfCamap, "The Rejection of Metaphysics", 20th-Century Philosophy: 
The Analytic Tradition, Morris Weitz (ed.) (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 207-219. 
133 Camap, pp. 218-219. 
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combinatorial functions and products of logic can be accounted for abstractly in a 
meaningful way, then the talk of general classes of things that this system does is 
meaningless when classes are not real objects of fact. Second, talk of general classes of 
propositions- for example, 'elementary propositions', 'primitive ideas', 'primitive 
relations', and 'protocol statements'- that are fundamental to the system's formulation 
of its own enterprise is meaningless when propositions are not real objects of fact. 
Logical positivism, in as much as it explicitly rejects metaphysics in all its permutations, 
cannot give a self-consistent justification, either of what it does or of what it is. One can 
assert the tenets of logical positivism are meaningful only if one pretends they are not. 
Feibleman says the same criticism applies to Wittgenstein. To give Wittgenstein 
the benefit of the doubt and grant him the removal of the ladder, thereby accepting that 
the Tractatus has left us without any of the second storey of logical metaphysics implied 
in his work, is to pretend there is meaning in that which, on its own terms, has none. The 
very kind of logical synthesis undermined by removing the ladder is the only thing that 
can give meaning to what has been articulated to that point. Synthesis is implied by and 
demanded for the logical connections and classifications and universalizations and other 
combinatorics. If what has been said is not nothing, then the ontological commitment 
that has been implied is not nothing either. One must accept the implication of 
ontological commitment, not only as it relates to the objects and facts of the world, but 
also as it relates to the reality of the combinatorial elements the presentation employs. 
63 
Feibleman argues that, as long as one who claims to be doing philosophy uses universals 
that are not names of facts but rather synthetic fabrications defined logically, then one is 
casting a vote for some degree of logical realism. 
On this argument, then, Feibleman brings a weakness he sees in the Tractatus, 
also recognized by Gellner, to a different conclusion. While Gellner concludes 
Wittgenstein renders his treatise a work of nonsense by kicking away the very 
propositions with which it is written, Feibleman believes he can save the Tractatus, albeit 
with amendments, by concluding from Wittgenstein's decision to employ these 
propositions that he is not sincere in his stated intent to destroy the ladder that he has 
kicked away. Feibleman concludes the Tractatus, at its very essence, is proof that 
Wittgenstein maintains the validity of the second storey since that is the realm in which 
the Tractatus operates. 
Peter Carruthers, like F eibleman, argues that the structure and movements of the 
Tractatus imply an ontological commitment. He comes to Feibleman's conclusion: that 
some of the tenets of the Tractatus must change to accommodate an ontological model.134 
One might argue that Carruthers, like Feibleman, gives more credence to the ontological 
model intended to rescue the text than to the text being modeled. Carruthers constructs 
134 Peter Carruthers, The Metaphysics of the "Tractatus .. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
64 
his model to tit within three broad constraints: firS~ it must meet the explicit claims of 
Wittgenstein regarding the ubiquity of simples in all possible worlds, the exhaustive 
analyzability of elementary propositions into names of simples in immediate 
concatenation, the mutual logical independence of elementary propositions, and the 
capacity of the totality of elementary propositions, evaluated upon truth-functional 
analysis, to completely describe the world; second, it must meet the implied claims of 
Wittgenstein, elucidated by Carruthers, that simples are not universals but individuals 
existing necessarily at all possible times in all possible worlds and that the names in 
elementary propositions not only represent simples in immediate concatenation but are 
themselves in immediate concatenation and are therefore relational though not of the 
subject-predicate form; and, third, that one must be able to tell whether the references of 
two names are different or the same in order to be able to understand those two names as 
two names: in other words, that names are introduceable by means of a general rule that 
establishes a priori whether their references are the same or different. The model must 
neither conflate simples with sense-data, since this would deny simples the logical 
independence Wittgenstein insists they have, nor treat simples as very small physical 
objects, since this would deny them both the character of existence in all possible worlds 
and the logical independence that can be characteristic of no physical object (given that 
physical objects are subject to spatial and temporal constraints which some elementary 
propositions would then have to describe, ground and connect relationally in a dependent 
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manner). 135 
Carruthers' model involves discrete coloured point-masses in space-time ordered 
according to five dimensions: the first three determined by sets of parallel planes each set 
of which intersects the other two sets at right angles; the fourth being the temporal 
dimension; and the fifth being an approximation on a unilinear chromatic scale 
interpolated between origin 0 and maximum position 1 lf'a ' 'a ' 'a ' '!II_' 'a ' ''!JI ' 
• ·3 ' ·2 ' ·I • -o ' I • ~ • 
' ' t th f th I . . 'b ' 'b ' 'b ' 'b ' 'b ' 'b ' 'b ' t a3 , e c. are e names o e p anes m one axts, .3 , •2 , •1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , e c. 
th fth I . th d . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' • ' ' ' ' • t are e names o e panes m e secon ax1s, c.3 , c.2 , c. 1 , c0 , c 1 , c2 , c3 , e c. are 
the names of the planes in the third axis and 't.3', 't.2', 't.1', 'to', 't1 ', 't2', 't3', etc. are the 
names of the coordinates in the time axis; and if the units 'n' of the colour axis are 
specified to represent decimal places on a unilinear chromatic scale such that colour 
(presumably 'wavelength' on this analogy) is defined with varying degrees of accuracy on 
the exponent 10""; then the point-mass indicated by, say, a4b8c 16t322 would be completely 
specified, in a logically independent manner, as the intersection of planes a4, b1 and c 16 at 
time t32 whose colour falls within the range .0 1 or .11.136 
Carruthers argues the strength of his model is that it accounts for the existence of 
m Carruthers, pp. 137-139. 
136 Carruthers, pp. 139-146. 
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simples in all possible worlds without proffering a particulate view of reality; it 
comprehends elementary propositions as proper names in immediate concatenation 
without reference to the subject-predicate form; it preserves the logical independence of 
elementary propositions; it grounds truth-functional analysis of elementary propositions 
and suggests the possibility of exhaustively describing the world through such analyses; 
and it suggests how the names of simples can be distinguished or identified a priori. The 
downside of Carruthers' model is that it demands an absolute, nonrelational view of space 
and time 137: something not only frowned upon by many metaphysicians but also doubted 
by many modem physicists, not to mention its direct contravention of the tenets of the 
Tractatus regarding the establishment of an ontology of absolutes. Moreover, it seems to 
demand that the configuration of the analytical grid be defined in advance, since grids 
defined in different ways can account differently for the same point-mass. It also 
accounts poorly for analytic equivalence - the equivalence of the relations among objects 
to the relations among names - even with the imposition of a chromatic dimension, since 
ultimately it fails on the criticism that "a system which ascribes sense-data to physical 
subjects cannot comply with the requirement of logical independence"131• In view of the 
failure of the model on this point, he scales it back from the phenomenal version, 
designed to account for colour, to a less-comprehensive realist version in four 
137 Carruthers, pp. 139-140. 
131 Canuthers, p. 146. 
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dimensions, excluding the chromatic scale. 
Despite its inadequacy, Carruthers believes his realist model is not only 
appreciated by Wittgenstein as a metaphor for how the world works but indeed embraced 
in the stronger sense, as a definition of what obtains. 139 Carruthers says: "Since there are 
a number of good reasons for supposing Wittgenstein to have had our model in mind, and 
no good reasons against it, I propose that such an interpretation should be adopted" 140• 
Again, he says "[i]t seems likely that Wittgenstein himself might have worked with the 
realist model, having it at the back of his mind (at least) in his thinking about elementary 
propositions"1" 1• What is more troubling is that Carruthers says "the realist model 
remains the most plausible, quite apart from the consideration to do with Wittgenstein' s 
attitudes towards metaphysics and epistemology"142• In effect, he is adding tenets to 
Wittgenstein's position and justifying the additions by deliberately ignoring and thereby 
subtracting from the Tractatus things Wittgenstein explicitly says. 
What neither Carruthers nor Feibleman seems willing to recognize is that, in the 
end, whether Wittgenstein is sincere or not in rejecting metaphysics by excluding logic as 
139 Carruthers, p. 142. 
140 Carruthers, p. 144. 
1
"
1 Carruthers, p. 147. [parentheses Carruthers'; brackets mine] 
142 Carruthers, p. 147. [emphasis mine] 
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a subject of meaningful discourse, exclude it he does. That exclusion undennines their 
conclusion that Wittgenstein's is a presentation of realist metaphysics- the conclusion 
they evidently argue is the only one that can rescue the Tractatus from the kind of charge 
Gellner levels against it: that it is nothing but irredeemable nonsense. By failing to take 
seriously the exclusion, they stall in the belief that the metaphysical statements 
Wittgenstein says he does not in the end intend to say do not on final analysis fail to say 
that which they at first appear to be saying. Abutting against their metaphysical models at 
all times is Wittgenstein' s insistence that he is not grounding a metaphysical system. He 
concurs the Tractatus is nonsense, but for him this does not mean it is irredeemable, 
ineffective or meaningless. In this light, arguably it is wrong to conclude the Tractatus 
demands the embrace of metaphysics, the criticisms of Gellner, Feibleman and Carruthers 
notwithstanding. 
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Chapter IV - Rejecting Criticism: 
What What Wittgenstein 
Doesn't Say Doesn't Say 
Some critics have speculated about alternate interpretations of the Tractatus that 
may allow Wittgenstein to escape some of the harsh criticisms of those who view this 
work of his youth as not being true to itself. Some of those critics seek to draw the 
Tractatus into the theses proffered by Kant and by Husserl. John Passmore says 
Wittgenstein, prior to writing the Tractatus in his youth, almost certainly had very limited 
exposure to philosophical works, the most likely candidates including the works of Kant 
and Husserl among a handful of others. 143 In this light, it may be helpful to look for 
implicit, if not explicit, reflections of Kant's and Husserl's theses in the Tractatus to 
determine whether and to what extent Wittgenstein shares their approaches and 
conclusions. There are benefits though also dangers in reading into a particular work 
certain influences that are not explicitly credited or articulated; however, there are also 
benefits in exposing divergences of argument that set one author apart from another, 
should such divergences be identified. In view of Wittgenstein' s own challenge to his 
successors to articulate more clearly what it is that he believes he has said poorly, it has 
143 Passmore, p. 352. 
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seemed to some not to be a wholly useless exercise to attempt to determine what may or 
may not be implied by what Wittgenstein does not explicitly say. What these interpreters 
determine, however, sometimes cannot stand up to the key theses of the text: namely, the 
propositions of the text itself are "senseless"144, "[w]hat can be said at all can be said 
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent"145• 
4.1 A Kantian Analysis 
David Pears, in his book Wittgenstein 146, contends that Wittgenstein's Tractatus 
is, in the Kantian ttadition, a work of critical philosophy. In contrast to speculative 
metaphysics, critical philosophy involves employing a method of rigorous analysis 
whereby thought systematically examines itself in an attempt to delineate the structure 
and limits of thought. 
Stephan Komer, in his introduction to Kant's philosophy147, interprets critical 
philosophy in its historical context. Kant considers himself to have been awakened by 
144 Tractatus, section 6.54. 
145 Tractatus, p. 27. [brackets mine] 
146 David Pears, Wittgenstein (London: Fontana/Collins, 1971). 
147 Stephan Komer, Kant (Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1990). [particularly pp. 
13-32] 
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Hwne' s rigorous approach to philosophy that dismissed all statements that were not 
analytic (such as mathematical statements) or empirically verifiable (such as those of 
natural science) as meaningless. On this analysis, which has also influenced 
Wittgenstein's heirs in the logical positivist movement. one who accepts this defmition-
that a meaningful proposition is one which is either empirical or analytic - must conclude 
that metaphysical propositions are meaningless since they are neither. Kant rejects 
Hume•s dichotomy and establishes a new classification scheme based on two 
fundamental divergences from Hume's approach: first. Kant considers. not propositions, 
but judgments, the latter being propositions that are actually affirmed by someone; and, 
second, he further analyzes what Hume takes as analytic statements in order to reveal the 
difference between analyticity and a-priority. A judgment is analytic if the relation 
between its subject and predicate is such that the predicate belongs to the subject (as, for 
example, the predicate 'is a wet day' belongs to the subject 'a rainy day' in the judgment 
'a rainy day is a wet day') or, as Komer rephrases it, "if, and only if, its denial would be a 
contradiction in terms or, what amounts to the same, if it is logically necessary or, again 
in other words, if its negation is logically impossible"1" 8; otherwise, the judgment is 
synthetic (i.e. its negation is not self-contradictory). A judgment is a priori if it is 
logically independent of all judgments which describe experiences or even impressions of 
sense, though its derivation may be achieved through experience (for example, that an 
148 Komer, p. 23. [emphasis Komer's] 
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equiangular Euclidean triangle is necessarily equilateral or that every father is necessarily 
male); otherwise9 it is a posteriori. So, where Hunte sees all meaningful propositions as 
being either analytic or empirical, Kant sees all meaningful judgments as being either 
analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori or synthetic a priori (with analytic a posteriori 
judgments being impossible since there is an inherent contradiction in the term). The 
synthetic a priori category is Kant's invention and has no equivalent or foundation in 
Home's work; but it is critical to Kant's project. Kant considers such judgments as 
·every change has a cause' to be neither analytic (since the predicate is not contained in 
the subject, as Hunte would agree) nor a posteriori (since it does not entail any particular 
proposition which describes a sense experience but rather has the character of a universal 
rule). He includes in this category certain metaphysical judgments as well as judgments 
of mathematics. Kant's approach to metaphysics is to establish a method by which the 
truth or falsity of its judgments can be ascertained. As KHmer puts it, "[b ]efore indulging 
in metaphysics we need a critique of reason to show how far or in what sense it is a 
possibility"1" 9• Since the statements of metaphysics fall within the synthetic a priori 
category on Kant's analysis, "[t]he critical philosophy is essentially an inquiry into the 
nature and function of synthetic a priori judgements"'so. 
1
"
9 KHmer, p. 16. [brackets mine] 
l$0 Komer9 p. 22. [brackets mine] 
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KOmer argues that the objection that there are no such judgments as synthetic a 
priori judgments since a·priority implies analyticity, is based on an erroneous contlation 
of the two senses of necessity: the narrow sense in which a negation is a self· 
contradictio~ which is reserved for analytic judgments, and the wider sense in which all 
judgments that are not logically dependent on particular empirical judgments are 
necessary, which includes synthetic a priori judgments. Judgments that are clearly not 
analytic can also clearly be of a different kind from empirical judgments. Komer says 
'every change has a cause' is logically independent of empirical verification in a way that 
'every man dies before the 300th year of his age' is not, yet it is not logically necessary in 
the way that 'a rainy day is a wet day' is logically necessary. So, while on Kant's view 
necessity and strict universality are adequate tests of the a-priority of a judgment, he 
identifies a different kind of necessity in synthetic a priori judgments. There is a 
universality to such judgments; but since they are synthetic, their negations are not self-
contradictory, though the denial of certain 'absolute' synthetic a priori judgments- such 
as those of traditional logic - would have major implications for natural science and 
human thought in general. Because of the way he views synthetic a priori judgments, 
Kant's project of critically examining them involves determining their a priori 
constituents to determine what has to be the case for such judgments to be what they are 
and to set out the limits of such judgments to determine which judgments of metaphysics 
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are meaningful. 151 
On Pears' analysis, critical philosophy can take one of two paths. The data to be 
investigated 
may be presented in a psychological form~ as ideas, thoughts and modes of 
thought: or they may be presented in a linguistic form, as words, sentences 
and types of discourse. Kant's critique starts from data of the first kind, 
and the second wave of critical philosophy, the logico-analytic movement 
of this century, starts from data of the second kind .... [Furthermore] it does 
not make any fundamental difference which alternative is chosen, because 
a significant sentence must express a thought, and a genuine thought must 
be expressible in words. 152 
Where Kant's method involves a critique of thought, Wittgenstein's method, according to 
Pears, is a critique of the language in which thought is articulated. Pears says of 
Wittgenstein: 
His philosophy was a critique of language very similar in scope and 
purpose to Kant's critique of thought. Like Kant, he believed that 
philosophers often unwittingly stray beyond the limits into the kind of 
specious nonsense that seems to express genuine thoughts but in fact does 
not do so. He wanted to discover the exact location of the line dividing 
sense from nonsense, so that people might realize when they had reached it 
and stop ... (Complementary to his negative purpose was his positive 
intention] to succeed in understanding the structure of what can be said. 
He believed that the only way to achieve this understanding is to plot the 
limits, because the limits and the structure have a common origin.153 
151 Komer, p. 31. 
152 Pe~ p. 28. [brackets and omission mine] 
ISJ Pears, p. 5. (brackets and omission mine] 
i5 
To put it another way: "Wittgenstein wanted to plot the absolute limits oflanguage, just 
as Kant wanted to plot the absolute limits ofthought."154 
Kant's project is to determine, based on a critical analysis of the limits of thought, 
what one can know. Where Descartes argues that the doubting and therefore undeniably· 
existing cogito and the extended world are both real because they are grounded in a 
perfect and good God whose existence is implied by the presence in thought for the 
cogito of the idea of the perfect God, Kant begins with a much more impoverished 
starting point and never does reach the stage where he says the subject and the world are 
real. One might say Kant allows nothing but that things appear to be a certain way and 
seeks to determine nothing but the range of conditions that thought must bring to the 
world to ground the possibility of it appearing in the way that it does. He is seeking to 
strictly determine the necessary conditions of the possibility of things seeming to be the 
way that they are. His is a critical analysis of the limits of thinking and not the 
establishment of the metaphysical grounds for the existence of an independent world and 
thinking subject. About the world independent of his knowing it, Kant in the end says 
nothing except that nothing defensible about any such independent realm can be said; but, 
not saying anything, he does not deny it either. In this sense, Kant fits in the idealist 
1s4 Pears, p. 37. 
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tradition; but he is a transcendental idealist, where 'transcendental' refers to laying forth 
the a priori conditions that must obtain to make possible our cognition with respect to the 
world. As Charles Crittenden puts it, "fa] transcendental argument is one intending to 
prove that certain concepts or presuppositions are necessary for language or thought"us. 
By focusing on a priori conditions, Kant initiates what he calls a Copernican revolution 
in philosophy, for he is concerned not with what the object must be like for it to affect 
cognition, but what cognition must be like for it to think about objects as it does. 
It can be argued (as Crittenden has argued156) that Wittgenstein's project, 
similarly, is to determine what conditions must obtain for the world to be spoken about in 
the way that it is, and to defeat skeptical denials of these conditions on the basis of 
reductio arguments that expose inconsistencies in skeptical contentions against these 
conditions. It might be argued further that his project has nothing at all to do with 
establishing what 'really' might be the case independently of one's experience of the 
world. In other words, where Kant establishes what is necessary in the context of 
transcendental thought, Wittgenstein establishes what is necessary in the context of 
logical discourse. For Kant, transcendental thought accounts for all we can meaningfully 
155 Charles Crittenden, .. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Arguments", Language, 
Logic, and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 
1979, Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds.) (Vienna: H6lder-Pichler-Tempsky, 
1980), pp. 259~261. [brackets mine] 
156 Crittenden, p. 259. 
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know of the world, and for Wittgenstein, logical discourse accounts for all we can 
meaningfully say about the world. The world thus encountered is all one can 
meaningfully say there is. So, it is not that there is a real world that these critical 
philosophies retreat from addressing, but rather that there is nothing beyond what these 
critical philosophies address that can be meaningfully thought, says Kant, or meaningfully 
said, says Wittgenstein. Whether or not there is a reality 'beyond' the world we 
encounter is irrelevant and talking about it is meaningless. From the perspective of 
meaning, the world we encounter is whole. 
On this analysis (though it strays somewhat from Wittgenstein's own 
terminology), Wittgenstein's facts and propositions are simply the two moments of the 
form of propositional discourse: the propositions are hypotheses pointing towards 
possible states of affairs while the facts are the whole range of possibilities to which 
propositions can point. It is not that objects are real and names are about them but rather 
that objects and names are two sides of the same coin: mutually-implicative aspects of the 
structure of the world through the eyes of logic. On this analysis, a proposition means 
nothing unless it has a focal point of intent and an object of experience means nothing 
except in the context of language, the grid in accordance with which the world 
materializes in experience. All the world - its objects and states and interconnections - is 
at its root these object-name moment pairs, made complex as fact-proposition moment 
pairs which present themselves as 'picture'-'depicted' pairs. The world is a logical space 
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containing moment pairs of all facts and the respective propositions that concern them. 
Brian McGuinness (who rejects the metaphysical interpretation ofWittgenstein's 
Tractatus and views its apparent realism as a heuristic device157) presents this analysis in 
a somewhat different way, identifying two different meanings of 'existence'. The world 
consists of facts, which exist; but these states of affairs are composed of objects, which 
also exist, though in a different way. Existence, as we ordinarily take it, is confined to the 
first of these senses.151 Objects are not independent things in the sense anticipated by 
realists. They are 
not in the world any more than [they are] in thought or in language. 
Objects are the form of all these realms, and our acquaintance with objects 
(our contact with them, to borrow a metaphor from Aristotle) is not an 
experience or knowledge of something over against which we stand. Thus 
it is not properly experience or knowledge at all. Objects are eti epekeina 
t~ ousias (beyond being), and it is therefore misleading to regard 
Wittgenstein as a realist in respect of them. His position is one, as indeed 
he tells us, from which realism, idealism and solipsism can all be seen as 
one.159 
McGuinness proffers this interpretation in view ofWittgenstein's stated intention to 
157 Irving Block, ''Introduction", Perspectives on the Philosophy ofWittgenstein, 
Irving Block (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. vii. 
151 Brian McGuinness, "The So-called Realism of the Tractatus", Perspectives on 
the Philosophy ofWittgenstein, Irving Block (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 62. 
as9 McGuinness, pp. 72-73. [emphasis and parentheses McGuinness'; brackets 
mine] 
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ground his project in logic. According to the dictates of logic, a proposition must be such 
that it and its elements can be specified independently of the existence of one state of 
affairs or another. The proposition must be able to capture any state of affairs, no matter 
what is the case. 160 
Such an interpretation accounts for a peculiarity Passmore identifies in the 
Tractatus: that some facts (Sachverhalt) can be only possible, not actual. 161 If facts were 
real things in the real world, it could hardly be the case that some of them are never 
actual; but Wittgenstein clearly allows that some of them are not. 162 All possibilities are 
comprehended in the logical space, but only some are verified through the application of 
truth-functional reasoning as being existent facts. The verification of a possible atomic 
fact is simply the establishment of its existence through a 'true' judgment regarding the 
atomic propositions concerning that atomic fact. The non-existence of an atomic fact, 
which betrays itself through a truth-functional analysis of its proposition, is a negative 
fact. 163 Erik Stenius contends Wittgenstein fits the false proposition within his picture 
theory by making a proposition of indeterminate truthfulness a "shadow" which does not 
160 McGuinness, pp. 64-65. 
161 Passmore, pp. 353-354. 
162 For example, Tractatus sections 2.0123, 2.0124, 2.05, and 2.06. · 
163 Tractatus, section 2.06. 
80 
have to bear similarity to what it represents. 164 
The way the 'picture'-'depicted' arrangement is worked out is described by Irving 
Block16s move by move in the following way. 
1) To say is to describe while to show is to enter into an immediate relation such that 
it is impossible to interpose a description in a showing relationship. This the 
Tractatus says at section 4.1212. 
2) That logic makes language possible can be shown but not described. 
3) The distinction between fonn and content shows itself in the difference between 
logical and empirical propositions inasmuch as logical propositions have truth and 
falsity because of their (formal) elements independently of external observations 
while empirical propositions point to external elements (content) on whose status 
questions of truth and falsity are answered. 
164 Erik Stenius, ''The Picture Theory and Wittgenstein's Later Attitude to it", 
Perspectives on the Philosophy ofWittgenstein, lrving Block (ed.) (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1981), pp. 121-123. 
16s Irving Block, "The Unity ofWittgenstein's Philosophy", Language, Logic, 
and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1979, 
Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds.) (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1980), pp. 
233-236. 
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4) Not only the tautologousness of a logical proposition is shown but also the sense 
of an empirical proposition. No rule can tell beforehand how to put together a 
sentence such that it will be sensible. Recognition of sense must precede the 
designation of'noun' and 'verb', for example. The sentence must show that it is a 
sentence. 
5) That there are no a priori rules for determining whether a string of words is a 
sensible sentence is another way of saying that a theory of meaning is impossible. 
6) The picture theory outlined in the Tractatus simply shows how propositions 
depict facts of the world that make them true. Propositions depict facts by 
picturing facts. 
7) Propositions can picture facts because they share a logical form. 
8) However, the logic of the world shows what is possible, not what is actual. 
9) To determine whether a proposition truly depicts what is actual, one must 
consider not form but content. 
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1 0) The truth or falsity of propositions can be determined because, according to 
logical atomism, propositions and facts similarly comprise simple elementary 
parts into which they are wholly analyzable. 
II) The relation between simple objects and simple names is immediate (though 
Wittgenstein never at any point in the Tractatus gives an example of either). 
12) The difficulty here is that names name objects that are the substance of the world, 
but names also reside in sentences whose status is purely formal and whose sense 
shows itself through this logical form. Put another way, its place in a sentence 
formally determines that a name is intended to be a name, but its status as a name 
also points to the existence of an object - its content. 
13) For Wittgenstein, unlike Russell, however, the content is not constitutive of the 
name. The name intends a content, but it is determined qua name solely on the 
basis of its formal relation in the proposition. Block argues there is an 
incoherence in arguing a purely formal relation can determine the existence of an 
object. 166 
166 Block (1980), p. 235. 
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14) Block argues it is also incoherent to say, as Wittgenstein evidently does, that to 
know all an object's internal relations without knowing any of its external 
relations - in other words, to know all its possible relations without knowing its 
actual relations - is to know all that can be known about the object. 167 Content, 
then, involves what is possibly the case and not what is actually the case. 
This picture theory of meaning Block says is internally incoherent and cannot withstand 
scrutiny as a philosophy of language. Of course, Wittgenstein does not maintain the 
theory as a philosophy of language since he disowns it at the end of the Tractatus; but, in 
the pages before it is disowned, it does seem to conjure up a world not unlike the Kantian 
world, in which the noumenal thing-in-itself is forever out of view and out of 
consideration. 
The world Wittgenstein is constructing is not the ordinary world but a world 
rigidly and exhaustively determined in logical space as the collection of'picture'-
'depicted' pairs in intimate, indivisible combination. There is no subject-object division 
or idea-thing division or name-object division, except for the sake of the analysis which 
itself is later disowned. The division, the connection and the elements never present 
themselves directly: they appear only surreptitiously; but the necessity of the structure is 
167 Block (1980), p. 235. 
nonetheless a condition of the possibility of there being an experience of the world at all. 
Here, Wittgenstein seems to be constructing an 'ideal language': as Passmore puts it, "a 
language the tenns of which are all of them precisely defined and the sentences of which 
unambiguously reveal the logical form of the facts to which they refer; such a perfect 
language must rest upon atomic propositions; the fundamental philosophical problem is 
to describe the structure of these atomic propositions"168• This form or structure, then, is 
the set of a priori conditions that must obtain for our world to be such as it is; and it is 
this form that Wittgenstein is talking about when he refers to facts and propositions, just 
as it is the form that Kant is talking about when he lays out his critique regarding 
synthetic a priori judgments. 
Elena Panova169 points out, however, that there is a discontinuity between Kant 
and Wittgenstein on this point. While Kant's deduction of transcendental logic is a 
"pure" deduction in the sense that it regards the phenomena of human experience rather 
than the things in themselves, Panova argues Wittgenstein's presentation rests on 
encountering logic not by seeing something as a state of affairs but rather by seeing that 
something is. Wittgenstein' s logical structure of language is a reflection of the structure 
161 Passmore, pp. 424-425. 
169 Elena Panova, "Kant's Influence on the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", 
Language, Logic, and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgen.stein 
Symposium, 1979, Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds.) (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-
Tempsky, l980),pp.272-274. 
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of the world, not a transcendental representation of the phenomena as they appear. 
Wittgenstein believes the symbols of all languages are ananged in the same way that 
things are arranged in reality, so there is an immediate sense of the veracity of the picture 
that language presents of the world if that linguistic presentation is clear. Panova quotes 
Wittgenstein saying what a picture represents is its sense and the agreement or 
disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity. 170 The world of 
Panova's Wittgenstein, then, is a materialist's world. 
Pears171 is interested more in the logical structure than in the material of 
Wittgenstein's world so he is much more open to it being a 'pure' analysis than is 
Panova. In his interpretation, he focuses on how Wittgenstein, like Kant, seeks to ground 
the logical necessity his presentation demands. On his analysis, Wittgenstein's project 
begins as a search for a foundation of logical necessity that Wittgenstein does not fmd in 
Russell's work. Logical necessity is not a dispensable feature of Wittgenstein' s 
presentation. According to Pears, we clearly rely on logical necessity in describing the 
world: for, though it is a contingent fact that one thing is smaller than another, it is 
logically necessary that a thing be either smaller or not smaller than another. It is not 
possible to think otherwise. Therefore, logically necessary, or a priori, truths must be 
170 Panova, p. 272. The references are to sections 2.221 and 2.222 of the 
Tractatus. 
171 Pears, p. 46. 
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satisfactorily grounded in an epistemological theory for that theory to be a meaningful 
articulation of the way things are. Wittgenstein holds that not only the limits of thought 
but also the limits of language are grounded in logical necessity and fiXed a priori. 
He grounds logical necessity by positing a simple yet comprehensive hand-in-
glove conception of language and reality. That conception has two moments, which 
Pears calls X andY. "X says that every factual proposition has a precise sense: Y says 
that the way in which every factual proposition gets this sense is pictorial."172 A third 
auxiliary assumption, Z, is that "whenever two propositions are logically related to one 
another, there will be within one of the two, or within both, some logical complexity 
which analysis could reveal" 173, which means the simplest propositions, of which all 
complex propositions are composed, are independent of one another. All sensible ways 
of articulating language involve propositions, and propositions analyze without remnant 
into elementary propositions. The sense of any proposition is the fact of reality that 
answers the question the proposition poses. A proposition is true if the fact of reality it 
posits is the case. The facts of reality themselves are analyzable without remnant into 
atomic objects. In this way, Wittgenstein establishes almost a tautologous relationship 
between language and reality since they are mutually delimiting without remnant or 
172 Pears, p. 60. 
173 Pears, p. 62. 
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confusion. This mutual delimitatio~ since it is grounded in the essential necessary 
structure of reality, is a relationship of logical necessity. There is no complexity or 
synthesis. The picture and the proposition are inseparable aspects of one another. 
This relation is described by Lee174 in Kantian tenns. On Lee's view, the 
Wittgensteinian fonnula • aRb' contains not three terms but two in a dyadic relationship. 
In a perspicuous language, • R' occurs, not by way of a name which names 
a real object in the empirical world (the real order), but by way of a 
configuration of objects .... Thus, relations are "ineffable": relations can be 
shown but are not nameable because relations are not nominata in the 
empirical world. 175 
In this sense, Lee argues, Wittgenstein and Kant are alike, both rejecting the ontological 
reality of abstract entities. In Lee's Kantian tenns, "the synthetic unity of objects is 
effected, not apprehended" 176• 
How Wittgenstein arrives at this hand·in·glove characterization of the language· 
reality relation is the subject of Pears' third chapter, the steps of which are these: 
174 K.wang·Sae Lee, uKant and Wittgenstein on Empirical Concepts", Language, 
Logic, and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 
1979, Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (eds.) (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 
1980), pp. 269-271. 
175 Lee, p. 270. [parentheses Lee's; omission mine] 
176 Lee, p. 270. 
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1) a factual proposition always shuts out a certain possibility, by the law of the 
excluded middle; for example, the proposition p shuts out the possibility not-p; 
2) the law of the excluded middle "necessarily excludes" the possibility half-p (for it 
is impossible) while it "contingently shuts out" the proposition not-p when the 
proposition p is asserted to be the case; 
3) every factual proposition that is not an elementary proposition analyzes into, and 
is logically equivalent to, other propositions that themselves shut out certain 
possibilities, and it can be rendered in tenns of the relevant possibilities of these 
subordinate propositions; for example, if p analyzes into q and r, which shut out 
not-q and not-r respectively, thenp can therefore be rendered in terms of the 
possibilities q and r, q and not-r, not-q and r, and not-q and not-r; and 
furthermore, the entire sense of the factual proposition is given in determining 
which of these possibilities it shuts out, which is to say Hany factual proposition is 
a truth-function of the propositions in its analysis"177; 
4) every factual proposition is ultimately analyzable into elementary propositions, 
and every factual proposition is therefore a truth-function of the elementary 
177 Pears, p. 71. 
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propositions into which it is ultimately analyzed; 
5) excluded from factual propositions are the propositions of religion and morality; 
6) Wingenstein is noncommittal on whether the veracity of a proposition is 
determined by empirical means, for example through acquaintance in the 
Russellian sense; 
7) like the solipsist, Wittgenstein is unable to say that certain named objects exist or 
do not exist from within his system of factual discourse for he cannot say what 
does not exist without naming and thereby positing it; so the existence of an 
object cannot be the subject of a factual proposition but rather it is the case that, in 
being named, the object is shown to exist and any proposition about the existence 
of that object is therefore a mere tautology; 
8) if not-p is taken to be the neutral situation which obtains in logical space prior to 
the assertion of factual propositions, then what the proposition p does is exclude 
the possibility of not-p, leaving not-not-p, which is logically equivalent top; 
9) a proposition is not a static compound name, tor it implies movement which either 
agrees or disagrees with reality; 
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l 0) the meaning of a name is its object. but there is something lacking in the name. 
namely the connection it demands to other names; which is to say "a name is an 
abstraction from a proposition. and. since a proposition is a semantic fact. a name 
is an element abstracted from a semantic fact" 178; 
11) just as there are necessities governing the combinations of the objects which 
names name. so too in the same way there are necessities governing the 
combinations of names in propositions, and these necessities limit the space of 
possibilities for such combinations; 
12) propositions which are tautologies shut out none of the possibilities into which 
they are analyzed; propositions which are contradictory shut out all of the 
possibilities into which they are analyzed; and factual propositions shut out some 
of the possibilities into which they are analyzed; and 
13) tautologies and contradictions demonstrate how factual propositions can be valid; 
for valid propositions. when combined with their conclusions. are tautologies and, 
when combined with the negation of their conclusions, are contradictions. 
178 Pears, p. 79. 
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Pears collapses Wittgenstein,s system in the following way: 
The connection is that logic covers everything that can be said in advance 
of experience, everything that is a priori. Experience can only give us a 
world of facts, but this world floats in a space of possibilities which is 
given a priori. When logic discloses the structure of factual discourse, it 
also discloses the structure of reality which factual discourse reflects. 
These two structures, which are really one, may be regarded as a 
framework, or grid of CO"'{)rdinates, spreading through the whole space of 
possibilities in which the world of facts floats. The limit of this space, 
which is reflected in the limit of factual discourse, is detennined by logic. 
For the point of origin from which the limit is calculated is plotted by 
logic, and the fonnula by which it is calculated is a logical fonnula. 179 
Furthennore: 
the general framework of any factual language is fixed objectively in 
advance. This framework is a truth-functional structure based on 
elementary propositions. When human beings devise a particular factual 
language, they must connect it up to this pre-existing structure. They have 
certain options about the ways in which they make the connections, but the 
structure itself is rigid. 180 
Arguably what Pears contends181 is that, for Wingenstein, the analyzability of the 
language-reality relation in this way is the logically necessary condition of the possibility 
of logic; and since logic is taken to be not only possible but in fact the case, then the 
condition obtains. This seems to be a transcendental argument with a very Kantian 
179 Pears, p. 84. 
110 Pears, p. 85. 
181 Pears, p. 83. 
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conclusion: that if we operate within the condition that logic is the case~ then 
Wittgenstein' s language-reality relation is logically necessary. Of course, if we take the 
converse of the hypothetical and assume logic is not the case~ then no conclusion is 
possible because that would be to employ logic while denying its efficacy. Only from 
within logic does the inquiry have purchase, and once the validity of logic is granted, 
logic demands Wittgenstein's conclusions about the nature of the language-reality 
relation. 
The question is whether the presentation of those ••necessary" (and therefore not 
factual or contingent) conclusions consists of tautologous a priori propositions, 
substantial and therefore synthetic a priori propositions, or propositions that belong with 
those of religion and morality in the region beyond what can properly be called 
propositions, whose function is to point while themselves shrinking from view. 
Pears points out that Wittgenstein' s options are severely limited. Wittgenstein' s 
conception of necessity differs from Kant's. Kant holds that it is possible to deduce 
synthetic a priori truths - which, as we have seen, are non-analytic truths that necessarily 
hold within the bounds of factual knowledge; for example, that every event has a cause -
and such truths are therefore not tautologous. On Pears' view, Wittgenstein holds that all 
necessity is logical necessity, and he contends that the necessary truths of logic are empty 
tautologies. He thereby abandons the notion of synthetic a priori truths, confining 
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necessity to tautologous propositions of logic. For him, while it is a contingent fact that a 
word has a given meaning, it is not contingent but rather necessary and tautologous that a 
certain set of circumstances will be the case if a proposition containing that word, once it 
has been defmed, is true. What is more interesting to Wittgenstein is absolute necessity 
whereby one can define with certainty the absolute limits of any possible language. What 
he arrives at through his analysis is a dissection of language into elementary propositions. 
But his description of this dissection of language and his conclusion that the dissection 
and its conclusions are absolutely necessary truths about the structure and limits of 
language leave Pears frustrated; for those articulations of Wittgenstein, while purporting 
to be absolutely necessary, cannot be tautological, yet Wittgenstein has rejected the 
notion of synthetic a priori truths. So, while Kant may perhaps be able to assert his 
synthetic a priori conclusions with confidence, Wittgenstein cannot. 112 
Pears' assertion that Wittgenstein forbids, or intends to forbid, synthetic a priori 
propositions is not without its critics. Nicholas Gier113, while conceding Wittgenstein 
appears to forcefully reject the concept in the Tractatus itself, contends the author 
112 Pears, pp. 49-50. 
183 Nicholas F. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of 
the Later Wittgenstein, Husser/, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Albany, NY: State 
University ofNew York Press, 1981). 
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nevertheless evidently either accepts the veracity of synthetic a priori propositions'"' or 
tolerates a "serious inconsistency"185 in his approach to the concept during this period. 
Gier refers to an instance recorded in Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundation of 
Mathematics in which he defines as synthetic a priori the proposition (similar to that 
recorded in section 6.3751 of the Tractatus) that 'a patch cannot be at the same time both 
red and green' .186 Further, he refers to Wittgenstein's statements in both Philosophical 
Remarlcs181 and Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics 181 that certain propositions of 
mathematics must be synthetic a priori propositions. To bolster his point, Gier takes a 
passage directly from two of Wittgenstein' s writings - Philosophical Remarlcs1JW and 
Philosophical Grammar190 - that states: .. Isn't what I am saying what Kant meant, by 
saying that 5 + 7 = 12 is not analytic but synthetic a priori". 
184 Gier, pp. 8, 13, 35, 88, 92, 157, 158, 171, 172. 
185 Gier, p. I 57. 
186 Gier, p. 158. 
117 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. 
White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), pp. 129, 218. In Gier, p. 158. 
181 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, trans. 
G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 125-126. In Gier, p. 158. 
119 Philosophical Remarks, p. 129. In Gier, p. 35. 
190 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans. Anthony Kenny 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 404. In Gier, p. 35. 
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Whether or not Wittgenstein expressly rejects synthetic a priori propositions~ or 
later changes his mind in this regard~ may be beside the point. Thomas Morawetz191 , like 
Pears~ contends Wittgenstein's apparent embrace of the indubitability of synthetic 
propositions is deceiving and grounded in a mistaken impression of Wittgenstein' s 
ambiguous use of the concept of certainty. He says Wittgenstein answers the question of 
whether synthetic judgments are ever thought to allow no exception with the observation 
that such judgments are inherently context-dependent and subject to rejection when 
information changes or the context is altered. On Morawetz' view, Wittgenstein 
concedes there are synthetic propositions that appear to be indubitable, but only because 
taking them to be indubitable is a condition of the possibility ofundenaking empirical 
inquiries to assess other synthetic propositions that are taken to be dubitable. For 
example, u[i]t is possible ... to establish historical facts only if the possibility that there 
were events in time before the present moment is not questioned"192• Morawetz points 
out this is not to say absolute indubitability is ascribed to the synthetic propositions 
whose afflfDlation permits empirical inquiries to proceed. To say that some indubitable 
propositions are not absolutely indubitable is to contend that certainty bas an ambiguous 
character, yet this on Morawetz' view is what Wittgenstein (like Kant before him, he 
says) contends. Certainty for such propositions is thereby defined within the context of 
191 Thomas H. Morawetz, ''Wittgenstein and Synthetic A Priori Judgments", 
Philosophy, 49 (1974)~ pp. 429-434. 
192 Morawetz, p. 433. [emphasis Morawetz'; brackets and omission mine] 
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its role in inquiry and thought and not granted absolute status. One might say the 
indubitability of certain synthetic propositions is the condition of the possibility of natural 
science and synthetic a posteriori propositions and therefore the condition of the 
possibility of there being for us a world, yet still not certain in any absolute metaphysical 
sense. This view of certainty within the context of asserted conventions is echoed by 
Michael Dummett in his analysis of Wittgenstein' s philosophy of mathematics. 193 
Pears. however, in outlining a range of four options, makes a different choice of 
what must be the case for Wittgenstein's project to be effective and internally consistent. 
He contends the four options are as follows: 
1) the propositions of the Tractatus itself that purport to be true are indeed 
tautologies and therefore not substantial, or at most definitional; 
2) the propositions of the Tractatus are synthetic a priori truths similar to Kant's 
and, moreover, Wittgenstein's apparent disavowal of such truths is deceptive; 
3) the propositions composing the Tractatus only pretend to be necessary truths and 
193 Michael Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy ofMathematicsn, Philosophy 
of Mathematics, Volume 11 of The Philosophy ofWittgenstein, John V. Canfield ( ed.) 
(New York: Garland, 1986), pp. 114-115. 
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are in fact only conditional statements used to compose a theory, in the manner of 
logical positivism; or 
4) the propositions of the Tractatus are, similar to those of religion and morality, of a 
different sort from ordinary propositions and ultimately evanescent, doing nothing 
more than showing what must be the case. 
One might say, then, that Wittgenstein's Tractarian propositions are either tautologous, 
synthetic a priori, conditional or evocative. Consider each in its tum. 
Pears collapses the first and fourth options into one. On his view, the content of 
the discourse strongly suggests his propositions about the tautological nature of the 
language-reality relation themselves purport to be more than tautologies or simple 
definitions and could be formulated differently without inherent contradiction. But could 
the overall project be a deep tautology, not unlike solipsism, which expresses indirectly a 
valid point which it cannot fully articulate? The question Pears asks is whether it could 
be articulated meaningfully at all: "According to him, what lies beyond the limits of 
language cannot be asserted in language, but can only be shown. But what would be the 
status of something that can only be shown?''194 Recall that a tautology expresses no 
194 Pears, p. 51. 
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factual state of affairs, yet it does not show nothing. 19s 
In the end, Pears rejects the notion that the Tractatus may be a deep tautology. 
While Wittgenstein "expresses the valid point that factual discourse is limited from the 
inside, because the base on which it is constructed is what exists"196, yet he does not 
employ the Tractatus to express a general tautology: for example, • What is reflected in 
the mirror of language is reflected in the mirror of language' or 'There is what there is' or 
'Reality has the character that it has'; but rather he uses it in an attempt to express the 
substantive truth 'Reality must have a certain character which can be specified'. Such an 
expression would raise substantive questions like 'Why must it have this character?', 
• How is the essential nature of language discovered?', and • What is the status of the 
propositions that describe it?'. Pears puts it this way: "either language may be defined, or 
its nature may be investigated empirically, and ... the first of these two alternatives will 
yield an empty necessary truth, while the second will yield a substantial contingent 
truth." 197 Since the Tractatus evidently is not of the first type because of the questions it 
raises, then it must be a substantial truth, whether that be a substantial contingent truth or 
a substantial a priori truth. 
19s Pears, p. 53. 
196 Pears, p. 86. 
197 Pears, p. 87. [omission mine] 
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Wittgenstein would not have been able to assert with consistency that the 
Tractatus is on the whole a substantial contingent truth since, first, he would have had to 
concede that nowhere in reality does one encounter what the book purports to describe; 
and, second, he would have had to acknowledge that to treat the propositions of the 
Tractatus as contingent propositions would be to imbue them with a character other than 
the true and necessary character that is demanded of propositions of philosophy. 
Pears says "[t]he Kantian way between the horns of this dilemma was to argue 
that there are substantial necessary truths. If there is another way between them, it 
certainly is not indicated by Wittgenstein's doctrine of showing."191 Since in Pears' 
assessment the propositions of the Tractatus are neither analytic nor contingent, therefore 
he concludes that Wittgenstein is employing synthetic a priori truths despite an apparent 
disavowal of them. 
An explanation of the word '~must" is also required. Does it or does it not 
express a substantial necessary truth? If this question is not unaskable, the 
answer would seem to be that it does express a substantial necessary truth. 
The argument for this answer has already been given: surely there is a 
difference between the necessary truth of a tautology and the necessary 
truth of the theory which is presupposed by the system of factual 
discourse. But what did Wittgenstein take the difference to be? In default 
of a clear answer from him, it is natural to conclude that in the end his 
system is like Kant's, although on the way to this destination it exhibits 
many differences, one of which is incompatible with the journey. t99 
191 Pears, p. 87. [brackets mine] 
t99 Pears, pp. 53-54. 
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Could the second option then be the case, despite Pears' pessimistic conclusion 
about it: namely, that while the propositions of the Tractatus are synthetic a priori truths 
similar to Kant's, Wittgenstein's apparent disavowal of such truths is deceptive? The 
Tractatus itself seems to agree with Pears on this point that such a conclusion is 
implausible. Wittgenstein seems determined, in the Tractatus, to reject the absolute 
indubitability of the synthetic propositions: for example, in his treatment of ibe law of 
causality where he makes explicit that the law of induction, being a "significant" 
proposition, therefore cannot be either a logical law or a law a priori. 
The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is 
obviously a significant proposition. - And therefore it cannot be a law a 
priori either.200 
Pears' third option is that the propositions composing the Tractatus only pretend 
to be necessary truths and are in fact only conditional statements used to compose a 
theory, in the manner of logical positivism. Pears defines this option in his Introduction: 
Might not philosophy abandon its claim to an intuitive apprehension of the 
essential nature of language without at the same time abandoning any 
attempt to theorize? This possibility has been explored by Russell, 
Camap, Quine, Strawson and many others.201 
But Wittgenstein evidently dismisses this option in his Preface to this work, where he 
200 Tractatus, section 6.31 and following. 
201 Pears, p. 39. 
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writes that "the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me to be unassailable 
and definitive" and "I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials 
been finally solved"202• To choose this option would be to place him in the camp of the 
logical positivists, who view their own project in this way; but Wittgenstein, though 
embraced by logical positivists, evidently does not consider his Tractatus to be such a 
work of contingent approximations. 
In view ofWittgenstein's own characterization ofthe Tractatus near its 
conclusion, the more plausible option may well be the fourth, separated from the first: 
that the propositions of the Tract at us are, similar to those of religion and morality, of a 
different sort from ordinary propositions and ultimately evanescent, doing nothing more 
than showing what must be the case. This conclusion is suggested by Wittgenstein 
himself: 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
fmally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
Ut:er he has climbed up on it. )203 
This relates directly to two statements in the Preface: 
... the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable 
202 Tractatus, p. 29 [emphasis Wittgenstein 's]. 
203 Tractatus, section 6.54. [parentheses Wittgenstein's] 
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and defmitive. 204 
Its [the Tractatus'] whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as 
follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly: and whereof one 
cannot speak thereof one must be silent. 205 
These three statements say, collectively, that 1) only what can be stated clearly can be 
stated at all; 2) the propositions of the Tractatus are senseless; and 3) what the Tractatus 
says is nonetheless unassailably true and can be understood as such. For these three 
statements to be meaningful collectively, it must be the case that truth is beyond that 
which can be stated clearly; or, to put it another way, truth transcends sense. Moreover, 
truth can be communicated by that which is senseless. 
Since Wittgenstein clearly shows in the Tractatus that every factual proposition is 
a truth-function of the elementary propositions into which it can be analyzed without 
remnant, then truth - in this case the truths expressed in philosophy - must not be 
delimitable by factual propositions. It seems, instead, that these truths are demonstrable 
through discourse that only on the face of it conforms to the style of well-formed factual 
propositions. This conclusion is further supported when certain sections of the Tractatus 
regarding the world are juxtaposed against once another: 
2cw Tractatus, p. 29. [emphasis Wittgenstein 's] 
205 Tractatus, p. 27. (brackets mine] 
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The world is everything that is the case. 
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
The world divides into facts. 206 
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything 
is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value - and if 
there were, it would be of no value. 
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and 
being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. 
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this 
would again be accidental. 
It must lie outside the world. 
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. 
Propositions cannot express anything higher. 
It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. 
Ethics is transcendental. 
(Ethics and aesthetics are one. )207 
These sections, taken together, indicate that any statement that is held to be non-
accidental - such as any statement of philosophy which is held to be true and necessary -
not only is outside the realm of factual discourse but is also outside the world delimited 
206 Tractatus, sections 1, 1.1 and 1.2. 
207 Tractatus, sections 6.41, 6.42 and 6.421. [emphasis and parentheses 
Wittgenstein' s] 
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by factual discourse. It - like the statements of ethics - must be transcendental and not 
necessarily subordinate to the limitations imposed on factual discourse. Wittgenstein 
clearly leaves a space for such discourse, though he leaves that space defmed only 
inasmuch as it is excluded from the realm of factual discourse and what it talks about is 
excluded from the world which facts compose. 
Both Kant and Wittgenstein are careful not to exclude religion and morality from 
the realm of meaningful discourse, though they do leave them in precarious positions; and 
so too may be Wittgenstein's view of the proper place for philosophy. In Pears' analysis, 
the critical philosophies of Kant and Wittgenstein do not abandon speculative 
metaphysics but rather put it in its proper perspective as an extrapolation of thought and 
language often in the right direction but beyond what can properly be, in Kant's case, 
thought or, in Wittgenstein' s case, articulated. Pears describes it as mistaking the 
geometrical points of a diagram for discrete features of the object described. 201 When 
discussing causality, for example, we are considering a feature of the grid thought 
imposes on reality rather than a feature of reality independent of thought; but Pears holds 
that for practical purposes, this loss of an independent metaphysical ground does not 
weaken the analysis since in either case causality is a feature of the world we apprehend. 
Thoughts and expressions with respect to causality can be explored to give us an 
201 Pears, p. 29. 
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understanding of the structure of reality; but to suggest on the basis of speculative 
reasoning that causality is an objective feature of reality independent of thought is to 
move one step beyond what we have the foundation to say. 
Certainly the disciplines of religion and morality cannot be what they are in the 
absence of speculative propositions. The questions at the root of these disciplines - Is 
there a God? Am I immortal? Am I free? - purport to regard matters wholly beyond the 
scope of the world of experience. Pears says critical philosophers have dealt with these 
disciplines in either of four ways: 1) by treating them as the subjects of scientific (or, 
more accurately, "pseudo-scientific") inquiry; 2) by rejecting them as dealing with 
nonsense; 3) by recognizing them as being outside the bounds of scientific knowledge 
and inquiry and therefore to some degree articulable even though, properly speaking, the 
logical construction of scientific inquiry is the only vehicle for sensible epistemological 
discourse; and 4) by viewing them and carefully describing them naturalistically as 
aspects of the way we are. Pears says Kant and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus embrace 
the third strategy while Hume and the later Wittgenstein embrace the fourth. Having 
placed religion and morality outside the bounds of sensible factual discourse, the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, in Pears' words, "might draw some subtle distinction 
between good and bad nonsense"209 so as to preserve religion and morality as meaningful 
209 Pears, p. 56. 
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disciplines. While these disciplines lack factual sense, they are not unintelligible; but to 
articulate them in descriptive terms would be to subordinate them to factual discourse, 
thereby changing them into what they are not. 
Of course, it is somewhat beside the point that Wittgenstein leaves room for 
discourse about religion and morality since the Tractatus is not composed of discourse of 
these kinds. What the TractatliS evidently is composed of is discourse about the nature of 
reality and our apprehension of it that presents itself as speculative metaphysics and holds 
itself to be necessarily true. The question that must be asked still, then, is whether 
Wittgenstein leaves room to ground philosophical discourse as an exercise in pointing or 
showing such that the Tractatus can stand on its own terms without collapsing in self-
contradiction? Consideration of this question is complicated by the fact that the later 
Wittgenstein views pessimistically the capacity of his earlier work to succeed on this 
point. 
Arguably, through the eyes of the Wittgenstein who wrote in the Tractatus that its 
thoughts were true and its effectiveness in solving the problems of philosophy was 
complete, the Tractatus can stand with consistency on its own terms only if it is regarded 
as something akin to myth and moral doctrine, both of which are expressible only outside 
the realm of factual discourse. The Tract alliS is myth in the sense that it expresses truth 
while itself collapsing in the metaphor of a discarded ladder. The Tractatus is moral 
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doctrine in the sense that it commissions the philosopher to weed out of factual discourse 
any statement - including any statement of speculative metaphysics - that does not survive 
the test of clarity: namely, that it is a truth-function of the elementary propositions into 
which it can be analyzed without remnant. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that 
Wittgenstein indicates ' 4ethics and aesthetics are one"210• The greater part of the final 
sections of the Tractatus, where matters of religion and morality are discussed, is 
composed of negative propositions suggesting it is an active corrective against the 
excesses of speculative metaphysics. It may be the case, then, that the Tractatus is an 
ethical-esthetic work whose purpose is to set the limits of the factual world and its 
language which it transcends while imbuing us with not only true understanding of the 
world but also the moral imperative to purge from factual language any language about 
the world that fails to meet the truth-functional test. The truth expressed in the Tractatus 
in this way rests in the knowledge of the one who has thought it, in silence; and this is 
therefore why Wittgenstein says in his Preface that only those who have thought the 
thoughts behind it will understand it since, by implication, its truth does not rest in the 
propositions through which it is articulated. 
If this analysis is taken to be accurate, then Wittgenstein need not ground 
synthetic a priori propositions since his philosophical discourse does not pretend to be 
210 Tractatus, section 6.421. 
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anything other than myth with a moral imperative (in the Biblical sense .. much as to say 
.,In the beginning was the name .. and the name was of the object, and the name and the 
object were one" and so forth). Pears argues that Wittgenstein is writing from within 
language, plotting its limits; and certainly Wittgenstein must work with words and 
propositions which are the stuff of which the world is made. Kant too works from within 
the system to plot its limits. Kant plots the limits of what can be thought while 
Wittgenstein plots the limits of what can be said while evidently leaving room to think 
truths which cannot be said; so is it enough to say Wittgenstein can avoid grounding 
synthetic a priori truths because his philosophy operates outside the limits he draws for 
the world where Kant's philosophy has nowhere to stand but within the world of thought 
that he delimits? That conclusion suggests Wittgenstein's is a speculative rather than 
strictly critical philosophy, and built of propositions that do not withstand the scrutiny of 
logic; so let us put aside that conclusion for now to consider the following. 
The character of the conclusion of Kant's critical analysis is conditional: that 
such-and-such a characterization of the world is the condition of the possibility of our 
taking the world to be the way that we take it to be. In the end his system is a deep 
tautology: that we have to take the world to be thus in order to take the world to be thus; 
or x iffx; or x c x. Kant's system, in the final analysis .. says that how thought is .. is how 
thought is; and he never escapes from this to comment on reality beyond thought - the 
noumenal realm of the thing-in-itself. So Kant's synthetic a priori truths -such as that 
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about causality, which is not analytic because it could be otherwise without inherent 
contradiction - are necessary within the system and necessary within thought, but not 
absolutely necessary since there is no perspective from which the absolute can be 
comprehended. But why should it be for Kant that the truths of logic obtain? Why 
should it not be the case that x c not-x? Is logic borrowed from outside the phenomenal 
realm, or is it part of the world? If the latter is the case, then Kant's reasoning is circular: 
for it is a circular to say it is logically necessary that logical necessity be the case. Yet 
without logical necessity, Kant has no tools with which to conduct his deduction. 
Therefore, either Kant's a priori truths are contingent on the acceptance of the validity of 
logic (which is to say they depend on the thesis that nothing can make sense unless 
making sense means something) and are therefore something less than absolutely 
necessary; or else his a priori truths are speculative, based on an assumption that logic 
really does obtain absolutely. What does this do to critical philosophy? Evidently it 
means that critical philosophy is a careful analysis of thought within the conditional 
framework that logic obtains. Critical philosophy, therefore, cannot say what philosophy 
purports to say: what is necessarily the case independent of contingencies. In either case, 
it is a speculative philosophy. 
Wittgenstein is honest in placing logic outside the realm of factual propositions: 
in other words, outside the world. For example, consider the following sections of the 
Tractatus: 
llO 
Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside 
logic all is accident. 
The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is 
obviously a significant proposition. - And therefore it cannot be a law a 
priori either. 
The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. 
All propositions, such as the law of causation, the law of continuity in · 
nature, the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., all these are a priori 
intuitions of possible forms of the propositions of science. 211 
That there is any truth in the laws of logic is grounded outside the contingent world of 
factual propositions. As does Kant's system, Wittgenstein's defines the matrix that is 
imposed on our world. As does Kant's, Wittgenstein's presupposes that the matrix is a 
matrix whose elements govern by and are governed by logic. As does Kant, Wittgenstein 
takes the veracity of logic as given. As does Kant, the Wittgenstein ofthe Tractatus 
therefore employs speculative metaphysics as the grounds of his critical philosophy. But 
unlike Kant, Wittgenstein backs away from the system he has created, allowing the 
necessities established in his critical philosophy to be rendered nonsensical and therefore 
inarticulable. When Wittgenstein says the law of induction is not a law but the form of 
any law12 and then backs away from having said anything meaningful, Wittgenstein is 
toying with the idea of synthetic a priori truths but then abandoning them as inarticulable, 
21 1 Tractatus, sections 6.3, 6.31, 6.2 and 6.34 respectively. [emphasis 
Wittgenstein' s] 
212 Tractatus, sections 6.32 and 6.36. 
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letting the kind of conclusion Kant reaches stand only as the implication that shows itself, 
not as a necessary truth that can be said. What Wittgenstein in the end backs away from 
saying, then, cannot be construed as saying the kind of thing that Kant says even though a 
Kantian conclusion may be the one he has in mind. 
These questions of reference and the synthetic a priori need not arise, on Richard 
Rorty's analysis.:m First, regarding the synthetic a priori, Rorty dismisses the Kantian 
presumption, presumed by others to obtain in Wittgenstein's analysis, that synthesis is 
meaningful and required for the analysis to proceed. To counter the place of synthesis in 
the analysis, Rorty questions the presumption that there is a manifold in the first place 
that needs synthesizing. He says "we are never conscious of unsynthesized intuitions, nor 
of concepts apart from their application to intuitions"21"; but, while Kant uses this 
observation to justify a leap from knowing based on perceiving objects, in the Lockean 
sense, to knowing based on propositions which organize the world, Rorty challenges 
Kant's assumption that the unsynthesized intuitions of which he is not conscious are there 
as a manifold at all. He asks "how do we get our information about intuitions prior to 
synthesis? How, for instance, do we know that there is more than one ofthem?nzls He 
213 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). 
214 Rorty, p. 154. 
215 Rorty, p. 154. 
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expands on this criticism in the footnote: 
Suppose a mystic tells us that intuition presents us with unity - the white 
radiance of eternity -whereas conceptual thinking (like a dome of many-
colored glass) breaks this up into a multiplicity. How could we decide 
whether he or Kant was right about whether unity was correlated with 
receptivity or with spontaneity? How could it matter~16 
He argues that9 if the synthesizing machinery and conceptual raw material of synthesis in 
the transcendental deduction are phenomenal, then we do have knowledge of them, 
despite Kant 9 s presumption to the contrary. If on the other hand they are taken to be 
noumenal, then nothing can be known of them9 including the little bit of information we 
need to get the deduction going. Without a foundation for the deduction, says Rorty, 
Kant's entire Copernican revolution- knowledge of the propositional which supersedes 
knowledge of the object - is impossible; but moreover, it is pointless, since the entire 
point of the revolution is to ground the synthetic a priori9 which itself has not been 
established except through an unwarranted prejudice that undermines its a-priority. 
This challenge would seem to leave the individual in a position of solipsism 
regarding what is the case and what is not; but Rorty deconstructs this myth9 focusing his 
attention on the question of reference. He challenges the validity of questions about 
whether the elementary propositions of a Wittgenstein-like analysis only seem to refer to 
the real world or really do refer to the real wor!d. Rorty says the distinction is grounded 
216 Rorty, p. 154n. [parentheses Rorty's) 
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in an old but indefensible notion of duality that places the clouded mind over against the 
actual world. He says the notion was brought forward most recently in the argument by 
Hilary Putnam that there must be truth in reference to preclude the disastrous conclusion 
that no theoretical term ever refers. Countering Putnam's concern, Rorty notes that there 
is no assurance the terms of current scientific theory will be seen, in the light of future 
theories, as referring or that the terms of those future theories will be seen in the light of 
their successors as referring; so grounding a position whose intent seems to be to assert 
the contrary seems dangerously artificial and counterproductive. He calls reference an 
"ali-or-nothing affair" whose function in theories does nothing to assuage fears that the 
world is not as the theory describes it.217 Rorty questions the point of having theories in 
which meaningful reference is supposed to defeat skepticism, saying their function is 
grounded in the conflation of two beliefs taken together to undermine intentional ism: 
namely, the failure of the definition of reference that holds that an "Sn refers to whatever 
entity would make most of someone's central beliefs about an "X" true; and the 
assumption that the validity of reference rests on one's having a corpus of true beliefs of 
the world. 211 In other words, intentionalism is seen to fail insofar as it cannot guarantee 
that the actual world is accurately mirrored in language. But Rorty points out that 
"reference" can mean either pointing (a factual relation) or mentioning (talking about 
217 Rorty, p. 287. 
211 Rorty. P. 288. 
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something); and mentioning can "refer'' to fictions as well as facts. He argues there is not 
only no need to posit 'really true' pointing reference as a check on justifiable (or 
"warranted assertiblen21") mentioning, but no basis for such a posit. There can be no 
reference to truth, but only a justification of mentioning in contexts of various widths. 
Reference, then, is reduced to the act of measuring events according to the truth-
functional prescripts of logic. He says those who argue a theory of reference is required 
are searching for either a general theory of meaning in accordance with which a 
historiographical presentation of philosophy and science can be achieved, or an 
epistemologically independent 'transcendental' standpoint from which one can judge the 
veracity of the representation-object relations that obtain in experience; the former he 
calls trivial and the latter - which is what 'theory of reference' is intended to mean - he 
calls impossible since the reasoning by which it is established is necessarily circular. He 
concludes "[ o ]ur best theory about what we are referring to is merely noncontroversial 
fallout from our best theory about things in general"220• We do not get beyond that point. 
Reading a theory of reference and synthesis into such a project, as Kant does, says Rorty, 
is more than can or should be done. Wittgenstein does not do it, nor does he need to do 
it. 
219 Rorty, p. 294. 
220 Rorty, p. 294. [brackets mine] 
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4.2 A Phenomenological Analysis 
Wittgenstein's project has also been compared to Husserlian phenomenology. 
Gier believes Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Husserl and embraced concepts 
that were distinctly Husserlian, even in Wittgenstein's early period when the Tractatus 
was composed.221 To demonstrate the point, he cites A Companion to Wittgenstein 's 
"Tractatus" in which author Max Black argues there is in the Tractatus a ••striking 
parallel" to Husserl' s "pure logico-grammatical doctrine of forms". 222 Others who see 
similar parallels to Husserlian phenomenology in the Tractatus include C.A. van 
Peurson223, Barry Smith224, and James L. Marsh225• 
Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge note a '•striking similarity" in problems 
221 Gier, pp. 99-101. 
222 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein 's "Tractatus" (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1964), pp. 136-137. In Gier, p. 99. 
223 C.A. van Peurson, ••Husserl and Wittgenstein", Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 20 (1959), pp. 182-184. In Gier, p. 240n. 
224 Barry Smith, "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy", 
Willgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought: Proceedings of the Second 
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1977 (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978), p. 
33. In Gier, p. 99. 
225 James L. Marsh, "The Triumph of Ambiguity: Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein'\ Philosophy Today, 19 (1975), p. 251. In Gier, p. 99. 
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identified and elucidated by Wittgenstein and phenomenologists. 226 Both Wittgenstein 
and Husserl attempt to get at the objects themselves~ though what is meant by this must 
be qualified. For Husserl, the distinction between appearance and reality must be 
destroyed and replaced by an effort to get beyond the presuppositions of particular 
conceptual frameworks according to which objects are encountered, in order to grasp 
'pure' phenomena. Husserl's student Merleau-Ponty qualifies this effort, noting there is 
only the world as experienced and not things-in-themselves behind that world. This, say 
the authors~ is precisely what Wittgenstein seems to argue at one point in the Tractatus, 
particularly in his presentation of the 'I' in solipsism that limits experience.227 Yet, they 
say, Wittgenstein also seems to be presenting an ontology of real objects, though there is 
little to defme those objects beyond saying they are a limit on experience. 221 Carruthers, 
for his part, takes exception to their project, deeming them to be ''obviously mistaken" in 
their presumption that Wittgenstein belongs in the continental tradition of epistemology 
that includes phenomenologist Husserl along with Brentano and Meinong. 229 The striking 
similarities, however, do warrant investigation. 
226 Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge, The Metaphysics ofWittgenstein 's 
"Tractatus". (Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy: Monograph Series) (Melbourne: The 
Australasian Association of Philosophy, 1982), p. 22. 
227 Goddard and Judge, p. 24. 
221 Goddard and Judge, p. 68. 
229 Carruthers, 189n. 
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Gier defines Wittgenstein's phenomenology in view of passages in Wittgenstein 
und der Wiener Kreis and Philosophical Remarks: "(p ]by sics wants to establish 
regularities. it does not look for what is possible.... Phenomenology always deals only 
with possibility, i.e. the sense (Sinn), not with truth and falsehood"230; and 
"[p)henomenology only establishes the possibilities. Thus phenomenology would be the 
grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories,.231 • These 
passages suggest Wittgenstein sees his project as the search for the fonnal conditions of 
the possibility of the experience of facts. In Gier's view, Husserl and Wittgenstein share 
a belief that a philosophical grammar can be elucidated that is more fundamental than 
traditional logic, that is completely free of psychology and that relies on no application to 
empirical content. 232 By providing the tools for an architecture of logical forms. such a 
grammar allows the construction of true and false propositions without showing whether 
any particular proposition is true or false. Propositions that properly conform to the 
architecture have a sense and on that basis alone are candidates for actualization. 
Gier identifies in the works of both Husserl and Wittgenstein a distinction 
230 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, (Conversations 
recorded by F. Waismann), B. F. McGuinness (ed.) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967), p. 63. 
In Gier, p. 94. [parentheses Gier's; brackets mine] 
231 Philosophical Remarks, p. 51. In Gier, p. 94. [brackets mine] 
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" o· 99 ~ 1er, p. . 
ll8 
between nonsense (Unsinn) and senselessness (Sinnlosiglceit or, for Husserl, Widersinn). 
The distinction rests in 'the pure logic of meaning-forms'; in other words, the logic that 
allows a meaningful proposition to be distinguished from a meaningless proposition 
irrespective of its empirical application. In Husserl' s presentation, grammatically proper 
propositions such as 'a round square' may not be nonsensical, since they follow the 
grammatical rules, but may be senseless, because their inherent tautologousness or, in this 
case, contradictoriness makes them absurd. Similarly for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, 
propositions such as 'a round square' violate no rules of grammar so are not nonsensical 
but, since they say nothing meaningful given their inherently contradictoriness, they are 
senseless. Gier notes with interest that Wittgenstein here stands with phenomenologists 
in calling such propositions 'senseless' instead of standing with Frege in calling them 
'referenceless' .233 
Another distinction that obtains similarly in the works of Husserl and 
Wittgenstein is that between 'state of affairs' (Sachverha/ten) and 'positive facts' 
(Tatsachen).234 'States of affairs' are formed by the relation (verhalten) of meaning-
things (Sachen) to other meanings, while 'positive facts' are facts that are the case and 
can be sensibly perceived. Gier notes there is a further direct parallel on this point 
233 Gier, pp. 100-101. 
234 Gier, pp. 103-104. 
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between Husserl's 'objective' and 'non·objective' Sachverhalten and Wittgenstein's 
'existing' and 'non-existing' Sachverhalten. Wittgenstein discusses the existence and 
non-existence of Sachverhalten in section 2.06 of the Tractatus. Gier notes it is a matter 
of dispute whether Sachverha/ten for Wittgenstein should be translated as 'atomic facts', 
as Ogden evidently believes, or 'possible facts'. Gier makes the case for the latter, 
arguing it is the only translation that makes possible Wittgenstein's statement elsewhere 
that a particular Sachverhalte is inconceivable. 
A third similarity between Husserl and Wittgenstein, especially in the period 
following the publishing of the Tractatus, is the reliance on a kind of bracketing or 
epoche.23s Gier says Wittgenstein demonstrates bracketing when he proscribes the use of 
hypothetical entities, whether they be those of traditional metaphysics or the theoretical 
entities of natural science. Only the phenomena of immediate experience can be 
considered proper candidates as intentional objects, and these intentional objects are 
taken not to be objects independent of the experience of them. Gier sees Wittgenstein's 
phenomenological program collapsed in a particular passage of Wittgenstein' s usome 
Remarks on Logical Form" in which he writes that a "logical analysis of phenomena 
themselves ... [would supply us with the] forms of space and time and with the manifold 
of spatial and temporal objects, with colors, and sounds, etc .... all of which we cannot 
ns Gier, pp. 104-109. 
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seize by our ordinary means of expression"236• While experience is bracketed during this 
activity, says Gier, this does not mean the "I' who undertakes this activity is an object of 
its thinking. Rather, Wittgenstein, like Husserl's successor Heidegger, conceives of the 
self existentially as an already-given Being-in-the-world, not a figure guaranteed 
transcendentally through the synthetic activity of consciousness.237 That the subject is not 
defined by or contained in either the phenomenological world or the phenomenological 
analysis is suggested, one might argue, in the fifth division of the Tractatus, where 
Wittgenstein says "I am my world"231; "[t]he subject does not belong to the world ... "239; 
and "(t]he I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the •world is my world"'240• In 
treating the world as 'my world' and bracketing it for a phenomenologically-reductive 
analysis, says Gier, Wittgenstein tits well into the phenomenological tradition. 
While Gier believes Wittgenstein's embrace of phenomenology is progressive, 
materializing most strongly in his later writings, Thomas Munson believes Wittgenstein is 
pursuing essentially the same project in his latest writings that he had undertaken in the 
236 Ludwig Wittgenstein, '"Some Remarks on Logical Fonn", Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (Suppl.), 9 (1929), pp. 163, 165. In Gier, p. 106. [brackets and 
omissions mine] 
237 Gier, pp. 108-109. 
231 Tractatus, section 5.63. 
239 Tractatus, section 5.632. [brackets and omission mine] 
240 Tractatus, section 5.641. [brackets mine] 
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Tractatus and, as such. it cannot properly be characterized as phenomenological. He says 
"despite incidental differences the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and of the [Philosophical 
Investigations] are cut of the same cloth"241 and there is a "continuous unity"242 
connecting the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, with the fonner's reliance 
on logical atomism and logical positivism - two features that do not fit with the 
phenomenological approach, he argues. This criticism is far from devastating, given 
Wittgenstein's efforts to separate his work from, particularly, the logical positivists. 
More damaging, it can be argued, is the criticism by Paul Ricoeur. In a 1966 
lecture2-43, Ricoeur undertakes a comparison ofHusserl's phenomenology and 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, finding a similarity of intended function linking the two. He 
says, just as Husserl seeks to ground a theory of meaning distinct from that of logical 
propositions, so Wittgenstein seeks to ground a picture theory distinct from that of truth 
conditions. Wittgenstein's reason for seeking this ground is that truth-functional 
propositions are not sufficient to account for his presentation in the Tractatus. Where 
truth-functional propositions have as their extreme forms tautologies and contradictions 
241 Thomas N. Munson, S.J., ''Wittgenstein's Phenomenology", Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 23 (1962-63), p. 37. 
242 Munson, p. 49. 
243 Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language", PhePlomenology and 
Existentialism, E. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds.) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1967), pp. 207-217. 
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which have no sense, "[t]he Tractatus must also take into account a nontautological 
concept of tru~ truth as concordance between propositions and facts"244• While the 
picture and what it depicts in Wittgenstein's theory are related by identity, what is less 
clear is how the pictorial form works for facts that do not necessarily have existence: that 
is, pictures that represent possible facts, pictures that represent nonexistent facts and 
pictures that falsely represent existing facts. 
Here the '~sense" is no more something in common, but an inner feature: 
there may be representation (Darstellung) without depiction (Abbildung). 
This concept of Darstellung as distinct from that of Abbi/dung is the 
closest to phenomenology.... As in Plato, the idea is an idea of something 
but not necessarily of something which is. Here phenomenology occurs.24~ 
The problem for Wittgenstein's approach, according to Ricoeur, is that the 
phenomenology cannot be maintained because the possibility of reflexivity is eliminated. 
By forbidding the kind of reflexivity essential to phenomenology, Wittgenstein not only 
ensures the Tractatus is not a work of phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition but, 
more importantly, undermines his project. 
This argument is explored by Robert Arrington246 in a critical examination of 
244 Ricoeur, p. 209. 
24~ Ricoeur, p. 211. [parentheses Ricoeur's; omissions mine] 
246 Robert L. Arringto~ "Wittgenstein and Phenomenology", Philosophy Today, 
22 (1978), pp. 287-300. 
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Ricoeur's article. The article, Arrington says, concludes Wittgenstein is not a 
phenomenologist fmt or last. What the Tractatus needs and lacks, Arrington's Ricoeur 
says, is a phenomenological reduction that provides for intentional acts and their 
intentional correlates. The phenomenological reduction is denied because, first, 
Wittgenstein's account lacks reflexivity in its account of language and philosophy and, 
second, its account of propositions and meaning is harshly realistic. Reflexivity is denied 
through Wittgenstein's insistence that the proposition cannot depict the way in which it 
represents a fact. Reduction is denied because the proposition is itself a natural fact 
constituted by a concatenation of names. lfthe language and the world are viewed rigidly 
in this way, then it is not possible to step back and view the world as a system of 
meanings intended by a consciousness free from the constraints of the world of fact. 
Ricoeur argues that phenomenology requires a distance-creating movement of reduction 
followed by a reconciling return to reality - a duality or dialectic that Wittgenstein' s 
project does not allow. Arrington acknowledges the Tractatus does not lend itself to 
reinterpretation in phenomenological terms because of the language it employs. He tests 
the hypothesis that undertaking a linguistic reduction may accomplish the bracketing 
phenomenology requires, but he rejects the result on the grounds that a 'mentioning' 
language completely bracketed from ordinary. language is no language at all.2" 7 While 
Arrington sees similarities between Wittgenstein' s project and those of 
247 Arrington, p. 299. 
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phenomenologists, he concludes the projects are finally incompatible: Wittgenstein is not 
a phenomenologist. 
4.3 A Semiotieal Analysis 
Some proffer a semiotical analysis ofWittgenstein's project. Cecil Brown241 
describes the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus as practising "pure semiotics' where his later 
works abandon the fabricated universal transformational grammar characteristic of pure 
semiotics in favour of the observation and description that is characteristic of 'descriptive 
semiotics'. Practitioners of pure semiotics such as Noam Chomsky believe the capacity 
to operate in a language is grounded in a pre-existing structure of rules embedded in the 
speaker which give the speaker linguistic competence: the ability to use a language. 
"[T]ransformational grammar attempts to describe explicitly the rules to which a speaker 
of a language attends in order to use signs grammatically and meaningfully. "249 The base 
rules of the transformational grammar are fundamental to all natural language and can be 
filtered out to construct a fundamental abstract language that can be used to analyze any 
natural language. Brown says this transformational deep structure is the equivalent of the 
artificial language presumed by Wittgenstein when he writes the Tractatus and also by 
2
"
1 Cecil Brown, Wittgensteinian Linguistics {The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1974). 
249 Brown, p. 13. [brackets Brown's) 
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the logical positivists. 2!o Brown credits Wittgenstein with introducing the notion of a 
fundamental artificial language into twentieth century philosophy when he advocates ·~e 
construction of a sign-language that excludes errors inherent in the grammars of 
languages"251 • Inasmuch as it invents a language to talk about signs, Wittgenstein's 
project, says Brown, constitutes pure semiotics. 
However, Wittgenstein's analysis in the Tractatus is criticized from a semiotical 
perspective by Paolo Teobaldelli.2s2 On Teobaldelli's view, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus 
sets out to establish a gapless, mirror-like relation between thinking and reality such that 
thinking is nothing but a representation of states of affairs. Because of the identity of 
'form of reality' and •logical form', "language is the medium through which the facts of 
[the] world projected as facts in the logical space become perceptible"2!3• Teobaldelli 
sees a parallel to phenomenological psychology's 'ingenue realism' in Wittgenstein's 
description of the proposition as a projection of a state of affairs, which projection comes 
to existence when the sense of the proposition - the object to which it refers - is thought. 
The proposition is the form of the sense of the object and not the sense itself; but in its 
2So Brown, p. 14. 
2St Brown, p. 15. 
2S2 Paolo Teobaldelli, "Signification and Knowledge: A Semiotical Philosophical 
Analysis ofWittgenstein's Work", Sincronia, spring 1998. Retrieved 01 June 2000 from 
the World Wide Web: http://fuentes.csh.udg.mx/CUCSWSincronia/Spring98.html 
253 Teobaldelli, p. 2 of 14. [emphasis Teobaldelli's; brackets and insertion mine] 
126 
own cognitive dimension, the form is an object. Teobaldelli here compares 
Wittgenstein's analysis with Husserl's: 
Both try, as a matter of fact, to establish an essential relation between the 
physical object and the perceived, finding it for what concerns Husserl in 
the apriori-form of perception which resists to the transcendental 
reduction, and for what concerns Wittgenstein in the logical form which 
constitutes the mirroring of the object within the logical space. Both try to 
isolate a 'form', a dimension other than the empirical or phenomenic data 
which fulfils this space. 2s.a 
The logical identity of logical form and the world escapes the Cartesian division of reality 
into the conscious and the physical, but it creates a new problem. Where the analysis 
fails, on Teobaldelli's view, is in its inability to express a self-reflective view or to 
account for semiotical states of affairs. Yet, to the extent that such representations are a 
part of natural experience, these representations do become objects. The difficulty is that 
propositions about such objects have as their sense the forms of other objects, and this 
evokes a triadic relationship rather than the two-moment relationship defmed by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. On this view, then, the Tractatus can embrace just two 
moments incorporating thinking and reality even though a third is implied. 
The problem with this analysis is that it assumes Wittgenstein's is a faulty 
semiotical analysis that can be rescued by adding a third, reflexive moment. To add such 
a moment would be to ignore the fact that the self-reflective and semiotical propositions 
254 Teobaldelli, p. 4 of 14. [emphasis Teobaldelli's] 
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the critic believes are essential to discourse are expressly rejected by Wittgenstein in the 
text9 no matter how much it seems that Wittgenstein does employ such propositions to 
construct the text. Wittgenstein clearly believes one cannot separate out mental acts for 
propositional analysis, though he clearly also does not want to claim such cognitive 
activity is not going on. To distort Wittgenstein's work by adding tenets expressly 
rejected in his work is unjustifiable. 
This semiotical analysis, like the phenomenological and critical analyses 
considered above, evidently faults Wittgenstein's Tractatus for failing to live up to 
standards that Wittgenstein himself has not set for the Tractatus. The Tractatus is not 
expressly set forth as a work of either Kantian criticism, Husserlian phenomenology or 
semiotics. While incorporating Wittgenstein' s work into either of these traditions might 
provide comfort to the adherents of the respective traditions, particularly when they view 
his Tractatus as a difficult or ineffective work, it is unfair to twist Wittgenstein's words 
to produce a conclusion the Tractatus does not support and indeed clearly rejects on its 
own terms. To consider the Tractatus rightly, one must take it on its own terms and yield 
not to the temptation to force the work to conform to some other philosophical approach. 
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Chapter V - Embracing Operations: 
What What Wittgenstein Says Doesn't Say 
Taking Wittgenstein's philosophy on its own terms is the project of Mathieu 
Marion in his book Wittgenstein, Finilism, and the Foundations of Mathematics 255• 
There he argues that, if for Wittgenstein philosophy has become an exercise in showing 
rather than saying, his approach is prefigured in his approach to mathematics. Marion's 
book is an elaboration on the theme that Wittgenstein's is "a form of reduction of 
arithmetic to a theory of'operations' (as opposed to a theory of'classes' such as that of 
Russell's Principia Mathematica)"256• 
Marion sets the stage for his argument by contending that the relative lack of 
attention for Wittgenstein's work on mathematics is based on the groundless popular 
view that his mathematical work is not merely of little significance but, moreover, flawed 
in its conception though not with fatal consequences for his other work. Marion 
disagrees on all these points, contending instead that his mathematical work is not only 
well-formed and cohesive in its conception but, moreover, at the very foundation of his 
255 Mathieu Marion, Wittgenstein. Finilism, and the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
256 Marion, p. 3. [parentheses Marion's] 
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work in philosophy generally and for that reason of critical importance to one who would 
understand Wittgenstein~s arguments generally, which his early critics- perhaps because 
of an anti-constructivist bias- did not.257 
Marion begins by placing Wittgenstein's anti-Platonism in its historical context~ 
delineating the battle between Leopold Kronecker, a nineteenth-century mathematician 
widely regarded as the father of modem constructivism in mathematics, and Georg 
Cantor. He argues that Cantor's set theory, which "cannot be dissociated from a Platonist 
philosophyn25a because of its insistence on pre-existing formal sets, draws fue from 
Kronecker, who views mathematics as a construction-like exercise of calculating on the 
basis of arithmetical algorithms without reference to pre-existing sets. Though 
Wittgenstein probably never read Kronecker's work, Marion argues, his position is in line 
with Kronecker's and for that reason shares its cohesiveness. Marion quotes Wittgenstein 
writing: 
Mathematics consists entirely of calculations. 
In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning: 
even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to 
talk aboul mathematical things. Even these words are used to construct an 
algorithm. ~9 
:u1 M · ·· · anon,pp.vu-xt. 
~~ M . 2 anon, p .. 
259 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 
468.ln Marion, p. 4. [emphasis Wittgenstein's] Note that this is evidently a different 
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The Platonist-constructivist distinction is also articulated by Michael Dummett. 260 
While for Platonists the mathematical objects are there with their relations to be 
discovered by the observer, for constructivists the observer constructs mathematical 
entities along the way. It follows, then, that for the Platonist, a mathematical statement's 
meaning consists in the proving true or false of its correspondence with a pre.-existing 
reality. In contrast, for the constructivist, 
the general form of an explanation of meaning must be in terms of the 
conditions under which we regard ourselves as justified in asserting a 
statement, that is, the circumstances in which we are in possession of a 
proof. For instance, a statement made up of two statements joined by a 
connective is to be explained by explaining a claim to have proved the 
complex statement in terms of what a claim to have proved the constituent 
statements consists in; thus a claim to have proved r A or Bl will be a claim 
to have a method leading either to a proof of A or to a proof of B. 261 
Although in Wittgenstein' s view nothing in mathematics is meaning, yet we 
achieve revelations from mathematical proofs that spur us to try to express what cannot 
be expressed without violating the proper limits of language. 
The proof lets us see something. What it shows, however, cannot be 
expressed by means of a proposition. Thus it is also impossible to say, 
'The axioms are consistent.' (Any more more [sic] than you can say, 
version of this text from the one cited by Gier and footnoted above. 
260 Dummett, pp. ll 0-134. 
261 Dummett, p. Ill. 
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'There are infmitely many numbers.' That is everyday prose.)262 
For Wittgenstein. mathematical terms are not signs standing for or describing pre--existing 
abstract structures beyond them. Rather than describe mathematics, its terms do 
mathematics; and we, too, are not able adequately to describe mathematics but can only 
do it. "And that of itself abolishes every 'set theory"', Wittgenstein writes.263 
Following the nineteenth century, proponents of set theory pursue a somewhat 
altered approach. Peter Gustav Lejeune-Dirichlet proposes replacing the notion of a 
function defined by a formula with the notion of a graph where each value of x is 
presented with its corresponding value of y. This presentation is taken by its proponents 
to point to and elicit an awareness of an 'arbitrary function' beyond it. For this reason, 
the approach has become known an extensionalism, where the number pairs are taken to 
extend beyond themselves to the arbitrary formula which they elicit. 
Those who reject extensionalism and adopt its converse, intensionalism, hold that 
the values of y correlating with their respective values of x are directly or indirectly 
defined in terms of some procedure of computation. In place of a disclosable arbitrary 
262 Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, from the notes ofF. Waismann 
(Oxford: Blackwell. 1979), p. 137. In Marion, p. 5. [parentheses in the quotation; brackets 
mine] 
263 Philosophical Remarks, p. 159. In Marion, p. 6. 
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function, the constructivists put a computational procedure by which values of y are 
calculated for their respective values of x. Historically, this led to the development of 
what has been called lambda-calculus: a calculus in which computational fonnulas are 
treated as operators which produce various results when the operations are applied to 
arguments, also called variables or objects. Marion explains it like this: 
The notion that lambda-calculus was originally devised to capture is ... 
precisely not that of a function as a set of ordered pairs but, rather, that of 
a function as an 'operation' which may be applied to some 'object' to 
produce another 'object'. The latter notion was given the name of 
'operator' in order to distinguish it from the set-theoretical notion of 
function. An essential difference between these two notions is that an 
operator is defined by describing how it transfonns an input (i.e. by a 
'fonnula'), without defining the set of inputs, i.e. without defming its 
domain. Moreover, there is no restriction on the domain of some 
operators. (Some operators are self-applicable, but that is not the case 
with functions.) To use again the tenninology of intension and extension, 
we can say that the notion of operator is intensional, while the notion of 
function as a set of ordered pairs is purely extensional. 264 
Wittgenstein rejects the notion of extension as a remnant of Platonism, which he 
opposes both in its weak sense and in its stronger, more radical sense. Regarding the 
weak sense, he rejects the notion held by contemporary mathematicians such as Friedrich 
W aismann and others that after we have generated mathematics, we find our creation to 
be governed by rules we have not detennined, as if the mathematics we have defined 
discloses a reality other than and beyond that which we have constructed. Wittgenstein 
argues, rather, that the mathematics we generate "is not a description of something, but 
264 Marion, p. 12. 
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the thing itself. We make mathematics. "265 In other words, there is in mathematics no 
autonomy from those who create it and no form or essence beyond that which we defme 
in creating it. Wittgenstein rejects Platonism in the strong sense by contending it is 
impossible to discover anything in mathematics, for it is entirely created in the same way 
that grammar is created. 
Wittgenstein's rejection of mathematics as a description contradicts both Frege's 
foundations of arithmetic and Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. 
Wittgenstein argues the two enterprises are not wrong in content so much as misguided in 
intent. The Principia is intended to reproduce what the word 'infinite' really means when 
applied, but in fact the Principia - as would any other such theory - becomes bogged 
down in conceptual talk about its intent instead of merely presenting a series of 
calculations that stand on their own. Insofar as they reach to describe the activity of 
calculating and its limits instead of just calculating, such theories overstep their proper 
bounds and become, as Wittgenstein would put it, 'uninteresting'. Moreover, since the 
entire point of such systems of calculus is to defme in this way the limits of application of 
calculations, they are uninteresting in their very essence and wholly misguided. 
Wittgenstein' s role with respect to the various systems of calculus he encounters, 
265 Waismann, p. 34. In Marion, p. 14. [emphasis Wittgenstein's] 
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then, is not to revise them but rather to expose their poindessness and to dissuade 
philosophers and mathematicians from bothering to invent them. 266 Marion's 
presentation illustrates how Wittgenstein' s corrective is brought to bear on several 
fundamental matters of concern in mathematics and logic: for example, the nature and 
place of operations; zero and succession among numbers; generality; identity; numerical 
equivalence; and quantification. These matters are here discussed one by one, beginning 
with the shift Wittgenstein advocates away from the class-based calculus on which so 
many others grounded mathematics. 
In place of the calculus, Wittgenstein proposes a new activity involving the 
elaboration of operations. In Marion's view, operations are central to Wittgenstein's 
articulation of a "logicism without classes" in the Tractatus. His logicism without classes 
is, in effect, a method of reasoning whereby elementary propositions evolve into more 
complex propositions progressively through the serial application of operations. In 
Marion's words, "any given (complex) proposition, from the set; of propositions is the 
result of successive applications of the operation N ... to given propositions taken from the 
set of elementary propositions".267 An operation is defined by the way in which an input 
is transformed into an output. The operation is an internal relation in the sense that two 
266 Marion, p. 19. 
267 Marion, p. 22. [parentheses Marion's] 
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entities are internally related when it is inconceivable that they do not stand in such a 
relation. The output - a more complex proposition than the original - can in tum function 
as the base for the application of the operation to produce a still more complex 
proposition. Marion cites as an example the ''series of fonnsn aRb: 
3x (aRb & xRb) 
3x, y (aRx & xRy & yRh) 
3x, y, z (aRx & xRy & yRz & zRh) 
and so on261 
In Marion's notation, if we take the symbol 0 to indicate the relation or operation, 
the apostrophe in 0' to indicate the result of the application of an operation, and a to 
represent the variable which is the point of departure for the application, then the 
successive application of the operation can be represented as the series a, O'a, O'O'a, 
O'O'O'a, and so forth. The operation is simply that which must happen to a proposition to 
transform it into another. The operation asserts nothing by itself: only its result in 
relation to its antecedent asserts anything. One such set of operations - the truth-
operations of truth-functions- is nothing other than a "mechanical expedient to facilitate 
the recognition of a tautology, where it is complicated", as Wittgenstein states it in 6.1262 
of the Tractatus. Thereby, mechanical operations replace classes as intensionality 
replaces extensionality in Wittgenstein's approach. It is in terms of operations rather than 
classes that Wittgenstein's entire project is defmed. 
268 Marion, p. 24. 
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Marion next describes how Wittgenstein reduces the arithmetical notions of zero 
and succession among numbers to intensional operations. A variable x can be identified 
in terms of an operation n. If x is taken to be the starting point of the application of the 
operation, then the number of times the operation has been applied to produce x in this 
case is zero. In Marion's notation, 0°x is identified withx and means the operation has 
been applied zero times to achieve a result. When the operation is applied one time, the 
unit S is introduced to indicate a single application of the operation, and the result of the 
application is the term n'IJ:t. When the operation is applied a further time, the subsequent 
successive application of the operation is denoted by the term SS, and the result of the 
application of the operation is the term n'\.''0x. The subsequent term in the succession of 
terms will be ~x, and so forth. In this way, numbers are represented as the exponents 
of an operation rather than classes. 
Wittgenstein' s shift from classes to operations also applies in his treatment of 
generality. Generality, defined operationally, means first replacing the variable a in the 
logical prototype aRb with the variable x which collects all instances of -Rb as a set, and 
then working out Vx (xRb) as a truth-function. Wittgenstein believes many, including 
Russell, make the error of failing to distinguish the two forms of generality: one in the 
accidental or empirical sense and the other in the essential or non-accidental sense, where 
generality is established by the application of a formal rule to generate a series. The 
theory of classes in Principia Mathematica needs axioms - for example, the axiom of 
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reducibility and the axiom of infinity - which are not logical propositions but possess at 
best accidental general validity; however, since mathematics demands a generality that is 
not merely accidental, the theory of classes is therefore inadequate to ground it. What is 
needed is the treatment of mathematics as a system rather than the elaboration of 
generalities and totalities; and a system is defined, not as the delineation of class-like 
properties of propositional functions, but rather in terms of operations.269 
Wittgenstein contends some of the critical foundational problems of mathematics 
are grounded in the attempt to replace the operations of arithmetic with classes. The 
problem emerges in the classical account of universal quantification as an infinite logical 
product and in the inductive definitions of numbers. For example, Henri Poincare, in 
seeking to define the infinite class, concludes that mathematics cannot in the end be 
defined predicatively since the totality of the infinite is presupposed in its definition. For 
infinity to be the case prior to its being defined, it must obtain in the Platonic formal 
sense; or, to put it in the Kantian terms Poincare prefers, mathematical induction must be 
synthetic a priori. Russell, too, betrays a desire to replace the operations of mathematics 
with classes. Marion quotes Russell in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy: 
What are the numbers that can be reached, given the terms '0' and 
'successor'? Is there any way by which we can define the whole class of 
such numbers? We reach 1, as the successor of 0; 2, as the successor of 1; 
3, as the successor of2; and so on. It is this 4 and so on' that we wish to 
269 Marion, pp. 35-37. 
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replace by something less vague and indefmite.270 
Marion writes that this is the source of the troubles for those who preach classes: 
This remark is rather important, because the expression 'and so on' that 
Russell wishes to eliminate is precisely the reference to the process of 
iteration which characterizes in the eye of constructivists the series of 
natural numbers. It is precisely in trying to eliminate this 'and so on', and 
therefore any reference to the potentiality of the processes involved, that 
Dedekind, Frege, and Russell produced their circular definitions. 211 
Their troubles include the paradox about classes that do or do not include themselves, 
which Russell felt compelled to address with his theory of types. But Russell's 
corrections ultimately fail, especially as Wittgenstein points out that Russell's reliance on 
the notion of 'a tenn in this fonnal series' in his class-bound approach to numerical 
succession is itself a formal concept that cannot be grounded except circularly. 
Wittgenstein, however, finds he does not need to eliminate the 'and so on' because for 
him mathematics is defined operationally as a recursive or iterative process. He states at 
section 5.2523 of the Tractatus that "[t]he concept of the successive application of an 
operation is equivalent to the concept 'and so on,. 
Wittgenstein's contrast between what can be said and what can only be shown is 
270 Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1919), pp. 20-21. In Marion, p. 41. 
271 Marion, p. 41. 
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apparent in his treatment of identity. While it is generally assumed that mathematical 
equality is a special case of logical identity, Wittgenstein not only contrasts the two but 
argues for the elimination of logical identity. Identity cannot be defined generally as a 
relation between objects- say, in the propositions 3x (x = x) or 'Vx (x = x)- because the 
general expression 'object' asserted in such propositions by the term x stands for a logical 
form, not a concept, and can therefore be expressed properly only by variables in well-
formed propositions, thereby showing itself through the employment of these variables 
rather than being stated directly. Quoting two sections of the Tractatus (here abbreviated 
as TLP), Marion puts it like this: 
... Wittgenstein could not see identity as a relation between objects: as a 
consequence of the ineffability of the name-object relation, the existence 
of an individual can only be shown through the use of its name: 'Identity 
of the object I express by identity of the sign and not by means of a sign of 
identity. Difference of the objects by difference of the signs' (TLP, 5.53). 
His argument against the notion of identity as a relation between objects is 
very simple and powerful: on the one hand it is indeed nonsense to say of 
two different individuals that they are the same; to say, on the other hand, 
of one individual that it is identical to itself is to say nothing (TLP, 
5.5303).:!72 
With respect to numerical equivalence, Wittgenstein rejects the arguments 
invoked by Frege and Russell because they assume what is to be proved. Frege argues 
that two sets F and G are numerically equivalent if and only if they are in one-to-one 
correspondence. Frege's argument stands only if the equivalence notion is conceptually 
272 Marion, pp. 50-51. [parentheses Marion's; omission mine] 
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prior to the notion of number, for otherwise his definition is circular. Wittgenstein allows 
that a kind of correspondence can be produced through the action of pairing off members 
of sets; but he contends this is not at all what is meant by the concept of equivalence. For 
equivalence to be meaningful as a concept9 it must first be established that the possibility 
of a one-to-one correspondence between sets can be established; and that possibility 
cannot be grounded except with reference to the notion of numbers. As Wittgenstein puts 
it9 "the possibility must be an internal relation between the extensions of the concepts, 
but this internal relation is only given through the equality of the 2 numbers".273 The 
notion of numerical equivalence rests on the Platonic assumption that the one-to-one 
correspondence between two sets obtains prior to and independently of their being 
counted. Wittgenstein makes clear his view by way of analogy: "A straight line is drawn 
only when it has been drawn. And this is how it is with numbers too."274 
With respect to quantification, Marion elucidates the positions ofHennann Weyl, 
David Hilbert and Frank Ramsey on quantifying over infmite sets. In Weyl's view, 
propositions containing an existential quantifier- such as F(a)- 3x F(x)- which purport 
to range over the totality of natural numbers do not in fact possess the full status of a 
judgment but are rather judgment-abstracts or rules for judging. So while one can speak 
273 Philosophical Remar/cs, § 118. In Marion, p. 79. [emphasis Wittgenstein's] 
274 Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, p. 165. In Mario~ p. 83. 
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meaningfully of a judgment regarding all elements of a wholly-given set, universally 
quantified arithmetical propositions purporting to extend over an infinite domain are 
without meaning as judgments since demonstrating that such a proposition is the case is 
in principle impossible. It is at best a hypothetical proposition that makes a hypothetical 
claim rather than a judging assertion or statement. Similarly for Hilbert, propositions that 
purport to range over infinitely many numbers and to enclose infinitely many numerical 
equations are of a fundamentally different sort from finite elementary propositions and 
can be considered at best hypothetical judgments to which the law of contradiction, the 
law of the excluded middle and the possibility of negation do not apply. Frank Ramsey, 
similarly, distinguishes general propositions involving finite domains and concretely 
given objects from general propositions with open-ended domains which he calls 
'variable hypotheticals' .215 
Wittgenstein's conception of an operations-based, rather than a class-based, 
mathematics is radical; but Wittgenstein did not recognize at the time he constructed the 
Tractatus just how radical a class-eschewing approach would have to be. The Tractalus 
is founded on what Wittgenstein later recognizes to be a fundamental presupposition, 
itself grounded in a class-based prejudice, that there is a solitary formal language to 
which all other meaningful discourse can be reduced. He comes to realize his attempt to 
215 Marion, pp. 84-94. 
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impose a rigid pre-assumed template on language and the world is doomed to reveal 
nothing more than his rigid presupposition imposes on language. 
During what is called his middle period, Wittgenstein explores the more radical 
implications of the rejection of overarching classes. This shift, again, can be viewed in 
terms of its correlates in mathematical theory. Marion quotes Georg Henrik von Wright 
reporting from a 1939 conversation with Wittgenstein that ''the biggest mistake he had 
made in the Tractatus was that he had identified general propositions with infinite 
conjunctions or disjunctions of singular propositions". 276 The new approach of separating 
the two Marion calls 'fmitism'. The separation, critical for Wittgenstein, was of equal 
importance to Hilbert. For Hilbert, 
... the sentential operators had to be truth-functional, so they could 
intelligibly apply only to propositions with determinate truth-conditions. 
Since Hilbert recognized that only justification conditions and not 
determinate truth-conditions can be associated with general propositions 
involving unrestricted quantification, he thought that not only the Law of 
the Excluded Middle but also the whole calculus of truth-functions fails to 
apply to infinitary propositions. 277 
ln Wittgenstein's presentation of the finitist position following his conversion from his 
views of the Tractatus, generality involving unrestricted quantification is taken to be 
276 Georg Henrik von Wright, "Wittgenstein's Views on Probability", 
Wittgenstein et le Prohleme d'une Philosophie de Ia Science (Paris: CNRS, 1971), p. 123. 
In Marion, p. 85. 
277 Marion, p. 90. (emphasis Marion's; omission mine] 
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inductive and hypothetical rather than assertorial, and therefore not of the form \rlx F(x). 
Furthermore, since inductive statements are not proper statements, they cannot be 
negated, ''the consequence of which being that the whole calculus of truth-functions does 
not apply - such propositions are neither true nor false - since the sentential operators, 
being truth-functional, could apply only to propositions with determinate truth-
conditions" .278 
Inductive or recursive proofs, in contrast to the other proofs of mathematics 
(namely, the algebraic proofs), serve as templates (otherwise called schemas or laws) for 
the construction of equations. Given a free-variable formula F, its inductive proof 
involves replacing the functions ofF with numerals and proceeding with the calculation 
to produce a variable-free formula. The inductive proof ofF is transformed into a proof 
of a given instance ofF. By continuing this process to produce a sequence of 
conditionals, the analyst is indirectly disclosing what the inductive proof is asserting 
about its generality but cannot directly state. In Marion's words, with reference to 
Wittgenstein's statements in Philosophical Remar/cs and the Tractatus, respectively: 
In order to extract the philosophical content of the notion of template, 
Wittgenstein asked: 'To what extent, now, can we call such a guide to 
proofs the proof of a general proposition?' (PR, § 164), and his answer 
was, in an application of the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing' 
(TLP, 4.121-4.1212), that the template does not assert its generality, but 
271 Marion, p. 97. 
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shows it, in that it ~allows us to see an infinite possibility' .... 279 
In Wittgenstein's words: "Its generality doesn't lie in itself, but in the possibility of its 
correct application. And for that it has to keep on having recourse to the induction. 09280 
While such proofs can demonstrate their generality without our being able 
properly to state that fact, what we also cannot state with respect to these templates is 
their negation. Wittgenstein writes in Philosophical Remarks that one cannot imagine 
what it would be for 7 to be divisible by 3 into a whole number without remainder, and 
this is not because of an incapacity of imagination but rather because the negation of such 
an arithmetical phrase is a groundless grammatical fabrication rather than an empirical 
proposition. Language cannot properly express the negations of such phrases. In other 
words, since the function cannot be negated, we do not have a clear sense of the function 
itself.211 
Wittgenstein's conception of the limitations offmitude on arithmetical 
propositions is encapsulated in the view that generalities purporting to articulate infinite 
lists are expressed functionally in terms of how one can arrive at particular solutions, not 
279 Marion, p. 99. (emphasis and parentheses Marion's; omission mine] 
210 Philosophical Remarks, § 168. In Marion, p. 100. 
211 Marion, pp. 100-101. 
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conceptually as abstract wholes. A generality can therefore be set out in a proof structure 
such as [f(1), f(~), f(~ +I)] since it is the articulation of a step-by-step process for arriving 
at particular solutions; but it cannot be expressed or asserted as a variable sign such as 
(x).fr since to put it thus would be to presume to describe a generality that cannot be 
described but can only be shown through more indirect means. Only with respect to finite 
collections of numbers can one talk about quantifying 'all' of them using a phrase such as 
Vx Fx.112 
Critical to Wittgenstein's shift away from the theses of the Tractatus is his 
recognition of difficulties with his conception of statements of degree. Marion argues 
Wittgenstein evidendy fust begins his move away from the theses of the Tractatus in 
1929 by doubting the completeness of its truth-functional logic, particularly as had been 
laid out in proposition 6 of the Tractatus. 283 He contends Wittgenstein is led to make this 
move upon recognizing the incapacity of truth-functional logic to account for the fact that 
a point in the visual field cannot have two colours at the same time. Truth-functional 
logic, as articulated in the Tractatus, fails to account for the nonsensicality of the 
conjunction 'xis red' and 'xis green' since the conjunction of two true statements in the 
logic of the Tractatus is taken to be true when experience tells us the conjunction is 
282 Marion, pp. 103-104. 
283 Marion, p. 110. 
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actually and necessarily false. Thereby, Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that 
statements of degree are unanalyzable. They are not concatenations of complex 
propositions composed of elementary propositions by means of truth-functional 
operators. Otherwise, it would be meaningful to speak of adding reds of one degree to 
produce another, or of an object of one length being two objects of lesser lengths when in 
fact it is one new object. 2114 
Since statements of degree are unanalyzable, therefore numbers must be part of 
elementary propositions. Citing Wittgenstein's essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form" 
as proof, Marion concludes this is 
a fairly obvious consequence of the fact that so-called 'statements of 
degree' are not analysable further: since such statements cannot be broken 
into further more elementary propositions, the multiplicity of the 
phenomena will not be captured by the use of the conjunction ... and the 
proposition attributing a given degree will have to be elementary. In 
particular, it will have to contain in itself the same multiplicity as that of 
the given degree, and the use of numbers (e.g. to give the values of 
coordinates) seems necessary for the expression of that multiplicity. 215 
The conclusion that numbers must be part of elementary propositions is one that 
undermines the fundamental assertion of the Tractatus that elementary propositions are 
2114 Marion, pp. 120-121. 
215 Marion, pp. 122-123. 
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logically independent of one another. 286 Marion contends this shift is the key movement 
in Wittgenstein's abandonment of the Tractatus in favour of ordinary language 
philosophy, and Marion characterizes the shift by quoting the words of D. Stem: 
At first, [Wittgenstein] retained the Tractarian conviction that language is 
grounded on reference to objects. which he now identified with the 
contents of experience. This project of analysing the structure of the 
experientially given is briefly articulated in the paper "Some Remarks on 
Logical Form". At this point, in the early months of 1929, he conceived of 
the project as a matter of articulating a "phenomenological language", a 
language for the description of immediate experience. Later that year, he 
gave up the idea that philosophy ought to start from a description of the 
immediately given, motivated by the conviction that philosophy must 
begin with the language that we ordinarily speak. 217 
The shift is a profound one. What Wittgenstein starts with in the Tractatus is a 
basic assumption at the root of analysis: that there are simple objects which are named 
pictorially by simple names or symbols. The natures of the simple objects and simple 
names are not given. They are simply assumed to be the case and are designated, 
respectively, by letters x, y, z and p. q, r. This is the minimal assumption about fonn that 
is needed to get the analysis going. Elementary propositions, then, are the simplest 
naming symbols for the objects of experience; and the mutual independence of the 
elementary propositions is taken as given. But what Wittgenstein moves towards, after 
the Tractatus has been published, is the radically different assumption that propositions 
216 Marion, p. 113. 
217 D. Stem, ''The 'Middle Wittgenstein': From Logical Atomism to Practical 
Holism", Synthese, 87 (1991), pp. 203-226. In Marion, p. 113n. 
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that appear to be of the same kind in fact have nothing in common. The fundamental 
assumption of common simple form is rejected and abandoned. Wittgenstein himself 
characterizes this new view in a key passage, published posthumously in Wiener 
Ausgabe, i: Philosophische Bemurlcungen: 
Imagine two planes, with figures on plane I that we wish to map on plane 
II by some method of projection. It is open to us to fix a method of 
projection (such as orthogonal projection) and then to interpret the images 
on plane II according to this method of mapping. But we could also adopt 
a quite different procedure: we might for some reason lay down that the 
images on [plane 1 II should all be circles, no matter what the figures on 
plane I may be. That is, different figures on I are mapped on to II by 
different methods of projection. In order in this case to construe the 
circles in II as images, I shall have to say for each circle what method of 
projection belongs to it. But the mere fact that a figure is represented on II 
as a circle will say nothing. - It is like this with reality if we map it onto 
subject-predicate propositions. The fact that we use subject-predicate 
propositions is only a matter of our notation; the subject-predicate form 
does not in itself amount to a logical form and is the way of expressing 
countless fundamentally different logical forms, like the circles on plane 
II. The forms of the propositions: "The clock is round', 'The man is tall', 
'The patch is red', "The picture is pretty', have nothing in common.213 
In other words, if the strictures of our notation impose too much on that which is being 
described in order to make the descriptions conform to an artificial predetermined form, 
they will diston what they pretend to capture; and this is the criticism Wittgenstein comes 
to level against his own Tractatus. The pictorial subject-predicate form of propositions is 
not fundamental. The fact that it is possible to describe a room by equations in terms of 
288 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wiener Ausgabe, i: Philosophische Bemurlcungen, 
(Vienna: Springer, 1994), p. 63. In Marion, pp. 115-116. [parentheses in the quote; 
brackets mine 1 
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the distribution of colour on the surface without reference to relations among noun-named 
objects is proof that the subject-predicate fonn (or, put another way, the function-
argument relational fonn) of propositions is not the underlying fonn. The underlying 
fonn, Marion concludes, is the logic of equations. 219 
In grounding numbers in elementary propositions and abandoning the notion of 
their logical independence, Wittgenstein is abandoning his project of reducing arithmetic 
to logical operations since truth-functional logic is no longer fundamental to arithmetic. 
He turns to an alternative, concluding that general arithmetical propositions - that is, 
propositions with a quantifier ranging over the natural numbers, commonly of the fonn 
'Vx F(x)- can be correctly expressed, not as statements, but only by means of induction. In 
this way, Wittgenstein - during his transitional phase between the Tractatus and his later 
period- comes to view 'hypotheses' as "those operations by means of which 
constructions could take place in language outside the scope oftruth-functionallogic".290 
His task, in searching for a more comprehensive syntax and a logically perfect language, 
becomes a supplementary - "in a certain sense a posteriori"' - analysis of the phenomena 
of ordinary language themselves: a "phenomenology" of logical possibility. 291 
219 Marion, pp. 115-119. 
~ Marion,pp. 122-123. 
291 Marion, pp. 124-126. 
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Wittgenstein uses the term 'phanomenologische Farbenlehre' 292, which translates as a 
'chromatic phenomenology' or a 'colour-taught phenomenology', no doubt referring to 
the failure of truth-functional logic to account for the contradictoriness of combined 
propositions regarding the colour of discrete points. The notation of such a 
phenomenology must express the entire multiplicity of possibilities while excluding 
impossibilities. In the ideal language, it should be impossible to state that which is 
nonsensical. 293 
Wittgenstein' s phenomenology Marion sees expressed most succinctly in a 
collection ofWittgenstein's lecture notes: 
A hypothesis goes beyond immediate experience. 
A proposition does not. 
Propositions are true or false. 
Hypotheses work or don't work. 
A hypothesis is a law for constructing propositions, and the propositions 
are instances of this law. If they are true (veritied), the hypothesis works; 
if they are not true, the hypothesis does not work. Or we may say that a 
hypothesis constructs expectations which are expressed in propositions 
and can be verified or falsified. 294 
Since a hypothesis of one form can range over an infinitude of possibilities, there is no 
292 Marion, p. 126 and 126n. 
293 Marion, p. 128. 
294 Wittgenstein 's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932, from the notes of J. King and 
D. Lee (Oxford: BlackweU, 1980), p. 110. In Marion, p. 129. [parentheses in the quote] 
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sense in which we can close in on its definitive veritability in all possible circumstances; 
and truth (verification) in respect of such hypotheses is therefore of a different sort from 
truth as it regards truth-functional statements. These hypotheses Wittgcnstein labels 
~Gesetze zur Bildung von Erwartungen', which translates as 'laws for forming 
expectations' .295 Hypotheses themselves can be neither true nor false, but only inductive 
applications expressed as particular phenomenological assertions can be judged true or 
false. 
Marion here summarizes how Wittgenstein has lost his faith in his project of 
discovering the logical form or fonns of elementary phenomenological propositions, and 
the consequences of this loss of faith. In place of the relationship between elementary 
and complex propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein now has a relationship between 
the assertions of phenomenological language and the hypotheses of physical language. It 
is the phenomenological assertions that can be verified or otherwise, while the hypotheses 
are merely laws in accordance with which assertions can be formed. All language, 
whether phenomenological assertions or hypotheses, is articulated physically and is part 
of the physical world: it is not a metaphenomenon somehow outside the world. 
Phenomenological assertions which purport to capture the world of experience 
themselves are played out in physical time, as is the process of verification applied to 
295 Philosophical Remarks,§ 228. In Marion, p. 131. 
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them. Time, therefore, is a factor in the description - in the assertions of 
phenomenological language • of immediate experience. Language, like physical life, 
streams out temporally, and the project of capturing the immediate instant of experience 
is therefore corrupted by the fact that language must stretch out beyond that which it 
seeks to capture. The physical theretbre has priority over the phenomenological since the 
process of capturing the latter is subordinate to the former. This realization leads 
Wittgenstein to conclude "[t]he assumption that a phenomenological language is possible 
and that only it would say what we must express in philosophy is - I believe • absurd"296• 
Wittgenstein comes to realize phenomenological language is not a legitimate fonn of 
expression midway between science and logic. The attempt to set up such a language is 
therefore a futile project since there are no logical forms of elementary, 
phenomenological propositions awaiting discovery. 297 "(T]here is no such thing as a 
language whose grammar is detennined by immediate experience. "291 
In abandoning the search for the ideal phenomenological language, Wittgenstein 
296 Ludwig Wittgenste~ Wiener Ausgabe, ii: Philosophische Betrachtungen, 
Philosophische Bemerlcungen (Vienna: Springer, 1994), p. 102. In Marion, p. 140. 
[brackets mine] 
297 Marion, pp. 128-141. 
291 Marion, p. 143. This conclusion Marion attributes to Alva Noe, 
"Wittgenste~ Phenomenology and What it Makes Sense to Say'', Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 54 (1994), pp. 24-25. [brackets mine] 
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shifts his focus to ordinary language to determine what its use shows about the limits of 
what can be said. Marion here inserts two quotes from Wittgenstein' s work which 
express well the nature and implications of the shift in focus. 
I used to believe that there was the everyday language that we all usually 
spoke and a primary language that expressed what we really knew, namely 
phenomena I also spoke of a frrst system and a second system. Now I 
wish to explain why I do not adhere to that conception any more. I think 
that essentially we have only one language, and that is our everyday 
language. We need not invent a new language, provided we rid it of the 
obscurities that lie hidden in it. Our language is completely in order, as 
long as we are clear about what it symbolizes. Languages other than the 
ordinary ones are also valuable in so far as they show us what they have in 
common.299 
I do not now have phenomenological language, or 'primary language' as I 
used to call it, in mind as a goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All 
that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is 
inessential in our language .... if we so to speak describe the class of 
languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what 
is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate 
experience. Each time I say that, instead of such and such a 
representation, you could also use this other one, we take further steps 
towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented. A 
recognition of what is essential and what is inessential in our language if it 
is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels 
turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological 
language. 300 
In shifting focus from the search for a special privileged language of immediate 
experience to a comprehensive ordinary language, Wittgenstein opens up the space in 
299 Waismann, pp. 45-46. In Marion, p. 142. 
300 Philosophical Remarks,§ 1. In Marion, p. 142. [emphasis in the quote; 
omission mine] 
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which his philosophy moves beyond this transitional phase. The key difference between 
a hypothesis and a proposition that purports to assert something about immediate 
experience is nothing other than the way in which the words are used. A statement of one 
form can be turned into a statement of the other kind through a simple manipulation that 
shifts the way the statement is used in ordinary language. Granted there remains a 
difference between the various ways of speaking: not the difference he previously thought 
obtained, but a difference nonetheless. The task of his later work, then, is to articulate the 
way words and statements are used in the various kinds of language, to determine the 
regularities that make the various kinds of language what they are. It remains the case 
that there are statements which purport to be assertions and which are analyzed in truth-
functional terms, but more fundamental than these are the norms which allow a statement 
to be an assertion or to be some other form of discourse. When he abandons the notion 
that there is a language of immediate experience, reliance on the hypothetical statements 
of induction as an approximation to an ideal language is abandoned in favour of a 
consideration of the many ways in which various kinds of language really do work. 
Wittgenstein seems to be realizing his search for the ideal language has been imposing 
something artificial on language when what his project should have been is to learn 
without prejudice what the various kinds of language are teaching. 301 What is 
fundamental is not the rules that make the various forms of language what they are and 
301 Marion, pp. 142-146. 
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permit one to define the ideal rule-abiding language, but rather that there are various 
forms of language in the first place: "rules are not constitutive of language-games; rather, 
it is the language-games that are prior to rules"302• 
To describe where Wittgenstein ends up, it is a radical anti-Platonist standpoint 
where one must be vigilant against assuming the a-priority of that which is being shown. 
The method of showing - of proving - not only must define that which is being proven but 
must withdraw from assuming its existence already since to do so is to go beyond what 
can properly be thought or said. This is because existence itself cannot be taken to have a 
priori status. As Wittgenstein puts it in attacking intuitionism, it is not merely that: 
'Every existence proof must contain a construction of what it proves the 
existence of.' You can only say •J won't call anything an ''existence 
proof'' unless it contains such a construction'. The mistake lies in 
pretending to possess a clear concept of existence .... We have no concept 
of existence independent of our concept of an existence proof. 303 
One deals with possibilities: not empirical possibilities, but grammatical ones. Marion 
states: 
[T]his is how one should understand the 'grammatical' infinite according 
to Wittgenstein: an expression ending with the words •and so on' does not 
point towards a possibility waiting to be realized (an empirical possibility) 
but shows a possibility of the symbolism, i.e. it does not forbid us to 
302 Marion, p. 157. 
303 Philosophical Grammar, p. 374. In Marion, p. 174. [emphasis Wittgenstein's; 
omission mine] 
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continue.... Wittgenstein is here not very far from his earlier distinction 
between 'saying' and 'showing'. A rule does not assert that it is infinite; 
it is not a statement about an infmite extension. Rather, it shows it by 
allowing us to 'see an infinite possibility' .304 
Wittgenstein is serious about the groundlessness of extensionality, and therefore refuses 
to accept the a-priority of what is being described or the a-priority of the relative validity 
of the language being used to describe it. He is reduced to a very radical kind of 
empiricism in which even defining the approach is subject to the rigours of intensionality 
in which process takes precedence over result and operations take precedence over 
classes. 
Dummett points out, however, that Wittgenstein does not end up at the extreme of 
subjective idealism such that the individual creates the world. Rather, Dummett posits 
between the radical Platonist and the radical constructivist an intermediate position 
according to which we picture "objects springing into being in response to our probing. 
We do not malce the objects but must accept them as we find them"305• Wittgenstein 
would likely have difficulty responding to Dummett's assertion in this regard inasmuch as 
Wittgenstein's constructivist position leaves him unable to characterize the way the world 
is prior to or independent of his apprehension of it. For him to engage in such a debate 
304 Marion, p. 181. [emphasis and parentheses Marion's; brackets and omission 
mine] 
305 Dummett, p. 134. [emphasis Dummett's] 
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would be for him to sink back into the very conversation he has tried to reject in writing 
the Tractatus. Grante~ Dummett is careful to step away from this characterization of 
Wittgenstein's position, calling it a "picture" rather than an ontology. 
In conclusion with respect to the evolution ofWittgenstein's position as 
epitomized by his changing conception of mathematics, Wittgenstein - in rejecting classes 
- is left with a dilemma: he cannot help but employ language in carrying out his work, yet 
the language he is forced to use is wrought with class-based extensional prejudices and 
presumptions which obscure the very points he is trying to make. Words conjure up 
phantoms and imbue them with a status that, on critical reflection, cannot be grounded. 
Wittgenstein's initial approach to his project is to define philosophy operationally, 
allowing strict truth-functional analysis to demonstrate through its activity that about 
reality which cannot be stated directly. But Wittgenstein comes to doubt that all language 
can be bound by the operations he defines, and fears he is imposing on language a rigid 
constraint instead of learning from language how it works. From beginning to end, 
Wittgenstein's project takes the fonn of a corrective on extension-based classism. What 
language can teach is at most how it works, not the independent reality of what it is 
talking about. Language creates the world, but there are nonns about how it does this in 
various ways. The task of philosophy, then, is to learn how ordinary language ordinarily 
works and to let the way in which it works - i.e., its self-manifestation through the action 
of articulation - demonstrate how it functions. Therefore, while the role of language is to 
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'say', the focus of the philosopher is not on what is being 'said' but rather on what is 
being 'shown' by the various ways in which this 'saying' occurs. 
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Chapter VI • Conclusion: 
How What What Wittgensteia Doesa 't Say Says 
Shows What What Wittgeasteia Says Doesa 't Say 
We have seen in the second section of this presentation that Wittgenstein's intent 
in writing the Tractatus is to foster a corrective activity to purge from philosophy and 
science in general the language of metaphysics and to ensure the propositions of natural 
science are articulated clearly in such a way that their truth can readily be detennined 
through truth-functional analysis. Clearly, Wittgenstein does not intend that his Tractatus 
should replace the metaphysical language it seeks to clear away, not because what he is 
writing is no better than what it replaces but because the whole point of the Tractatus is 
to foster an activity, not to foster discussion about the grounding of that activity. One 
who truly understands what the Tractatus is attempting to say will recognize the 
Tractatus itself cannot properly become a subject of discourse; and, as a corollary to that, 
one who makes the Tractatus the subject of discourse betrays a lack of understanding of 
its intent. In this way, the Tractatus is akin to the grounding of the religious fervour of 
the zealot or the meditational activity of the mystic in the sense that it can point to but not 
circumscribe the activity it engenders. To put it poetically, kicking away this ladder after 
ascending it means nothing other than that the point of ascending a ladder is not to 
contemplate the ladder but rather to get to where one is going. We have seen that the 
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Tractatus, like a Zen koan, gets in the way of one who seeks to understand its message 
because it seems to tolerate a deep contradiction by asserting in the form of a meaningful 
pronouncement a blanket denial that its pronouncements are meaningful. Inasmuch as it 
seems to engender a contradiction, the Tractatus leaves itself open to both criticism and 
reinterpretations, and it is these criticisms and reinterpretation that are addressed, 
respectively, in the third and fourth sections of this presentation. 
We have seen in the third section that Wittgenstein cannot easily dismiss the 
implications of statements he makes and later denies when he kicks away the proverbial 
ladder, the chief of those implications being that his work either falls into self-
contradictory nonsense or becomes the very kind of philosophy it is a corrective against. 
However, neither can we pretend Wittgenstein is not serious when he sets aside the ladder 
and calls his own words 'nonsense'. We have to take Wittgenstein at his word when he 
says the message of the work can be known to be true and seen to be efficaciousness even 
though its presentation is nonsensical. In this way, we recognize what is articulated 
despite his not wanting to say it without embracing that which is articulated as if it is not 
denied. By tolerating his work as a kind of myth about what already shows itself to those 
who have thought the thoughts he is expressing, we counter Gellner's criticism that the 
work demonstrates nothing and reject Feibleman's suggestion that Wittgenstein embraces 
the very metaphysical language, qua metaphysical language, that he later rejects. While 
Gellner is right that Wittgenstein and the logical positivists are operating within a 
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privileged circle when dismissing as meaningless all language that does not correspond to 
their preordained specifications and Feibleman is right as well that they nevertheless 
violate their own specifications by utilizing class-based language that can only be 
described as having second-storey metaphysical implications~ yet something is shown, if 
not said directly, by the silencing of the Tractatus at its penultimate proposition; and what 
is shown arguably is not what Gellner and Feibleman conclude is shown. 
It is no doubt because ofWittgenstein's obtuseness on the issue of self-
contradictoriness that many have sought to reinterpret his work in light of other 
approaches to philosophy: the Kantian critique, phenomenology and semiotics. We have 
seen in the fourth section that there are great dangers in reading into Wittgenstein' s work 
things that not only are not there to begin with but are expressly rejected in the work. 
While the Tractatus appears to reproduce certain aspects of Kant's critique of pure reason 
as a critique of language, particularly in the Copernican revolution it undertakes to focus 
on the propositional instead of the empirical, it also seems clear Wittgenstein rejects key 
moves in the Kantian critique by abandoning the synthetic a priori, embracing a more 
context-dependent notion of necessity and employing a notion of reference that wholly 
rejects the transcendental standpoint. While others infer Husserl ~ s phenomenological 
influence from Wittgenstein's use of an ante-logical architecture of logical fonns, a 
nonsense-senselessness distinction, a state-of-affairs-versus-positive-facts distinction and 
an epoche with intentional-intended noemic-noetic poles, we have seen how 
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Wittgenstein's denial of reflexivity prevents the activity of reconciliation that is integral 
to phenomenology. While the Tractatus also bears a resemblance to semiotical discourse 
inasmuch as it points to a universal transformational grammar, it has been noted the 
analytical movement Wittgenstein employs is a gapless dyadic relation rather than the 
triadic relation semiotical theory demands. 
While the Tractatus evidently does not survive on the terms prescribed by these 
other analysts, the question remains whether the Tractatus stands on its own terms. 
Wittgenstein himself concludes that it does not. We have seen in the fifth section how a 
mathematical interpretation of Wittgenstein' s project allows the reader to follow 
Wittgenstein in his evolution towards a new approach that, while abandoning certain 
positions of the Tractatus, nevertheless can be seen as a sort of radical completion of the 
enterprise. There is a sense in which the movement is an inevitable completion of his 
initial task rather than a repentance. Here we see how his denial of metaphysical 
discourse translates, mathematically, into the embrace of operations over class-based 
preordained formulas. We cannot forget that the Tractatus is set out from the beginning 
as the artistic rendition of a kind of apotheosis. One can never say what philosophy is: 
one can only do it. About what one is doing and the logical form that grounds this 
activity, one must be silent. The operation, then, is always something one does and never 
something one talks about doing, for the second-order description is completely other 
than the doing and completely groundless in its own right. Talking about doing is not 
l6j 
only a different kind of doing from the doing about which one is talking but, moreover, a 
doing that gets nothing done. 
The movement through which Wittgenstein, in his mathematical evolution, goes 
can be described as the radical fulfillment of his statement at section 6.1233 of the 
Tractatus that "( w ]e can imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid. 
But it is clear that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world is really of 
this kind or not79306• Wittgenstein expands on this point in the following section: 
The logical propositions describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather 
they present it. They "treat" of nothing. They presuppose that names have 
meaning, and that elementary propositions have sense. And this is their 
connexion with the world. It is clear that it must show something about 
the world that certain combinations of symbols - which essentially have a 
definite character- are tautologies. Herein lies the decisive point. We 
said that in the symbols which we use something is arbitrary, something 
not. In logic only this expresses: but this means that in logic it is not we 
who express, by means of signs, what we want, but in logic the nature of 
the essentially necessary signs itself asserts. That is to say, if we know the 
logical syntax of any sign language, then all the propositions of logic are 
already given. 307 
In other words, the medium is the message; and the medium is nothing static but an 
activity. This is Kronecker's anti-Platonist constructivist mathematics working itself out: 
never meaning or representing but always doing and, in doing, showing how necessity 
3()6 Tractatus, section 6.1233. [brackets mine] 
307 Tractatus, section 6.124. 
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works itself out. On one aspect of mathematics after another - succession, generality, 
identity, equivalence and quantification - Wittgenstein shows how an operational 
presentation can account for the activity without reference to classes. 
Following through on the radical implications of constructivism, Wittgenstein 
comes to realize that even the privileged position of logico-mathematical discourse is 
grounded in an untenable prejudice. He comes to recognize mathematics is but one of 
many fabricated languages in the world whose activity shows the workings of the world. 
Once he recognizes (as does Rorty) that, in Marion's words, ''only justification conditions 
and not determinate truth-conditions can be associated with general propositions 
involving unrestricted quantitication"301, the stage is set for him to conclude that 
statements of degree are unanalyzable, numbers are part of elementary propositions, 
elementary propositions are not independent of one another, and measures to fit 
propositions into a rigidly perfect universal code are artificial and fatally distortional. 
Language still shows, through its operations, how the world is; but there is no particular 
privileged language to undertake this showing. Rather, one must give each different 
ordinary language game its due. His project not only remains therapeutic rather than 
didactic but indeed abandons the last vestige of didactics by relinquishing any hold, even 
a deceptively tentative one, on the possibility of a pure and perfect transformational 
301 Marion, p. 90. 
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discourse. 
Ironically, it is in correcting the inadequate critiques of the Tractatus that the 
efficacy of Wittgenstein' s project manifests itself; for the Tractatus is just as effective in 
countering Wittgenstein's critics as it is in correcting the excesses of the philosophers 
who went before him. Addressing the criticisms by stripping away the meaningless 
excesses of their talk is a demonstration of what Wittgenstein views as philosophy's 
appropriate activity. It is a manifestation that what what Wittgenstein doesn't say says 
does indeed show what what Wittgenstein says doesn't say. The act of showing is the act 
of actively silencing critics whose criticisms are grounded in metaphysical systems 
Wittgenstein rejects. 
Unfortunately for Wittgenstein's project, however, it is only from within the 
perspective he adopts that one can view his critics' express views as merely perspectival 
manifestations of language games in operation. It is only from the perspective of 
Wittgenstein' s anti-standpoint position that his countercriticisms of his critics are 
effective; for surely within their systems, his criticisms are as meaningless as his critics' 
seem from his. Gellner has a point that there is something unsettling and unsatisfying 
about an approach that silences critics instead of debating them on common ground; but, 
then again, Wittgenstein has a point when he implies it is for metaphysicians to justify 
why the grounded position should be the default in the first place. When Wittgenstein 
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proffers no counter-ground but rejects the very notion of ground, silence becomes not so 
much an effective philosophical strategy as a diplomatic one, for there is clearly little 
point in debating metaphysics with those who approach the debate from this perspective. 
To the philosopher within the metaphysical tradition, Wittgenstein may look very much 
to be adhering with religious faith and fervour to a nonrational mystical position as 
grounded in prejudice as metaphysical discourse appears to be from the Wittgensteinian 
position. It leaves Wittgenstein vulnerable to the charge that his allegedly 
presuppositionless neutral position is beyond the grasp of reason and outside what is 
ordinarily taken to be philosophy. Since Wittgenstein would have to agree that there are 
no longer any meaningful philosophical propositions to utter, philosophy's authentic 
activity for him must be considered to be an activity whose measure is entirely in the eyes 
of the acolyte and whose learning occurs entirely through epiphany. That is, of course, 
precisely how Wittgenstein described his project in the opening lines of the Preface to the 
Tractatus: "not a text-book" but a book that ·~n perhaps only be understood by those 
who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it"309• 
309 Tractatus, p. 27. 
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